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Abstract
Scheduling Routine: An Analysis of the Spatio-Temporal Rhythms o f Practice in Everyday Life
Stanley John Blue, B.A., M.A., Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D, Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, July 2013.
This thesis is concerned w ith  the relationship between social action and social change in 
'everyday' life. I position my argument in contrast to  lay and academic re-presentations of 
action tha t maintain a distinction between subject and object, between action and change and 
between being and becoming. I argue fo r a 'practice-approach' that considers action, or 
practice, not as performance or entity; but instead attempts to  capture the presencing o f 
social action by concentrating on 'practice as event' and 'practice in the moment o f doing'. 
This serves to locate 'knowledges' and 'subjectivities' firm ly w ith in  the realm o f the material 
and bodily actions o f doing, and thus in the continually changing 'w orld ' o f practice. I 
therefore develop an understanding o f change as a fundamental and ongoing property of 
tem porally and spatially situated practice. To support these theoretical claims I employ a 
rhythmanalytical methodological approach, studying my own experiences o f rhythms of 
practice at five empirical sites, including resistance training, ashtanga yoga, stock car racing, 
computer gaming and mixed martial arts. Analysis o f my own engagement in these rhythms 
(including immersive participant observations and in depth interviews w ith fe llow  participants), 
from  a theoretical-methodological position that recognises practice as change, leads me to 
argue tha t the re-production of 'moments' o f practice, depends on the scheduling o f practice 
as routine or nonroutine. So understood, I argue that the scheduling of 'moments' o f practice 
as routine requires 'training' to  develop sufficient 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', 
'syncopation' w ith in  the polyrhythmia o f 'everyday' life and the absence o f 'arrhythm ia' or 
nonroutine 'moments' o f practice, in shaping the rhythms o f practice in 'everyday' life. My 
research contributes to  a distinct ontology o f practice that re-evaluates the notion of 'change'
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Preface
With your feet in the air and your head on the ground, you can try this trick and spin it... (Francis)
Perhaps somewhat dangerously, I would like to  preface this text by paraphrasing one o f my 
favourite  authors:
Nothing o f me is 'original'; I am the combined e ffo rt o f everyone I have ever met,
every book I have ever read and every experience I have ever had. (Adapted from
Palahniuk 2000)
This sentim ent at once sets up the theoretical and methodological position o f this thesis and 
at the same tim e re-presents the concluding argument regarding the becoming-ness o f social 
being. In order to  remain consistent w ith  the conclusion o f this thesis tha t social change is not 
separate from  social action, it is necessary to  take up a particular theoretical-methodological 
position tha t recognises the situated-ness and becoming-ness o f the researcher. However, in 
order to  take up such a theoretical-methodological position requires an understanding that 
social action, or practice, as it is described in this thesis, is ipso facto  change.
In the preface to  Difference and Repetition ([1969] 1994), Deleuze writes tha t it is often said 
tha t prefaces should be read only at the end, whilst conversely, the conclusion should be read 
at the outset. Whilst this suggestion may well be true of this thesis, it has nevertheless been 
organised in a traditionally linear fashion, first setting up a theoretical framework, before 
outlining a methodological position and then building an argument through the remaining 
chapters towards a supported conclusion. However, the argument presented in this text is, in 
many ways, a circular one. That is to  say tha t the theoretical and methodological positions that 
are taken up in this thesis cannot be fu lly appreciated until the reader accepts the conclusion, 
tha t presents the built up and supported argument that in turn calls fo r such a theoretical and
methodological position. Here, I only seek to  make clear the underpinning theoretical 
suggestion tha t structures the w riting  o f the text, w ithou t giving any recourse as to  where to  
start or where to  finish. I leave it in the capable hands o f the reader to  dissect as he or she 
sees fit.
However, this theoretical underpinning has significant implications, which should be noted at 
the outset, in particular regarding the status o f the contribution tha t this thesis makes to  the 
fie ld o f social theory. Understanding being as becoming, doing as difference, or as this thesis 
argues, practice as change, requires a re-framing o f our 'everyday' understanding o f the 
'orig inal' and the 'new '. Nothing o f this thesis is 'original'. In keeping w ith  the conceptual 
argument, it is rather a distinct combination o f my own questions, experiences and theoretical 
enframings. Having said that, this thesis contributes and develops four particular concepts fo r 
social theory and 'theories o f practice', they are: 'the world o f practice', 'embodied- 
knowledge-in-practice', 'practice as event' and 'practice in the moment o f doing'. These 
concepts are positioned and extended throughout this thesis, w ith in  a thoroughly defined 
ontological framework. This fram ework supports a second contribution, by providing a distinct 
methodology fo r studying rhythms o f practice, through a unique empirical study of a 
combination o f five sites o f rhythms o f practice. Finally, the thesis contributes suggestions for 
implementing this ontological fram ework towards shaping rhythms o f practice and scheduling 
routine. None o f these contributions are 'original', fixed entity-1 \ke-things, void o f histories and 
geographies, separate from change and from  the 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' o f this 
researcher-writer. Instead they are re-productions, repetitions o f 'moments' o f practice, o f 
ideas tha t produce the same; but in producing the same, they also produce difference. They 
are, then, a d istinct set o f contributions made up o f a particular set o f rhythms o f practice, of 
experiences, thoughts and conversations.
The approach to 'theories o f practice' and social theory detailed in w hat follows does not 
require standing 'everyday' thinking about social action and social change on its head, rather 
it requires a leap, or better, a dance, into another way o f thinking about 'agency', about 
'knowledge' and about change. I do not claim to  describe the correct and only way to 
approach this field o f enquiry; I instead try  to  offer an alternative set o f ideas tha t can be 
taken out fo r a spin, taken up in the dancing, so tha t in dancing they m ight be re-produced 
again in a distinct combination, already d ifferent.
XI
Introduction: Towards a Shift in 
(Self-) Understanding
... 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed — the deed is everything. (Nietzsche)
Scheduling Routine
This thesis takes up the methodological and theoretical challenge set by Henri Lefebvre in 
Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life ([1992] 2004), namely, to  make the present 
presence, to  turn  every-thing  into presences. That is, to  resist the reification and 
commodification o f doing as it is re-presented by the subjects and objects o f social action in 
the mediatised 'everyday'. As such, this study investigates how to understand the relationship 
between social action and social change w ithou t resorting to  re-presenting doing through an 
identity tha t is present, tha t is, as 'a practice'. Instead it seeks to  capture the 'm om ent' o f 
practice in its presencing and to  conceptualise how 'moments' o f practice become repeated 
and become different. I show in this text tha t the re-production o f 'moments' o f practice can 
be argued to be dependent on the ir characterisation as routine or nonroutine.
It is in this sense that the title  o f this thesis Scheduling Routine points to  a dual usage o f the 
word 'routine '. Most often, in this combination, 'routine ' is heard as a noun, as a thing  tha t is 
made up o f a linear and repetitive series o f actions or 'practices' usually belonging to 
someone or some kind o f entity. This thesis is indeed concerned w ith  the making and breaking 
o f routine-as-a-noun; but significantly wants to  challenge both 'everyday' understandings of 
the temporal organisations o f what people do and sophisticated academic understandings of 
the shaping o f rhythms o f practice, by pointing to  the possibility o f a shift in understanding 
away from  considering routines-as-things tha t belong to  'selves' and away from  'selves' as 
captured and organised by routines. Thus I suggest tha t we can pay close attention to  the
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sense o f 'routine ' as an adjective, as a quality o f 'm oments' o f practice tha t allow them or 
deny them  the opportunity to  be re-produced.
In this way, I acknowledge the fie ld o f study and the political aspirations fo r shaping what 
people do; but significantly I set my analysis apart from  those who seek to  explain how social 
action becomes organised through an explanation o f the ordering o f 'practices' across 'tim e ' 
and 'space' in a bid to  schedule routines. Rather, I shift my attention to understanding how it 
is tha t 'moments' o f practice become scheduled as routine, tha t is as repeatable and 
'everyday'. This requires not only a focused study o f the material, bodily, spatially and 
tem porally situated 'm om ent' o f practice; but also o f the mechanisms o f repetition and 
difference  tha t are ongoing w ith in  the co-ordinated and synchronised 'polyrhythm ia' o f 
rhythms o f practice in 'everyday' life.
In order to  fu rther introduce this topic, I go on now to  briefly outline the field o f study of 
'theories o f practice' both w ith in  which and against which this thesis positions its arguments. 
From this positioning I frame my research questions and go on to  suggest why these questions 
require study w ith in the rhythms o f practice in 'everyday' life. Finally, I o ffer some words on 
what these questions (thus framed and explored through this particular site o f study) allow me 
to  do and outline the distinct contributions o f this thesis before detailing an outline o f the 
fo llow ing chapters in this text.
Theories of Practice
W hat have come to  be labelled as 'theories o f practice', w ith in  both the realms o f social 
theory and philosophy, have sought to  attend to  these concerns: to  move beyond problematic 
and dualistic ways o f thinking, to  bridge the gap between individual 'agency' and social 
structure and to  understand the routine-ness and embodied-ness o f social action and how it
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changes. The histories and geographies o f 'theories of practice' can be traced (though not at 
all as a singular or linear progression) through the writings o f authors such as Bourdieu, 
Foucault, Heidegger, W ittgenstein and Marx, to  argue tha t the relationship between social 
action and social change cannot be understood solely through the experience o f the individual, 
nor solely through the existence o f any form  o f social to ta lity, but only through considering 
'social practices' (Giddens 1984, 2). Indeed such a heavy emphasis has been placed on 'social 
practices', tha t Schatzki et al. suggested in 2001 that there has been a 'practice tu rn ' in 
contemporary theory:
"In social theory, consequently, practice approaches promulgate a distinct social 
ontology: the social is a field o f embodied, materially interwoven practices centrally 
organized around shared practical understandings. This conception contrasts w ith  
accounts tha t privilege individuals, (inter) actions, language, signifying systems, the life 
world, institutions /  roles, structures, or systems in defining the social." (Schatzki 2001, 
3)
This 'social ontology' may well be distinct from  certain strains o f intellectualism, 
intersubjectivism, various individualisms, structuralism, system theory, semiotics and so on; 
but the turn towards 'practice theory' as a unifying and holistic solution to  age old and critical 
fractures in social theory, has seen this ontology taken up by all manner o f writers, from  all 
manner o f academic backgrounds, in addressing all kinds o f questions and has thus led to  the 
'bleeding' in and out o f the central concerns o f 'practice theorists' into fu rther disciplines and 
fu rthe r systems o f thought. Thus, Schatzki comments: "Varied references to  practices await 
the contemporary academician in diverse disciplines, from  philosophy, cultural theory, and 
history to  sociology, anthropology, and science and technology studies." (Schatzki 2001, 1) 
This diversity o f approaches to  'theories of practice' is not in itself problematic and is surely an 
accolade that should be celebrated as successfully encouraging "a shifted self-understanding..."
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(Reckwitz 2002, 259) to  a wide variety o f disciplines. However, what does become problematic, 
or at least in my view, takes away from  the strength o f the concept o f practice (as at the same 
tim e underlining both subject and object, structure and 'agency' and 'm ind ' and body) is the 
merging o f concepts o f practice w ith  concepts from  cognitive psychology tha t see 'practices' 
as the outcomes of motivated desires or decisions (for examples see Lizardo 2009; Vaisey 2008) 
or the coming together o f understandings from  'Science and Technology Studies' w ith  notions 
from  'theories o f practice' tha t recognise 'practices' as outcomes o f structured networks 
negotiated by the relationship between human and nonhuman actors (for examples see Law 
1986; Mol 2002). That is to  say, there is a danger that the notion o f practice could lose its 
theoretical 'punching' power and potential fo r achieving the above described aims of 
reconciling subjectivity and objectivity by becoming diluted by established frameworks, the 
foundations o f which are already firm ly built on such theoretical divides.
It is in this sense tha t I argue that practice driven theoretical accounts o f social action can 
maintain the ir power only if we take the notion o f practice both back to  and go beyond its 
theoretical roots. In particular, I argue tha t it is necessary to  take seriously Heidegger's notion 
o f 'being-in-the-world' as described in Being and Time ([1927] 1962) and to  go one step 
fu rthe r and recognise the temporally and spatially situated-ness and becoming-ness of 
'practice in the moment o f doing'.
In Chapter Four I o ffer a thorough account o f my concept o f 'practice as event' as distinct from 
practice understood as performance or entity. However it w ill be necessary to  outline this 
theoretical approach here in order to  frame my core research questions and methodological 
approach.
In an early text, Social Practices: A W ittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social 
(1996), Theodore Schatzki made a distinction between practice as 'performance' and practice 
as 'en tity ', a distinction which has since become the theoretical and methodological
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underpinning o f the m ajority o f studies in this field. This theoretical claim offers a 
sophisticated and subtle distinction between recognising 'practices' as 'performances' tha t 
people do and as 'entities ' tha t can be mapped across 'space' and 'tim e '. Whilst this 
theoretical distinction is a far cry from the socio-technical ordering o f 'practices' or the 
individualistic motivations required to  do certain actions, it nevertheless maintains a thing- 
ification  o f doing so tha t it can be recognised as a provisionally stable entity, which I argue 
opens the door fo r fu rthe r systems o f thought to  introduce the notion o f 'practices' as entities, 
w ithou t tru ly  considering the implications o f a move beyond subjectivity and objectivity, 
structure and 'agency' and so on.
For example, Alan Warde has studied consumption as an outcome o f 'practices' as performed 
by practitioners motivated by desire fo r intrinsic reward:
"Judgements o f performance are made internally w ith  respect to  the goals and 
aspirations o f the practice itse lf and proficiency and com m itm ent deliver satisfaction 
and self-esteem." (Warde 2005,148, emphasis added.)
In this analysis o f practice, doing becomes reified as an objective entity whose performance is 
dependent on the 'internal-goods' and 'self-esteem' of the subjective practitioner. Whilst this 
distinction between subject and object tha t defines and organises 'agency' and structure is in 
itse lf problematic, we also find in fu rther analyses tha t these positions are also reversed. For 
example, Reckwitz defin ition of 'a practice' as an objective entity is often invoked in writings 
on 'theories o f practice'. He writes:
"A 'practice' (Praktik) is a routinized type o f behaviour which consists o f several 
elements, interconnected to  one other: forms o f bodily activities, forms o f mental 
activities, 'things' and the ir use, a background knowledge in the form  o f understanding, 
know-how, states o f emotion and motivational knowledge." (Reckwitz 2002, 249)
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In this form ulation o f practice as entity, the 'm om ent' o f doing is excluded and becomes re­
presented as a thing  tha t exists across 'space' and 'tim e '. 'Practice' becomes understood as a 
subject tha t is carried by people-as-objects as opposed to  Warde's (above) analysis, as an 
object tha t is performed by subject-people:
"The single individual -  as a bodily and mental agent - then acts as the 'carrier' (Trager)
o f a practice -  and, in fact, o f many d ifferent practices..." (250)
The distinction between practice as performance and entity  goes some way to  offer fresh 
insight into the sociological analyses o f what people do. However, I contend tha t it is possible 
to  go one step further, by firs t taking a step back, in order to  reconcile the subject and object 
o f social action. This depends on not making this distinction between performance and entity 
and instead coming to  recognise doing as always both spatially and temporally situated and 
becoming as 'practice in the moment o f doing' and as 'practice as event'. It is w ith  this 
theoretical fram ework tha t it is possible to  ask d ifferent kinds o f questions, to  employ 
d ifferen t kinds o f methodologies and arrive at a d ifferent kind o f social ontology tha t more 
thoroughly fu lfils the cry tha t draws academics and policy makers towards 'theories o f 
practice': to  move beyond problematic dualisms and free social action from over-determined 
structures and individually motivated 'agencies'.
Framing Research Questions
The theoretical turn towards 'practice as event' and 'practice in the moment o f doing', as 
suggested in this text, requires fram ing the questions asked in this research in a particular way. 
However, this thesis does not re-present only a theoretically driven account o f social action. 
Indeed asking questions in such a way, as described below, also necessitates a methodological 
re-framing. As I suggest in the preface to  this text my theoretical analyses o f 'practice as event'
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and 'practice in the moment o f doing' support the decision to  locate my sites o f enquiry as 
sites o f doing at the level o f the 'everyday'. Such a methodological approach thus requires a 
theoretical analysis tha t can make sense o f doing, tha t is, practice, in its happening like quality.
It is clear then, tha t not only what questions are asked; but also how these questions are 
framed is extremely im portant fo r the types o f analyses and answers tha t w ill result.
For example, Alan Warde's suggestion that: "'W hy do people do what they do?' and 'how do 
they do those things in the way that they do?' are perhaps the key sociological questions 
concerning practices..." (2005, 140) presents a particular theoretical frame tha t clearly 
separates "people" from  "w hat they do" and establishes people-as-subjects who perform 
practices-as-entities. Moreover, the asking o f "w hy" already presupposes a linear and causal 
relationship between people and what they do and necessarily points the field o f enquiry in 
the direction o f intrinsic internal or external factors as motivators o f individuals' actions.
In an interesting reversal o f this framing, Shove and Pantzar ask: "how practices-as-entities are 
made and reproduced by the ir carriers?" and "how  do practices capture and retain the 
resources and energies of active practitioners on whom the ir survival depends?" (2007, 155). 
Again this positioning separates people-as-objects who are caught by practices-as-subjects, 
emphasising practice as a provisionally stable entity and suggesting an approach that requires 
an investigation o f both the intrinsic components and extrinsic forces tha t come to  constitute 
'a practice'. Instead o f framing questions in such a way that they come to re-present doing, or 
'practice-as-a-th/ng', I seek to  position my own research questions in order to  capture the 
happening like quality o f doing, free from  the subjects and objects o f action. Immediately this 
seems to  be perhaps unsafe ground or an approach that m ight yield minimal 'u tility ' in terms 
o f recommendations fo r action, as our 'everyday' approach to social action has to  be put to 
one side in favour of an approach tha t necessarily recognises the actions of the researcher or 
anyone who would wish to  'use' this research as similarly void of a simplistic conception of
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'agency'. However, this should not prevent us from  considering the notion o f practice from a 
d iffe ren t angle.
W ith this in mind, I frame the research questions o f this study, as described at the beginning of 
this chapter, as those o f understanding how practice becomes characterised as routine or 
nonroutine and how rhythms o f practice m ight be shaped. Specifically, I ask:
•  How can practice be conceptualised w ithou t resorting to  re-presentations o f the 
subjects and objects o f social action?
•  W hat would such a conceptualisation mean fo r the study o f doing in social life?
•  How does conceptualising practice in this way frame the relationship between social 
action and social change?
•  Finally, understood in this way, is it possible to  schedule practice as routine or 
otherwise and how might this be achieved?
Framed in this way, these questions help establish and develop my distinct contribution not 
only to  the fie ld o f 'theories o f practice' but to  the field o f social theory more generally. W hat 
is particular and distinct about this contribution is outlined in the section below; but firs t it is 
necessary to  explore the significance and the importance o f re-thinking the scheduling of 
routine practice and the shaping o f rhythms of practice in 'everyday' life.
Rhythms of Practice in Everyday Life
In order to  address the research questions framed above, it is necessary to  find both a site of 
analysis and methodological approach tha t is consistent w ith  the thesis tha t practice is 
understood as 'event' and in the 'm om ent' o f doing . 1 1 thus turn to  an analysis o f the rhythms
1 Of course the tem poral and spatial aspects of doing must be understood together, I deal with them  
separately in Chapter Four and Chapter Five in order to dem onstrate that they go together.
o f 'everyday' life as proposed by Henri Lefebvre in Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday 
Life ([1992] 2004). In this book Lefebvre seeks to  found a 'new science' tha t can both study 
and capture the presence o f doing w ithou t resorting to  the re-presentation and th ing-ification  
o f doing through subjects and objects:
"The analysis does not isolate an object, or a subject, or a relation. It seeks to  grasp a
moving..." (Lefebvre [1992] 2004,12)
This 'moving' is the 'm om ent' o f practice, repeated and made d ifferent in its returning, in its 
rhythm, in its doing. In order to  capture moving, or doing in its presence, void from  re­
presentation, Lefebvre, as in much o f his work, sites his analysis in 'everyday' life, in the 
repetition o f routine and nonroutine 'moments' o f practice . 2 Critically though, fo r Lefebvre, 
'everyday' life is not just where we can analyse routine practice, im portantly it is also the 
terra in o f struggle. It is where the rhythmanalyst can both listen to  the rhythms o f the 
'everyday' and where doing can be made to  presence; but it is also where the rhythmanalyst 
can intervene in the 'everyday' to  shape rhythms and contribute to  the art o f living. It is w ith  
these ambitions in mind that I go on to  fu rthe r describe what it means to  approach questions 
from  a rhythmanalytical perspective and indeed as I go on in the rest o f this thesis to  build 
towards an argument tha t suggests it is possible to  restore 'moving' to  re-presentation, by 
providing an analysis o f social action tha t resists re-presentation and to  come back to  the 
'everyday', to  schedule routine and to  shape rhythms o f practice by making the present 
presence.
Significantly then, when Lefebvre refers to  the 'everyday', he does not simply mean habitual, 
routine and day to  day ordinary life (although this is an im portant part o f the concept of 
'everyday'); rather he means something more particular. In this thesis, I take up this particular 
sense o f the 'everyday' in my analysis o f the spatio-temporal rhythms o f 'everyday' life as
2 See the three volumes on Critique o f Everyday Life (Lefebvre 2002).
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argued by Lefebvre and others described below. In detail, the 'everyday' is not just a 'natural' 
concept tha t expresses the ordinary-ness and routine nature o f living; but it is a description of 
the commodification o f ways o f living tha t has made human life come to  be experienced as 
dull, mundane and 'everyday'. Therefore, whilst the English translation o f la vie quotidienne is 
usually 'everyday life ', we must bear in mind that, fo r Lefebvre, it retains tw o  im portant senses: 
first, 'everyday', (quotidian ) suggests the commodification o f ways o f living and second, 
'everydayness' [quotidiennete) refers to  the repetition o f daily life (Elden 2004, 112). Both 
these senses are required to understand Lefebvre's contention tha t linear rhythms o f modern 
technological and industrial production have come to  dominate cyclical rhythms o f the 
becoming-ness o f social being. This is not, as some readers take it, a crude distinction between 
objective (linear) and repetitive (cyclical) 'tim e '. Both are rhythms, both are repetitions o f the 
same tha t produce difference, and fundamentally, they constantly interfere w ith  and 
reciprocate each other. Rather, the difference between linear and cyclical rhythms, denotes 
the difference between a mechanistic repetition o f modern labour and continual industrial 
production o f 'progress' and a repetition based on the rhythm ic and becoming nature o f the 
lived, o f the body and o f the cosmos.3
Thus Lefebvre is responding to the growth o f capitalism and its domination o f all areas of 
social life. In particular he builds on Marx' concept o f alienation, o f the worker's alienation 
from  his work and thus, the rest o f social life. However, Marx' analysis focuses on the 
alienation o f the economic sphere from  the rest o f social life and does not examine in detail 
the experience o f alienation across other spheres o f social life. For Lefebvre, capitalism grows 
in the tw entie th  century to  dominate both the cultural and social spheres, in effect coming to 
produce 'everyday' life -  la vie quotidienne. It is the banal, repetitive and alienated 'everyday'
3 O f course 'tim e' itself becomes commodified and re-presented as 'scientific' or 'objective' tim e as a 
result of the dominance of linear rhythms; but this does not make the distinction between linear and 
cyclical rhythms one of a distinction between objective and subjective 'tim e'. Lefebvre has a d ifferent 
notion of 'tim e' in mind -  see Chapters Five and Six.
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tha t this study seeks to  investigate. This notion o f 'everyday' life is very similar to  Lukacs and 
Heidegger's notion o f 'everydayness' (Alltaglichkeit). For Lukacs (1971), capitalism prevents 
the realisation o f a more thoroughly lived life and instead produces a triv ia l life characterised 
by comm odity fetishism and a mechanical existence. So too in Being and Time ([1927] 1962), 
Heidegger contrasts the inauthenticity o f modern 'everydayness' w ith  an authentic way o f 
being which he claims cannot be revealed in the current mechanical and capitalistic way of 
thinking.
Indeed this is why Lefebvre often refers to  the 'everyday' as mediatised, because he 
understands presence, that is doing and I w ill argue, practice, as having been commodified, re­
presented and made into a thing  tha t is present. He writes:
"W e must ceaselessly come back to  this distinction (opposition) between presence and 
present: it takes a long time to prepare the tria l (process) [process (processus)]. The 
already marked difference links back to  the philosophical and socio-political critique o f the 
image, o f mediation (mediatisation), o f time, o f all representation. The present simulates 
presence and introduces simulation (the simulacrum) into social practice. The present 
(representation) furnishes and occupies time, simulating and dissimulating the living. 
Imagery has replaced in the modern the sacralisation o f time and its occupation by rites 
and solemnised gestures; it succeeds in fabricating, introducing and making accepted the 
everyday. A skilfully utilised and technicised form  o f mythification (simplification), it 
resembles the real and presence as a photo o f photographed people: it resembles but it 
has neither depth, nor breadth, nor flesh. Yet the image, as the present, takes care of 
ideology: it contains it and masks it. Presence is here (and not up there or over there).
W ith  presence there is dialogue, the use o f time, speech and action. W ith the present, 
which is there, there is only exchange and the acceptance o f exchange, o f the 
displacement (of the self and the other) by a product, by a simulacrum. The present is a
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fact and an effect o f commerce, while presence situates itself in the poetic: value, creation, 
situation in the world and not only in the relations o f exchange." (Lefebvre [1992] 2004, 47)
Thus, Lefebvre's critique o f 'everyday' life is a radical and suspicious questioning o f industrial 
and technological society tha t investigates the overlaying o f technical linear rhythms over lived 
cyclical rhythms by introducing, re-presentation, tha t is mediatisation and commodification, 
into social practice.
However, unlike Heidegger's undervaluing o f the 'everyday' as 'inauthentic' and o f his 
understanding o f 'au thentic ity ' as being unable to  be revealed to  us in this epoch, Lefebvre 
argues tha t whilst the 'everyday' is both alienated and banal, it is at the same tim e the very 
ground out o f which people can experience 'moments' o f presence and 'authenticity '. Thus, in 
Lefebvre, the 'everyday' is not only produced by capitalist and mechanical linear rhythms; but 
it  is also the site o f struggle, both fo r the individual and the social theorist, where the present 
can be made to  presence through an 'overcoming' o f re-presentation and mediatisation:
"The act o f rhythmanalysis [le geste rythm analytique] transforms everything into 
presences, including the present, grasped and perceived as such. The act [geste] does 
not imprison itself in the ideology o f the thing. It perceives the thing  in the proxim ity 
o f the present, an instance of the present, just as the image is another instance. Thus 
the thing makes itself present but not presence. On the contrary, the act of 
rhythmanalysis integrates these things -  this wall, this table, these trees -  in a 
dramatic becoming, in an ensemble fu ll o f meaning, transform ing them no longer into 
diverse things but into presences." (23)
By adopting a rhythmanalytic approach to  analysing the spatio-temporal rhythms o f practice in 
'everyday' life, I propose to reject systems o f thought tha t deal in things, in re-presentations 
and entities. Instead I intend to  make the rhythms of practice presence, to  capture them in
12
the ir doing, in order to  contribute an alternative theoretical frame and methodological 
approach to  understanding the relationship between social action and social change.
A Distinct Contribution
In fram ing its central research topic in this way this thesis sets itself apart from  other 'theories 
o f practice' and aligns itself w ith  authors and texts whose more primary concerns have been in 
studying the relationship between being and becoming. In so doing, I contribute a distinct 
ontology o f social action and social change to the field o f 'theories o f practice' and to  social 
theory more generally. However, this ontological approach necessarily rejects, or at the very 
least has to  re-frame the notion o f an 'original' contribution, as outlined in the requirements 
fo r a doctoral thesis. As I suggested in the preface to  this thesis, the idea o f an 'original' is 
sealed firm ly in the realm of commodification and re-presentation and stands in stark contrast 
and contradiction to  understanding change as a fundamental property of practice, o f being as 
becoming and o f difference produced through repetition, tha t I argue fo r here. To understand 
som e-thing  as 'original' implies a particular understanding of the 'new' as a stable and fixed 
entity tha t is separated from  other entities through difference as the negation o f identity. I 
position my argument to  the contrary, suggesting that there are neither 'new' nor 'original' 
things; but that difference is constituted by return, by repetition o f the same. That is to  say, 
that, as I argue in chapters four, five and six, tha t doing is not separate from change, rather, 
practice is ipso fac to  change. Therefore, to  maintain a consistency between the ontological 
fram ework presented in this thesis, and my own 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' (which are 
in no way separate), I continue now to re-frame what is 'original' about my contribution by 
outlining what is different about this argument, and what it contributes to  the field o f social 
theory.
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First and forem ost I contribute four significant and intim ately related concepts: 'the world o f 
practice', 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', 'practice as event' and 'practice in the moment 
o f doing'. 'Practice as event' and 'practice in the mom ent o f doing' refer to  the spatial and 
tem poral situated-ness o f practice respectively. Of course neither sense can be taken w ithou t 
the other; but I deal w ith  them separately in Chapter Four and Chapter Five in order to  bridge 
the gap from  our 'everyday' understandings o f things tha t exist in 'tim e ' and 'space', towards 
an ontology tha t can recognise the "becoming space o f tim e and the becoming tim e o f space..." 
(Hagglund 2008, 2). I precede discussions o f these tw o concepts by situating subjectivities and 
'knowledges' firm ly w ith in  the material and bodily realm of practice, through a discussion of 
'the world o f practice' in Chapter Two and 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' in Chapter Three.
Further to  these four concepts, I also contribute in this thesis a distinct methodological 
fram ework that complements and reinforces the above theoretical claims. Detailed in the 
fo llow ing chapter, this research does not distinguish between the rhythms o f research and the 
rhythms o f participation in order to  remain consistent w ith  the theoretical suggestion that 
seeks to  make the present presence. In this way, it would be impossible to  re-present this 
theoretical account through a positivistic methodology. Thus, I present a unique combination 
o f ideas brought to  light through a distinct combination o f my own rhythms o f practice.
Thirdly and finally I contribute both to  social theories seeking to  understand the relationship 
between social action and social change a distinct and alternative social ontology, a set o f 
concepts, frames, tools and methods that is fu lly oriented to  understanding the rhythms of 
practice in 'everyday' life. In providing this fram ework I also suggest in Chapter Six, how 
rhythms o f practice m ight be shaped and how routine might be scheduled through three 
example conceptual tools: 'arrhythm ia', 'tra ining' and 'syncopation'. These ideas contribute 
the conceptual weapons tha t social theorists, policy makers and people in 'everyday' life can
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use to  th ink about practice in a d ifferent way and potentia lly 'overcome' routine rhythms o f 
practice by making practice presence in the 'everyday'.
Thesis Outline
From here I go on in the first chapter to  put forward a methodological approach to  studying 
doing, tha t is both capable o f capturing 'practice in the mom ent o f doing' and tha t remains 
consistent w ith  the argument presented in this thesis tha t 'knowledge' is not external to  
practice. Therefore, I critique more traditional approaches tha t seek to  deal w ith  and 
accommodate the binary relationship between researcher and respondent, between subject 
and object, in efforts to  come closer to  the 'tru th ' o f tha t object o f study and instead o ffer an 
interpretative position that recognises my role in this study as fu lly historically and 
geographically situated w ithin both the rhythms o f research and in the rhythms o f practice. In 
particular I argue tha t this position can be best understood through an understanding of 
Lefebvre's outlin ing of the 'rhythmanalyst', who does not need to "jump in and out o f 
observed bodies" (Lefebvre [1992] 2004, 20); but rather uses her own rhythms and her own 
experiences to  listen to  and in terpret the 'polyrhythm ia' o f that 'world '. It is w ith  this 
approach tha t I continue in the fo llow ing five chapters to  draw out five d ifferent studies of 
rhythms o f practice, the specific details and justifications o f which are described w ith in  each 
chapter. Nevertheless, it is im portant to  note that in order to  make the present presence by 
taking up the position o f the rhythmanalyst, as suggested by Lefebvre, requires an 
understanding o f theory and method as inseparable. That is to  say that this theoretical 
approach both informs the study o f my own rhythms o f practice and at the same tim e is also 
developed through and drawn from my empirical experiences. Thus, whilst each empirical site 
o f resistance training, ashtanga yoga, stock car racing, computer gaming and mixed martial 
arts has its own story and plays its own role in conjunction w ith others, none of these
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empirical sites were explicitly 'chosen' as objects o f study; but rather the discussions tha t I am 
able to  facilitate in this text were only able to  be re-presented in the way tha t they have been 
both through and w ith  my experiences o f these rhythms o f practice.
Chapter Two presents an analysis of the rhythms o f resistance training to  begin to  provide the 
basis fo r the theoretical ontology suggested in this text. In particular it begins by taking a step 
back from  already given frameworks that separate the subject and object o f action, in order to  
th ink through M artin Heidegger's discussion in Being and Time ([1927] 1962) and consider the 
'w o rld ' o f practical activity, the 'w orld ' o f practice. In this chapter, I contrast this discussion 
w ith  arguments from  'Science and Technology Studies' tha t are more readily concerned w ith 
the relationship between humans and nonhumans and the distributions o f 'agencies' across 
networks o f entities as constituting 'practices'. Rather than studying subjects, objects or 
relations, I turn firs t to  Heidegger's analysis o f Dasein and then to  the notion o f 'being-in-the- 
w orld ' to  argue that people cannot separate themselves from  the network o f equipment 
w ith in  which they are always involved amid practical activity. Thus rather than studying the 
relationship between resistance training practitioners and the weights and the other 
equipm ent in the gym, I suggest that we can turn our attention towards the 'w orld ' o f that 
practice as a site o f analysis.
Recognising practice as 'world ly', as doing, I go on in Chapter Three to  detail what I have called 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' through a discussion o f the rhythms o f practice o f ashtanga 
yoga. In this chapter I first position an understanding of the 'lived body', as described by 
Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology o f Perception ([1945] 1962), not as separated between 
'm ind ' and body; but rather remaining consistent w ith Heidegger's analysis o f 'being-in-the- 
w orld ', as the site o f all possible and potential action. I contrast these theoretical building 
blocks w ith  arguments from other systems of thought tha t distinguish between body-subjects 
and body-objects in order to  explain how 'knowledge' about 'practice' is passed between
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practitioners. Instead I draw on Lave and Wenger's (1991) argument tha t 'knowledge-in- 
practice' is always fu lly  embodied to  propose my concept o f 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' 
tha t brings together both the notion o f the 'lived body' and 'knowledge-in-practice'. Finally in 
this chapter I show how, fo llow ing Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1988), we can understand 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' as providing the conditions, the very site fo r assemblages o f 
bodies and things tha t make up the 'w orld ' o f practice in its event.
Chapter Four examines the rhythms of stock car racing, particularly on race day, to  both draw 
out and illustrate an alternative approach to  'theories o f practice' tha t focuses on 'practice as 
event'. In particular, I first contrast this idea w ith  'theories o f practice' which seek to 
distinguish between practice as performance and entity. I then build on the suggestions made 
in the previous tw o chapters regarding 'the world o f practice' and 'embodied-knowledge-in- 
practice', relating these to  a discussion of Allan Pred's (1990) understanding o f the spatially 
and tem porally situated-ness and becoming-ness of social practice. Of course the spatial and 
temporal senses o f 'practice as event' cannot be separated, however I distinguish between the 
notions o f 'practice as event' in this chapter and 'practice in the moment of doing' in the 
fo llow ing chapter in order to  o ffer a contrast to  systems of thought, tha t indeed take this 
singular thought separately. As such, I tu rn  at the end o f Chapter Four to  contrast my 
understanding o f 'practice as event' w ith  Theodore Schatzki's argument in The Timespace o f 
Human Activity  (2010) in which he provides a most sophisticated account o f the distinction 
between performance and entity. Here I argue tha t Schatzki's separation o f 'being-in' and 
'w orld ' as performance and entity  deny him the opportunity to  move beyond a re­
presentation o f the subjects and objects o f social action and to consider a move towards 
thinking about the situated-ness and becoming-ness of social practice.
In Chapter Five I propose understanding the temporal quality o f 'practice as event' (which 
again, in no way can be separated from  its spatial quality) through a concept derived from  an
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analysis o f the rhythms o f computer gaming, 'practice in the moment o f doing'. I begin w ith  
the observation tha t both computer gamers and computer games designers make a distinction 
between subjective (experienced) 'tim e ' and objective (scientific) 'tim e '. I trace this 
understanding o f 'tim e ' back through various social theories to  demonstrate tha t even 
sophisticated 'theories of practice' tha t explicitly deal w ith  the tem pora lity o f 'practice' are 
built on a re-presentation o f 'tim e ' as linear and objective. I suggest tha t instead, practice can 
be understood 'in the moment o f doing' and turn to  Nietzsche's account, in Thus Spake 
Zarathustra  ([1883-85] 1961), o f 'eternal return' to  more fu lly explore the ramifications of 
understanding the spatially and temporally situated-ness and becoming-ness of practice on 
the relationship between social action and social change. I argue then, tha t fo llow ing Deleuze 
([1969] 1994), rather than considering change, or difference as the negation o f identity, o f a 
practice-as-entity, tha t we can instead consider change as a fundamental property o f practice. 
That is to  say tha t doing is change.
Finally in Chapter Six, I offer three conceptual tools fo r potentially shaping the continually 
changing rhythms o f practice: 'arrhythm ia', 'tra ining' and 'syncopation'. These ideas are born 
out o f and illustrated from  a study o f the rhythms of mixed martial arts. To begin this chapter I 
firs t draw out how the returning o f 'moments' o f practice can be understood to constitute 
difference, through an understanding of rhythms a la Lefebvre. I then argue tha t it is possible 
to  shape the constantly changing rhythms of practice by inducing breaks in rhythms of practice, 
by repeating and drilling certain rhythms and by placing emphasis on or highlighting certain 
rhythms so that they come to  'fall in' as routine. These conceptual tools are explained w ith 
examples from  the rhythms o f mixed martial arts practice.
In sum, this thesis w ill argue tha t it is possible to  schedule routine, through the study o f an 
ontological fram ework that resists the re-presentation o f the subjects and objects o f social 
action. By considering the relationship between social action and social change as described in
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this thesis, by recognising 'practice as event' and 'in the moment o f doing', I claim tha t it is 
possible fo r social theorists, policy makers and people in 'everyday' life to  make the present 
presence through the act o f rhythmanalysis, to  break certain rhythms o f practice and to  
strengthen 'eurhythm ic' rhythms o f practice and in the long term  come back to  and shape the 
spatio-temporal rhythms o f 'everyday' life.
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Chapter One: Studying Doing
The rhythmanalyst will not be obliged to jump from the inside to the outside of observed bodies; he should come to 
listen to them as a whole and unify them by taking his own rhythms as a reference: by integrating the outside with 
the inside and vice versa. (Lefebvre)
Introduction
Given the theoretical fram ework suggested in the introduction to  this thesis, this research 
requires a methodological approach tha t can necessarily account fo r an 'overcoming7 o f the 
subject /  object divide. Further, the research methodology needs to  remain consistent w ith  
the argument made in this thesis tha t rejects the notion o f 'knowledge7 as an external object 
and instead recognises it as 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice7. In this sense we can 
immediately suggest tha t just as the distinction between the subject and object o f action is a 
re-presentation, so too is the idea tha t theory and method are separate. Whilst this chapter 
puts forward the study o f one particular research methodology fo r studying practice in its 
presencing, it should be noted, tha t o f course, other 'theories o f practice7 that understand the 
notion o f practice d ifferently, from  as it is proposed in this text, require d ifferent 
methodological approaches. My point is that these methods must remain consistent to  their 
theoretical conceptualisation o f 'practice7. Thus, if one subscribes to  the claim that 'knowledge7 
is not an external object; but is in fact an embodied and continually changing part o f practice, 
then one must also acknowledge tha t this very research is a study o f my own 'embodied- 
knowledge-in-practice7, thing-ified, commodified and re-presented as a part o f the ongoing 
'w orld7 and rhythms o f academic practice.
Critically then, this understanding o f 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice7, stands in stark 
contrast to  traditional and contemporary studies of social life that recognise a distinction 
between researcher and respondent, between subject and object and between theory and 
method. Instead of seeking to maintain a critical and reflexive distance from my object of
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study, or resist any a ttem pt to  'go native', I recognise my position as already w ith in  the 
'polyrhythm ia' o f 'everyday' life, w hether tha t is w ith in  rhythms o f practice tha t I am already a 
part of, or beginning a peripheral participation in rhythms tha t I have less experience of. In 
order to  make this argument, it w ill firs t be necessary to  outline how 'theories o f practice' and 
social science more w idely has attended to  the 'u tility ' o f particular research methodologies. 
In particular I refer to  Russell Hitchings' (2012) article tha t suggests tha t 'People Can Talk 
about the ir Practices' and Bourdieu's (1999) chapter entitled simply, 'Understanding', in order 
to  highlight tha t social science research methods continue to  maintain a distinction between 
talking and doing, between the cognitive and the embodied and between the researcher and 
the respondent. In response to this I then fo llow  an argument made by Cerwonka and Malkki 
in the ir insightful tex t Improvising Theory (2007), tha t recognises the historically and 
geographically situated position o f study as necessarily both participant and researcher. I 
argue then tha t this position can be more fu lly appreciated by taking up the suggestions made 
by Lefebvre in Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life ([1992] 2004), towards a 
methodology o f the rhythmanalyst. Finally, I suggest tha t this approach necessarily requires 
situating in the 'polyrhythm ia' o f the 'everyday', rather than in a longitudinal or historical 
study. In summary I refer to  LoTc Wacquant's (2004) immersive and detailed study o f his 
training in a boxing gym to provide both a model on which this research is based, but also a 
springboard from  which this study wishes to  go beyond traditional social scientific 
methodologies, tha t is, beyond immersive participant observations such as Wacquant's, in 
order to  recognise and study my own 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', my own rhythms of 
practice, so tha t the gap between the conceptual and the empirical, between the thinking of 
the researcher and the practice of the respondent can be more thoroughly scrutinised.
Talking About Practice
There remains w ith in  'theories of practice' as well as w ith in  w ider social scientific literature a 
concern regarding how to  study what people do. In a recent article Russell Hitchings (2012) 
asks the question: can people talk about the ir 'practices'? He suggests tha t more recent 
studies o f 'practices' have moved away from  utilising the interview as a key methodology for 
obtaining 'knowledge' about what people do, regarding them as offering only a re­
presentation o f doing because they occur after the fact and therefore can only provide a 
washed out account o f whatever social action tha t took place. Indeed Hitchings suggests that 
many theorists have gone so far as to  dismiss the interview  as incapable o f successfully 
attending to  routine and 'unconscious' 'practices', instead choosing to experiment w ith 
d ifferent methods including videoing participants and participating in the practice whilst 
conducting interviews. However, Hitchings gives a strong defence of the 'u tility ' and 
importance o f collecting data through interviews, both through reference to  his own 
successful empirical research and through a theoretical argument o f key 'practice theorists" 
(Giddens, Reckwitz, Schatzki and Bourdieu) positions on this topic.
Hitchings firs t describes that whilst Giddens (1984) claims that routine practice is 'unconscious' 
and guided by a 'practical consciousness', tha t there is also a 'discursive consciousness' tha t is 
capable o f talking about routine practice, particularly during moments o f disruption or:
"... when otherwise routine actions are brought abruptly into consciousness by 
realising they are out o f step w ith  the w ider social scene. The act o f interviewing could 
logically achieve exactly this effect, were we only confident enough to quiz people 
about acting otherwise." (Hitchings 2012, 62)
Similarly Hitchings argues that whilst more recent incarnations o f 'social practice theory' that 
"... decentre human 'w ill' such tha t people... find themselves relegated to  a position o f being 
just those who get drawn into the reproduction of behavioural norms w ith the ir own powerful 
'teleoaffective' logics" [Schatzki] and that "paint people as the unwitting 'carriers' o f practices
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by which they have previously been infected [Reckwitz] ..." (Hitchings 2012:62), tha t this 
remains a fram ework w ithin which people amend and improvise the contextual rules tha t 
structure the ir practice. Thus:
"Like the tennis player, respondents may be preoccupied at the tim e, but still able to  
discuss how things went afterwards." (Burkitt in Hitchings 2012, 63)
Finally, Hitchings suggests tha t despite Bourdieu's (1990) view tha t practices are opaque to 
the ir practitioners, he later advocates (1999) a disposition analysis tha t recognises the 'self'- 
reflexivity o f both the researcher and the respondent tha t supports "... a sensitive form  o f self 
evaluation tha t could quite feasibly be initiated through ta lk." (Hitchings 2012, 62)
Therefore, Hitchings offers a strong defence o f the 'u tility ' o f interviews fo r studying 
'practices'. Nevertheless, this argument (and the same goes fo r all the above positions) tackles 
the question o f whether talking to  people is a 'useful' research method fo r gaining empirical 
'knowledge' about 'practices'-as-things. This enframing necessarily demarcates the subject 
and object o f research, separates talking and doing and draws a distinction between 
researcher and respondent. Thus, fo r the above social theorists, the methodological struggle 
appears to  be about closing the gap between researcher and respondent w ithout 
contaminating the evidence obtained from  the study.
Jumping From the Inside to the Outside
Indeed, the struggle over trying to  position social scientific research methodologies has been a
site o f contention and discussion fo r social theorists seeking to  understand the ir own roles and
the ir own 'knowledges' in relation to  the ir research. Quite often the desire to  reduce the
distance between researcher and respondent is born out o f a desire to  remain as unbiased
and as impartial as possible. Bourdieu deals w ith this very problem in his chapter
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'Understanding' (1999). Here he argues tha t it is necessary fo r the researcher to  recognise her 
position as being in no way neutral; but that the differences in position, capital and social 
hierarchy between researcher and respondent, w ill undoubtedly affect responses and can lead 
to  'in trusion ' on behalf o f the researcher (leading the respondent, interrupting at the 'wrong' 
times and so on), as well as m isinterpretation and misunderstanding. Bourdieu suggests, in 
this piece, tha t to  avoid these pitfalls tha t it is necessary to  "reduce as much as possible the 
symbolic violence exerted through tha t relationship." (Bourdieu 1999, 609) To achieve this it is 
necessary fo r the researcher to  be reflexive about her study and recognise the distance 
between herself and her object o f study, tha t is to  construct herself and the interview or the 
research in such a way that it minimises the symbolic violence done to the 'knowledge'-to-be- 
collected.
However, whilst it is extremely im portant (as argues Bourdieu) fo r the researcher to  have a 
keen self-awareness, it must be noted tha t the researcher can also run the risk o f not paying 
enough attention to  her subject and can end up imposing her own definitions, interpretations 
and understandings onto the respondent's answers. Bourdieu suggests tha t this can become 
particularly problematic when research seems at first glance to  be highly successful, obvious 
or 'natural':
"Paradoxically, the more successful it is and the more it leads to  an interchange that 
has every appearance of 'naturalness', the more that work is destined to  remain 
invisible (where 'natural' is equated w ith  what ordinarily happens in the ordinary 
interchanges o f everyday life)." (612)
Thus, in order to  combat this danger, Bourdieu suggests that it is necessary to  put oneself in 
the place o f the subject in order to  more thoroughly understand both practically and 
theoretically her particular social conditions and circumstances. Indeed, it is only through this
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intim ate and extensive 'knowledge' o f the subject tha t we are able to  understand the 
responses o f the subject w ithou t extrapolating and interpreting them in our own terms:
"This means tha t researchers have some chance o f being tru ly  equal to  the ir task only 
if they posess an extensive knowledge o f the subject, sometimes acquired over a 
whole lifetim e o f research..." (613)
However, whilst it is necessary to  develop an intim ate and extensive 'knowledge' o f the 
subject o f study, Bourdieu warns the prospective researcher o f becoming too close to  the 
subject, less the 'naturalness' o f common sense or 'everyday' understandings o f situations 
transpose the personal, emotional and intim ate accounts o f the respondent into the 
impersonal, general and 'everyday' sense o f the researcher:
"Although it may produce the theoretical equivalent o f the practical knowledge that 
comes from  proxim ity and fam iliarity, not even the deepest prelim inary knowledge 
could lead us to  true understanding if it were not accompanied both by an 
attentiveness to  others and a self-abnegation and openness rarely encountered in 
everyday life." (614)
Thus Bourdieu argues tha t it is both necessary to  put oneself in the place o f the subject; but 
also to  remain attentive and open to  the respondent, despite attem pting to be fam iliar in 
understanding. As such, the researcher is required to  both develop an extensive 'knowledge' 
o f her object o f study and at the same tim e maintain a sense o f reflexivity about her own 
position as researcher. As if this were not enough fo r a researcher to  contend w ith, Bourdieu 
offers one fu rthe r concern that I shall mention here, that is the 'self'-reflexivity of the 
participant. He warns tha t whilst many studies are keen to encourage participant reflexivity in 
a bid to  fu rther close the gap between respondent and researcher, between subject and 
object and in order to  come closer to  the 'tru th ' o f the matter, that, problematically,
25
respondents reflecting in 'real-tim e' during the interview, may well resist any objectifications 
made o f them:
"Certain interviews bear numerous traces o f the respondent's attempts to  master the 
constraints constrained w ithin the situation by showing tha t they are capable o f taking 
in hand the ir own objectification and o f adopting toward themselves the reflexive 
point o f view tha t is inherent in the very conception o f the research." (616)
By a ttributing  reflexivity to  the respondent, the researcher herself has to reflect on the values 
represented by the respondent who may check and adjust her responses in order to  protect 
the image tha t she presents to  the world and to  herself:
"One o f the most subtle means o f resisting objectification comes from  those 
interviewees who, playing on the ir social proxim ity to  the interviewer, try, more 
unconsciously than consciously, to  protect themselves from  it by seeming to  play 
along and attem pting to  impose, w ithout always knowing it, something akin to  self- 
analysis." (616)
Therefore, it seems tha t it is necessary fo r the researcher to  reflect on and recognise her own 
position as researcher, put herself in the place o f her subject in order to  gain an intimate 
understanding o f the subject's position, whilst remaining attentive and open to the 
respondent and at the same tim e foster a 'self' reflexivity in the participant, whilst constantly 
being on the lookout fo r any resistance to objectification. In this sense a thorough 
methodology that seeks to  understand what people do, requires a careful jumping in and out 
o f observed bodies that avoids any intrusion on the 'true ' object of 'knowledge' to  be 
collected.
According to  this reading, Hitchings is quite right to  defend the 'u tility ' o f interviewing as a 
methodology because, whilst it appears to  be a fine art, people do the ir own routine 'practices'
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and are also able to  'consciously' reflect on those 'practices' and communicate some object 
'knowledge' about them to  a researcher during an interview.
However, as set out in the introductory chapter, this thesis' theoretical fram ework 
understands practice in a d ifferent way and therefore it is necessary to  offer several criticisms 
o f the above enframing o f studying what people do. First, there is a problem w ith the idea that 
there is an object 'tru th ' to  what people do tha t can be uncovered if only all the issues 
described above could be attended to. Second there is an assumption in the above enframing 
o f this kind o f research, tha t 'conscious', reflexive talk about practice is somehow separate 
from  doing (surely the interview is itself a doing, a 'm om ent' o f practice?). Third, the entire 
negotiation o f positions relies on a distinct separation between the subject and object in the 
doing o f the interview (a theoretical and methodological fram ework tha t this thesis rejects). 
Finally, the above discussion rests on an understanding o f 'conscious'/ 'unconscious' and 'm ind' 
/  body dualisms tha t are not shared by this thesis' theoretical foundations.
Therefore, instead o f working from  a position tha t seeks to  lim it the intrusion and impact of 
the researcher on an objective 'knowledge', this research takes an interpretative position, and 
argues fo r a methodology tha t does not seek to  acquire some kind o f object 'tru th '. In the ir 
methodological reflections on an email exchange between supervisor and student conducting 
ethnographic fie ldwork Allaine Cerwonka and Liisa Malkki highlight the paradoxical 
reproduction o f positivist principles through a self-reflexive approach:
"The positivist research model encourages one to  strive fo r objectivity by erasing all 
personal influences on the research. Self-reflexivity is an approach to  research that is 
critical o f many o f the principles o f positivism (including the ambition to  achieve 
objectivity). Further it aims to attend to  the imbalance of power in the research 
encounter tha t privileges the researcher. W ith the aid o f self-reflexive strategies, 
individuals strive to  reduce the ir authority and power in the research context through
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self-awareness and sensitivity. Yet, too often such attempts in the end reproduce the 
positivist ambition o f containing polluting influences on the research (in this case, 
power) by adhering to  certain methodological principles (self-awareness rather that 
self-effacement)." (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007, 30)
To reiterate, this thesis necessarily re-frames 'tru th ' from  a positivist, or 'self'-reflexive 
strategy concerned w ith  understanding 'knowledge' as an external object tha t can be passed 
from  practitioner to  researcher, to  a conceptualisation tha t recognises 'knowledge' always as 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice'. That is to  say, tha t rather than being a lim itation, this 
research recognises the position o f the researcher as 'so-close' or even indistinguishable from 
the object o f study, as one o f its greatest strengths. Again, Cerwonka and Malkki support this 
claim:
"...[Sjocial science positivists have accorded ethnographic methods scant authority 
because the researcher is not sufficiently removed from  the "data". But the very thing 
tha t renders ethnography's knowledge claims suspicious fo r some is in fact its strength. 
The nature o f the ethnographic encounter (partic ipant observation) has prompted 
anthropologists in particular to  confront the inseparability o f the ethnographer's 
"horizon" (Gadamer) from her object o f inquiry. For this reason, ethnographic 
fie ldwork is a rich and demanding activity where questions about the relationships 
among experience, self and the alterity o f the research object are more readily 
explored than in other research practices." (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007, 30)
It is exactly in this sense that this research seeks to  understand the other-ness o f the rhythms 
of practice studied, through bringing my 'self', that is, my own built up 'embodied-knowledge- 
in-practice' to  these experiences. Whilst I did undertake interviews, I therefore conducted 
them as part o f my engagement in those rhythms of practice. They occurred whilst waiting 
outside the studio fo r a yoga class to  begin, whilst sharing an umbrella under the rain and
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standing in the mud watching the days' final 'dem olition derby' stock car race and whilst losing 
te rrib ly  at computer games. Some took place more form ally a fter intense weight lifting 
workouts or on the rest days leading up to  an im portant mixed martial arts competition. 
Several were recorded and transcribed; but many o f the most fru itfu l or insightful exchanges 
tha t helped to  develop a fu lle r 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' occurred whilst wrestling 
respondents and being wrestled by them into submission holds, whilst attending privately 
arranged extra-sessions to  practice the latest postures tha t we had been taught in our yoga 
class or whilst fighting through a gruelling cardio workout w ith  respondents in the gym. Of the 
many respondents whose reflections, 'knowledges' and actions are referred to  in order to  re­
present the argument o f these pages, some began as friends, others just as training partners, 
or friends o f friends. However, through the course o f this research through engaging in these 
various rhythms o f practice these relationship have grown in breadth and in depth, from 
introductions as far afield as specialist stock car memorabilia and heritage collectors and 
independent computer games design teams, to  intensely committed relationships and 
synchronised timetables w ith fe llow  mixed martial art training partners and 'gym buddies'.
It is only through doing these activities w ith  my fe llow  participants tha t I was able to  build up 
the sufficient (and at times insufficient) 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' to  be able to  hear, 
to  in terpre t and to  engage w ith  the anecdotes, the accounts, the movements, the doings that 
make up theses rhythms o f practice. Therefore, this research requires a methodological- 
theoretical approach tha t recognises research as producing 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', 
whilst at the same tim e re-producing it. Cerwonka and Malkki refer to  Gadamer's (1999) 
argument tha t understanding is not only a re-productive activity; but always productive as well:
"Rejecting the idea that research is an exercise in recording an objectively observable 
reality, Gadamer insists on the constructive nature o f understanding and 
interpretation. His theory o f interpretation develops an account of how understanding
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inevitably involves the concrete, historically situated personhood o f the researcher." 
(Cerwonka and Malkki 2007, 25)
Rather than considering the position o f the researcher as abstract, 'se lf-re flexive and as trying 
to  stand in and out o f the body tha t it observes and observes w ith, I instead recognise my 
position as fu lly  historically and geographically situated as both researcher and practitioner. 
Adopting this theoretical-methodological position is not simply to  acknowledge tha t I bring my 
own bias and own 'knowledge' to  any object of study; rather it is to  fundamentally recognise 
tha t my 'knowledges', questions and frames o f reference fu lly shape both my own rhythms of 
practice and the rhythms of practice o f those others involved; but also critically, tha t the 
rhythms o f practice w ith  which I am engaged in shape my 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' 
as researcher as well (i.e. my questions, frames o f reference, etc.) A final quote from 
Cerwonka and Malkki supports this position:
"To say tha t understanding is always a situated practice is not simply to  acknowledge 
tha t we always bring personal "bias" (conceptual and personal for-understandings and 
pre-judgments) to  our research. It is to  say that we always understand through a set o f 
priorities and questions tha t we bring to  the phenomenon /  object we are researching. 
While scholars might not acknowledge the elements tha t inform the ir research, the 
elements are nevertheless there, invisibly so. This point bears on the im portant 
question o f how one's personhood is also a condition fo r knowledge claims, rather 
than a deterrent to  understanding." (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007, 28)
In this way I recognise myself as fu lly implicated in this research, as the very site that the 
rhythms o f practice and the ideas that are re-presented in this thesis have come together. 
Thus, in a sense none o f the sites of these rhythms of practice have been 'chosen' by me, in 
the same way that this thesis would reject a conceptualisation o f the rational actor as simply 
'choosing' the 'practices' that make up her daily routine. Rather these sites are the products of
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my own histories and geographies, my own situated 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice'; but 
they are also the grounds out o f which the concepts tha t I re-present here, have been thought, 
grown and shaped.
Before moving on to  describe the empirical sites in more detail, I firs t tu rn  to  describe how I 
have appropriated the above ideas through the theoretical and methodological framework 
tha t underpins this entire thesis: rhythmanalysis.
The Rhythmanalyst
This research takes its methodological approach to  the analysis o f the rhythms o f 'everyday' 
life from  an interrogation and study o f the previsionary fram ework built and proposed by 
Henri Lefebvre in Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life ([1992] 2004). In this work 
Lefebvre sets out to  found a 'new science' and to  critique the process o f th ing-ification , of 
objectifying 'knowledge' and practice. He begins, in the second chapter, to  paint 'A 
Previsionary Portrait o f the Rhythmanalyst'. It is ’previsionary1, he claims, because 
explanations and analyses o f the social world remain mediatised, re-presented and full o f 
images. The portra it is to help bring into existence a theoretical and methodological 
orientation tha t can transcend re-presentation in this way. Unlike the researcher w ith whom 
Bourdieu (1999) is concerned, who is required to both put herself in the place o f the 
respondent and at the same time to remove herself to  a place o f 'self'-reflexivity; the 
rhythmanalyst, according to  Lefebvre cannot separate herself from her object o f study:
"The rhythmanalyst w ill not have these methodological obligations: rendering oneself 
passive, forgetting one's knowledge, in order to  re-present it in its entirety in the 
interpretation. He listens -  and firs t to  his body; he learns rhythms from  it, in order 
consequently to  appreciate external rhythms. His body serves him as a metronome. A
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difficu lt task and situation: to  perceive distinct rhythms distinctly, w ithou t disrupting 
them, w ithou t dislocating time. This preparatory discipline fo r the perception o f the 
outside world borders on pathology yet avoids it because it is methodical. All sorts o f 
already known practices, more or less mixed up w ith  ideology, are similar to  it and can 
be o f use: the control o f breathing and the heart, the use o f muscle and limbs, etc." 
(19-20)
The body o f the rhythmanalyst plays a pivotal role fo r Lefebvre, as indeed it does in this work, 
as the site and means o f analysis. Indeed in Chapter Three I develop an argument from  
Deleuze and Guattari ([1972] 1984, [1980] 1988) tha t sees the body as the site o f connection 
to  o ther people, tools, machines and assemblages as 'practice as event' and 'in the moment of 
doing'. In the same way the body o f the rhythmanalyst is not separate from  her object o f 
study, nor 'self'-reflexively distant from her own embodied practice; but all o f her 'embodied- 
knowledge-in-practice' needs to  be connected to  the machinic assemblage that is the doing- 
researching o f her study. In this way she can fu lly employ all o f her built up experience, her 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' o f breathing, o f moving and of practicing, to  listen to the 
'polyrhythm ia' o f the 'w orld ' o f practice, not from  the inside or the outside; but to  be in 
concert w ith  the rhythms of tha t object o f study. Thus, the rhythmanalyst is fundamentally 'in- 
the-w orld ' o f and not separate from, the practice that she is studying. Nor indeed from the 
practice o f studying itself:
"He w ill be attentive, but not only to  the words or pieces o f information, the 
confessions and confidences of a partner or a client. He w ill listen to  the world, and 
above all to  what are disdainfully called noises, which are said w ithout meaning, and 
to  murmurs [rumours], full o f meaning -  and finally he w ill listen to  silences." (19)
Hitchings' concerns, as described above, regarding the dismissal o f interviewing as a method 
o f research then, from  a 'rhythmanalytical' viewpoint are well founded. Talking to people and
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practicing w ith  others is fundamental to  taking part in the rhythms o f practice. However, from 
this methodological stance, interviews, or any form  o f discourse analysis, must be recognised 
as not being separate from  doing. Speaking is not separate from  doing. When I give a 
presentation o f my work to  my peers, despite a lack o f bodily movement and action (most o f 
the tim e!) clearly this is a 'm om ent' o f practice, a doing tha t involves, in ter alia, speaking. Thus, 
talking to  people about practice is only a part o f the method o f perform ing a rhythmanalysis. 
Rather, the rhythmanalyst has to  come to an embodied understanding o f noises and silences 
and 'moments' o f 'arrhythm ia' through experience, through participating and practicing 'in- 
the-w orld '.
For Lefebvre, this is not a m atter o f interfering or provoking 'arrhythm iatic ' situations; rather it 
is about coming to  catch and perceive rhythms as those who are caught by rhythms perceive 
them. This catching and perceiving is facilitated through the build up o f experience that the 
rhythmanalyst brings to  perception. Thus, to  understand rhythms as 'polyrhythm ia', as people 
experience, is to  bring oneself, one's own rhythms to  the practice. Lefebvre argues, that in this 
way, the rhythmanalyst comes closer to  the poet than the empiricist because she always 
brings something to  the analysis (herself), thus rhythmanalysis is always productive. Of course, 
it is a repetition, a re-production o f the practice; but it is always a repetition tha t brings w ith it 
something d ifferent. He writes:
"Does the rhythmanalyst thus come close to  the poet? Yes, to  a large extent, more so 
than he does to  the psychoanalyst, and still more so than he does to  the statistician, 
who counts things and, quite reasonably, describes them in the ir immobility... In short, 
he is not a mystic! W ithout going so far as to  present himself as a positivist, fo r 
someone who observes: an empiricist. He changes that which he observes: he sets it in 
motion, he recognises its power. In this sense, he seems close to  the poet or the man
33
o f the theatre. Art, poetry, music and theatre have always brought something (but 
what?) to  the everyday. They haven't reflected  on it." (23-25)
In this sense, this thesis is not a reflection on an objective study o f five d ifferent 'leisure' case 
studies. Rather the ideas and concepts that make up each chapter are born out o f the coming 
together o f my own questions, my own frames o f reference and my own 'embodied- 
knowledge-in-practice' o f five distinct and at the same tim e connected rhythms o f practice 
tha t have shaped and produced both my own rhythms o f practice (which include the rhythms 
o f w riting  this thesis) and 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' (which include an understanding 
o f 'rhythmanalysis'), as much as my own rhythms and 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' have 
shaped those 'moments' o f practice.
Im portantly and in summary, fo r Lefebvre, the rhythmanalyst must recognise that her rhythms 
come together w ith the rhythms o f tha t which is studied. It is only an understanding o f one's 
own rhythms tha t allow an interpretation o f the other, as it is already changed.
Finally, in the above quote, Lefebvre makes one im portant contrast between the poet and the 
rhythmanalyst. The rhythmanalyst (because she is perform ing a rhythmanalysis), recognises 
the power (and the limits o f tha t power) tha t she has in shaping rhythms of practice, in 
changing the 'everyday'. This recognition o f her power demands a responsibility tha t moves 
beyond the rem it o f the poet, according to  Lefebvre. The main text o f this thesis is devoted to 
an analysis that leads to  a form ulation o f scheduling routine and shaping rhythms o f practice. 
However, the fo llow ing chapters build up an ontological fram ework that is deployed in the 
final chapter to  offer a discussion of how the rhythmanalyst might return to  and 'intervene' in 
the 'everyday' by making the present presence and thus shaping rhythms o f practice.
Before preparing the reader w ith  an outline o f the empirical sites o f enquiry and the ir role in 
building this ontological fram ework (in tha t they have both helped build and now work to
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build) it is necessary to  say something about the site o f empirical enquiry as situated in the 
'everyday'.
History vs. the Everyday
I have already suggested in the introduction tha t the realm o f the 'everyday' provides a 
particularly lucrative site of analysis both fo r the rhythmanalyst and fo r the sociologist more 
generally. However, as a methodological position, the 'everyday' is im portant as well. As 
described in the introduction to  this thesis, Lefebvre was one o f the firs t social theorists to 
investigate the banality and alienation o f 'everydayness' (quotidiennete). The 'everyday' then 
is not only a reference to the routine nature o f day-to-day living; but particularly refers to the 
alienated, banal and dry 'everydayness' that results from  the thing-ification  tha t turns all 
presences into presents, that mediates all material through image and displaces the 'self', 
presence and authenticity w ith  re-presentation, the commodification o f life through capitalist 
enterprise. Im portantly though, the 'everyday' is also the location fo r opportunities, for 
'm oments' o f presence where people can experience themselves and the ir activities in an 
unalienated and 'authentic' manner. Fundamentally, there is no room fo r stepping out o f the 
'everyday'; although there is potential fo r overcoming (Uberwinden) 'everydayness' and re­
presentation through, among other methods, a rhythmanalysis.
Methodologically then, it w ill be necessary to  define the 'everyday' as this thesis' site of 
analysis and its theoretical differences to  approaching 'history'. For Lefebvre, a focus on the 
'everyday' draws the micro and the macro together, simultaneously taking account o f the 
whole o f and the small details o f 'everyday' life. Rather than the bracketing out o f social 
relationships by phenomenology to  focus on the experience o f the individual, or the denial o f 
experience by structuralists, Lefebvre seeks to  study the interrelation between structure and
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experience through the lens o f the 'everyday'. Indeed this is the job  o f the sociologist and the 
philosopher, according to  Lefebvre, to  employ critical knowledge o f social structure and 
experience o f practice to  investigate the 'everyday':
"...only the philosopher, and the sociologist informed by the dialectic, and maybe the 
novelist, manage to jo in  together the lived  and the real, fo rm a l structure and con ten t" 
(Lefebvre in Elden 2004,113)
This can be done in various ways, fo r example, one could take a day in the life o f an individual, 
no m atter how mundane or trivia l and through the act o f rhythmanalysis, make it presence, 
tha t is, by making the fam iliar strange and drawing out the extra-ordinary in the ordinary, the 
nonroutine from  the routine. A lternatively, one could pick a random date in 'h istory' and 
rather than re-present it as a 'factual' account o f the events o f tha t day, attem pt to  recognise 
those events as 'm oments' o f practice, as presences belonging to  particular 'worlds' o f practice. 
Necessarily then, this methodological approach requires a d ifferent sense o f the word 'history'. 
To understand the event as the 'm om ent' o f doing requires a theoretical re-framing o f 'tim e ' 
and thus o f 'h istory' as well. For example, Heidegger argues tha t to  understand practical 
activity, practice, it is not useful to  examine 'h istory' as a list o f things tha t are more or less old, 
to  investigate events, causes, effects or collected facts; but to  investigate the 'w orld ' o f that 
'practice'. He writes:
"W hat is 'past'? Nothing else than tha t world  w ith in  which they belonged to  a network 
o f equipment and were encountered as ready-to-hand by a concernful Dasein who 
was in-the-world. That world  is no longer." (Heidegger [1927] 1962,432)
Thus, w hilst we maintain a focus on the 'everyday', 'h istory' can no longer be thought o f as a 
set o f objectified things o r events stretched out over linear 'tim e '. Indeed, Stuart Elden (2004) 
notes tha t Lefebvre goes as fa r to  claim in La Fin de L'Histoire (Lefebvre 2001), tha t 'h istory'
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itse lf has to  be left behind. This m ight at first seem problematic. To understand events 
requires an understanding of 'tim e '. 'Time' does not end according to  Lefebvre and because 
'h istory' and 'tim e ' usually go together, how can we say tha t 'h istory' ends? To solve this 
problem requires th inking about 'tim e ' in a d ifferent way. Rather than one 'tim e ', we can 
consider tha t there are many temporalities, many rhythms tha t overlap and conflict w ith  each 
other. Thus there is no one 'h istory' o f separate and unlinked events. Rather events leave 
traces or histories and geographies. However, whilst Lefebvre argues that prolonging 'h istory' 
only serves to  re-present 'tim e ' and events, he also warns against a simple and naive 
liquidation o f 'h istory'. If 'h istory' is only an abstraction, then becoming, that is change has no 
direction and becomes only chaos. It is in this sense that 'h istory' must be defined as having an 
end. Im portantly though, this is clearly not an end tha t results in a post-historical period in a 
Hegelian or Marxist sense. It is not a linear and progressive 'h istory' that comes to  an end and 
becomes post-historical. Instead it should be thought in terms o f a Nietzschean 'overcoming' 
(iOberwinden) tha t accomplishes the birth o f a d ifferent civilization through a repudiation of 
'h istory':
"H istory does not end as much as we exit it, we leave it behind and this should be
seized in terms of an overcoming..." (Elden 2004,177)
In this way, Nietzsche's understanding of the 'm om ent' o f practice4 has significant 
ramifications not only fo r how we th ink about 'tim e ' but also methodologically. 'Overcoming' 
'h istory' in this way provides a critical methodological alternative to  the Hegelian model o f the 
dialectic whereby oppositions are synthesised. Indeed, "Nietzsche stressed the ongoing and 
reversible character o f this 'synthesis'." (Shields 1999, 72) It also offers a significant alternative 
to  the Marxian adoption of the Hegelian dialectic as a model o f historical and linear progress. 
In Lefebvre's account:
4 See Chapter Five, section on: 'Eternal Return'.
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"... the traits o f the original ingredients -  the thesis and the anti-thesis -  were never 
lost or perfectly blended in the synthesis. Syntheses were always falling back or apart. 
Hence they were reversible. History too could thus be reversible, falling back as much 
as fo llow ing an arrow like course o f progress." (Shields 1999, 72)
Methodologically speaking the end o f 'h istory' does not mean tha t there is a fron tie r to  be 
reached or tha t has been reached; rather it is an exit from  'h istory' in order to  'overcome' re­
presentation and objectification. It is a method tha t both allows and requires a re-framing o f 
'tim e ' as the 'm om ent' o f presence, situated firm ly in the 'everyday' and in routine practice. It 
is in this way that this thesis suggests re-framing 'history' as the context specific histories and 
geographies o f tem porally and spatially situated 'moments' o f practice in order to  locate its 
analysis w ith in  the spatio-temporal rhythms o f 'everyday' life.
Beyond Body and Soul
In sum, I take up this research and conduct my empirical work inspired by and in a similar vein 
to  Loic Wacquant's seminal text Body and Soul: Notebooks o f an Apprentice Boxer (2004). 
Wacquant's study o f the 'w orld ' o f the boxer conducted at 'W oodlawn Boys Club', a boxing 
gym in Chicago, took place over three years and originally began as a 'way in' to  the ghetto "to  
observe the social strategies o f young men in the neighbourhood." (Wacquant 2004, 9) 
However, after sixteen months of attendance and after being accepted as a bona fide  member 
o f the boxing gym, Wacquant decided to study the craft o f the boxer. This involved interviews 
w ith  fighters, training partners and coaches and collecting field notes on various exchanges 
and activities in the gym; but most significantly it involved his own participation in the training 
o f this sport, bringing his own body to  the demanding and repetitive training workouts and his 
own understandings to the interpretation and study of that 'world '. Wacquant describes in
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this book how he developed a deep rapport w ith  his training partners who became his closest 
friends and his coach who became a second father figure to  him. Indeed he became so 
immersed in this practice tha t he ended up competing in this sport and struggling w ith  the 
decision o f giving up a career in academia to  'turn  pro' and fight fo r a living.
Significantly, this account both summarises the discussion above and echoes my own 
experience to  lesser and greater degrees at the various sites o f rhythms o f practice tha t I 
studied.
First and im portantly, participation is key. Wacquant argues tha t it would have been 
impossible to  study the boxing gym in the way tha t he did if he had not participated in this 
practice himself.
"There is no doubt tha t I would never have been able to  gain the trust and to benefit 
from  the collaboration o f the Woodlawn regulars if I had joined the gym w ith the 
explicit and avowed aim o f studying it, fo r tha t very intention would have irrevocably 
modified my status and role w ith in  the social and symbolic system under 
consideration." (Wacquant 2004, 9)
For the same reason (with the exception o f stock car racing and computer gaming), I studied at 
empirical sites o f rhythms of practice tha t I was already engaged in, to  d ifferent degrees, to 
benefit from  a position w ithin these rhythms o f practice as a more 'authentic' practitioner. 
However, whilst I had not participated in the rhythms o f practice o f stock car racing at all 
before this study and in those of computer gaming only to  a lim ited extent, my peripheral 
participation as gamer and spectator must be considered, in the same way, as fundamental to 
drawing out the particular notions o f 'practice as event' and 'practice in the moment o f doing', 
as they are detailed in this thesis, respectively. For example, had I been thoroughly immersed 
in the rhythms o f practice o f computer gaming, then questions regarding the differences
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between respondents' experiences o f the 'tim e ' o f playing computer games and my own 
experiences may not have been raised in the same way. Similarly it was only from my specific 
position, w ith  my particular and peripheral 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' o f the rhythms 
of practice o f stock car racing tha t I interpreted and conceptualised the proceedings on race 
day as 'practice as event'. Framed in this way (as this thesis develops and draws out this 
fram ing through the fo llow ing chapters), it no longer becomes a question o f having enough or 
sufficient 'knowledge' about 'a practice' to  warrant its participation and study. Rather, my 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' and my context specific histories and geographies enable 
me at each site to  in terpre t these rhythms o f practice and offer a re-presentation o f these 
interpretations towards an understanding o f the relationship between social action and social 
change. In this way, what, from  a positivist viewpoint, may well be considered a lim itation of 
this research, is in fact fundamental to  maintaining a methodological approach that remains 
consistent w ith  a theoretical endeavour to  capture practice in its presence.
Thus, as they are in Wacquant's study, interviews were conducted, both form ally recorded and 
transcribed and informally as part o f practice and noted down.5 Significantly though and in 
response to  Hitchings (2012) suggestion as explored above, that 'people can talk about the ir 
practices', interviews form  only a part o f and only supplement participation in and the doing of 
practice:
"Breaking w ith  the moralizing discourse -  tha t indifferently feeds both celebration and 
denigration -  produced by the "gaze from  afar" o f an outside observer standing at a 
distance from  or above the specific universe, this book seeks to  suggest how boxing 
"makes sense" as soon as one takes pains to  get close enough to grasp it with one's 
body, in a quasi-experimental situation." (Wacquant 2004, 7)
5 Among the uncountable (and immeasurable) am ount o f 'tim e' spent engaged in these rhythms of
practice, tw enty formal interviews were conducted with practitioners, of which nine w ere fully 
transcribed.
40
Therefore, in the course o f these empirical investigations, I have stood in a crowd of 
spectators, in the wind and rain fo r hours on end watching stock cars speed round and round 
an oval track, have contorted my body into strange positions I never thought possible, spent 
uncountable hours in the gym, frustratingly failed at trying to  complete several computer 
games, and competed in mixed martial arts at a high level.
It is im portant to  note here the difference between Bourdieu's (1999) concerns as laid out 
above regarding the 'self'-reflexivity o f the researcher and the desire to  positivisticly re­
present the object 'tru th ' o f the study and the view of participation tha t this research 
undertakes. Wacquant (one tim e student o f Bourdieu) notes this difference in a note to  the 
prologue o f Body and Soul where he discusses his intoxication w ith  being immersed in these 
rhythms practice to  the point tha t he considers leaving academia:
"PB [Pierre Bourdieu] was saying the other day tha t he's afraid tha t I'm letting myself 
be seduced by my object but, boy, i f  he only knew. I'm already way beyond seduction!" 
(Wacquant 2004, 94, note 3)
It is only by being seduced (and recognising resistance to seduction) tha t one can develop an 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' tha t can recognise "the external factors and the internal 
sensations that intermingle to  make the boxer's w orld." (Wacquant 2004, 7) Of course 
understanding the 'w orld ' o f practice requires grasping, the rhythms of boxing fo r example, in 
the 'everyday', through performance of the banal and mundane routines and rhythms:
"... the drab and obsessive routine o f the gym workout, o f the endless and thankless 
preparation, in separately physical and moral, that preludes the all-too-brief 
appearances in the lime-light, the m inute and mundane rites o f daily life in the gym 
tha t produce and reproduce the feeling this very peculiar corporeal, material, and 
symbolic economy tha t is the pugilistic world. In short, to  avoid the excess knowledge
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of spontaneous sociology tha t the evocation o f fights never fails to  conjure, one must 
not step into the ring by proxy w ith  the extra-ordinary figure o f the "champ" but "h it 
the bags" alongside anonymous boxers in the ir habitual setting o f the gym." 
(Wacquant 2004, 6)
Like Wacquant then I have "h it the bags", experienced the 'everyday' train ing and the extra­
ordinary situation o f competing. Similarly I recognise tha t need to  "make sense" o f the 'w orld ' 
o f practice by experiencing w ith  your body, the requirement o f participation (and its 
theoretical orientation) and the u tility  o f focusing an analyses at the level o f the 'everyday'.
However, in drawing on a range of empirical sites I develop and go beyond the methodological 
position and thus theoretical account that Wacquant was able to  re-present. By drawing on 
the figure o f the rhythmanalyst I suggest it is possible to  draw on all o f my own rhythms of 
practice, o f stock car spectating, o f lifting weights, o f practicing yoga, o f playing computer 
games, o f training in mixed martial arts; but importantly, of my rhythms of studying, of 
thinking, o f w riting  and o f being an academic. Despite his immersion and intoxication w ith the 
practice o f boxing, Wacquant saw his academic studies, his rhythms o f being 'an academic' as 
separate from those o f being 'a boxer'. Thus in a sense there is a sixth empirical site that is 
studied w ithin this thesis: the rhythms o f practice o f doing research and o f thinking 
themselves.
If we take this argument seriously, that is, if we take the position o f the rhythmanalyst as 
proposed by Lefebvre ([1992] 2004), as one who cannot separate the various rhythms of 
practice, say of ashtanga yoga, or o f computer gaming, or of thinking and of w riting  a doctoral 
thesis, then it is significant and im portant to  note that this implies key differences in respect to 
both epistemological position, of how we can come to  know about a certain social 
phenomenon and the significance given to re-presentation through illustrations o f doing.
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W hilst Wacquant concerns himself, in Body and Soul (2004) w ith reflecting on and identifying 
his own position in relation to  his object o f study, tha t is in struggling to  maintain his position 
o f critical reflexivity in the face o f being seduced by the 'w orld ' o f the boxer, I make no claims 
to  either distance nor standard 'self'-reflection. Rather, in this thesis I am interested in 
precisely the process o f seduction. Given the theoretical-methodological claims already laid 
out tha t seek to  move beyond subjects and objects o f doing, in each chapter thus, I do not 
seek to  give a re-presentative account o f the 'knowledge' tha t exists at those sites at which I 
conducted my empirical study as Wacquant seeks to  provide a thorough and thick description 
o f the 'w orld ' o f boxing. Instead, in taking up this position, I only seek to  give an account o f my 
own experiences and 'knowledges' at those sites in relation to  my experiences and 
understandings o f studying and thinking about the rhythms o f practice in everyday life. So, 
whilst at all sites the empirical experience of being-there is fundamentally generative o f the 
ideas re-presented in this text (doing yoga generated an embodied experience and 
understanding o f the notion o f the lived body, doing MMA generated thinking about changing 
rhythms o f training and competition), they are generated w ith in  the rhythms o f practice of 
w riting  about this topic and from  my own uniquely, historically and geographically situated 
position.
Thus, whilst Wacquant exerts himself to  great lengths to  be able to  capture the reader w ithin 
his analysis and experience o f the 'w orld ' o f boxing through thick description and almost 
autobiographical prose, I make, in comparison, a rather more lim ited attem pt to  try  to  capture 
fo r the reader my experiences of the various rhythms of practice re-presented here, precisely 
because from this epistemological position o f interpretation rather than reflection, each 
reader w ill read each o f these sites from the ir own experiences, the ir own frames of reference 
and the ir own understandings. Thus, instead I illustrate these empirical examples from my 
own position. It should be made clear to  the reader that whilst to  d ifferent extents I have 
conducted my study in a similar methodological approach to Wacquant's study o f boxing
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(through immersive participation, informal and formal interviews, taking field notes etc.) that 
these pages in no way provide a detailed and through description o f my activities. Whilst the 
process has been thoroughly generative fo r me, from  my own rhythms o f practice, from  my 
own position, it may well not have been generative in the same way fo r another researcher- 
w riter. For the most part therefore, these generations are re-presented through short 
illustrations or 'snap-shots' to  provide examples, to  illustrate and to  support my re­
presentation o f the ontological fram ework tha t I go on to  detail in this thesis.
In the final section o f this chapter, I set out the methodological outline o f the rest o f this thesis 
by describing how the empirical site o f each chapter in turn contributed to the theoretical 
analysis re-presented in this thesis in order to  support this claim.
Conclusion
From here, the fo llow ing chapter examines the material 'w orld ' o f the gym as the empirical 
site o f rhythms o f resistance training. Consisting o f a m ultitude o f material objects and human 
practitioners engaging in and failing to  achieve more and less strict routines, the gym provides 
a particularly useful site at which to  begin an examination o f the material 'w orld ' o f practice. I 
have attended this particular gym fo r over seven years now and continue to  participate 
thoroughly in the rhythms o f resistance training. As such I have a unique access to  members, 
trainers and owners o f this gym, as well as a depth o f 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' about 
this 'w orld '. Indeed it has been experiences in the gym tha t have fuelled my interests in 
commitments to  routines and tha t have helped to  develop a detailed understanding of the 
relationship between human and material in the doing o f these overtly material and embodied 
rhythms o f practice.
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I go on in Chapter Three to  explore the rhythms o f practice o f ashtanga yoga in order to  o ffer a 
conceptualisation o f the body in practice a re-framing o f 'knowledge' as 'embodied- 
knowledge-in-practice'. I had practiced ashtanga yoga fo r something over six months before 
these rhythms o f practice revealed themselves as replete w ith  examples fo r illustrating; but 
also fo r drawing out, ideas about learning embodied actions and skills. Taking my own rhythms 
o f practice and experiences o f developing particular embodied movements both aided my 
ability to  talk w ith  and understand o ther practitioners; but also helped to  develop the idea of 
'embodied-knowledge-in practice'. W hilst the ontology tha t is built up in this thesis is 
applicable across the range o f empirical examples and indeed further, computer gaming or 
stock car racing may well have been less accommodating sites at which to  study and draw out 
th inking about bodily action. Similarly, ashtanga yoga, w ith  its distinct lack o f material 
equipment, would have provided a less fertile  setting fo r considering the relationship between 
humans and nonhumans than the gym.
In contrast to  yoga and resistance training, the rhythms o f stock car racing at the beginning of 
this research were relatively unknown to  me. I had watched it some tim e ago; but was 
unfamiliar w ith  the particularities o f fo rm at and content. In itially it served as a site of 
investigation into the routine and large scale co-ordination o f material equipment; but quickly 
inspired thinking about race day as event. Studying the notion o f event helped to 
conceptualise the scale o f all the various doings tha t people described as happening on race 
day and to  position my understanding o f 'practice as event' as spatially and temporally 
situated. Again, thinking the event o f ashtanga yoga, fo r example, may well not have resulted 
in these kinds o f ideas.
The problem w ith  studying computer gaming is that I am hopeless at playing them. I have 
played them fo r brief amounts o f 'tim e ', but have never been drawn into committed play. 
However, my interest in computer gaming came from living w ith  friends who spent all o f their
45
't im e ' engaged in the rhythms o f this practice. I wanted to understand conceptually the 
difference between routine gaming practice and nonroutine gaming practice. This led to 
spending 'tim e ' at a computer games production company and finding tha t games designers 
and producers have a sophisticated account o f tem porality tha t informs the ir design o f games 
to  catch gamers in 'flow '. As such th inking about 'tim e ', 'flow ' and computer games developed 
th inking about tem porality as 'the mom ent o f practice'. Again, this temporal effect was 
discussed by respondents at all five empirical sites and my re-framing o f 'tim e ' can be 
illustrated in all five as well; but in none other was the idea o f 'flow ' so explicitly discussed nor 
was 'tim e ' such a central feature.
Finally, the last chapter examines the rhythms o f mixed martial arts to  explore how rhythms of 
practice m ight be shaped through 'arrhythm ia', 'tra ining' and 'syncopation'. Similar to  rhythms 
o f resistance training, I have been engaged in the rhythms o f mixed martial arts fo r the last 
five years, and it is through wanting to  understand my own changing rhythms of resistance 
training and mixed martial arts and the rhythms o f my training partners and peers, that my 
academic studies turned to an interest in routine, embodiment, tem porality etc. Uniquely it is 
the intensity o f training, drilling and preparing the body coupled w ith the mundanity and 
banality of routinely performing the same techniques and movements that make up so much 
o f the rhythms o f mixed martial arts that generated and help to  illustrate thinking about the 
relationship between social action and social change in terms o f rhythms o f practice.
Further specific information regarding the empirical engagement at each site is given in each 
chapter where appropriate. However, to  bring this methodological chapter to  a close, I want 
to  re-iterate and stress again tha t throughout this work I do not a ttem pt to  put myself in the 
shoes of my object o f study, nor do I o ffer a 'self'-reflexive and critical 'knowledge' o f an 
external object from  a distance. Rather I o ffer a rhythmanalysis of my own rhythms of practice,
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fu lly  recognising my historically and geographically situated position as both participant and 
researcher.
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Chapter Two: The World of Practice
The world is not the mere collection of the countable or uncountable, familiar or unfamiliar things that are just there. 
But neither is it a merely imagined framework added by our representation to the sum of such given things. The 
world worlds, and is more fully in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we feel ourselves to be at 
home. (Heidegger)
Introduction
If we are to  re-consider 'practice as event' and 'practice in the moment o f doing', in order to 
go beyond an understanding o f the re-presentations o f the subject and object o f social action, 
a firs t step is to  consider action not as some-thing tha t is performed by people, nor as an 
entity  ordered by material objects; but as the 'w orld ' o f practice. In short, this firs t step 
requires us to  take a step back and provide an account o f the materiality o f doing, o f social 
action, and o f practice tha t can resist the re-presentations o f more straight forward 
discussions o f 'agency' tha t rely on a distinction between the subject and object o f action, on a 
'scientific' account o f linear 'tim e ' and on an understanding of reflexive 'consciousness' as 
outside o f the m ateriality o f doing, separate from what people do and the material equipment 
involved in what they do.
In this chapter, I begin by contrasting methods of understanding the 'w orld ' o f practice w ith 
concepts from  the field of 'Science and Technology Studies' tha t view relationships between 
humans and nonhumans as distributing 'agencies' across networks o f these entities that come 
to  constitute 'practices' and even fu rthe r to  critiques of 'actor-network theory' that 
nonetheless maintain and focus analyses on a distinction between living and nonliving things.
Stepping back from  re-presenting practice as constituted by so many entities, I fo llow  a 
Heideggerian analysis o f the tool taken from Being and Time ([1927] 1962). Through a 
discussion o f the notions o f Dasein and of 'being-in-the-world', I suggest tha t the material 
equipment of practice can be considered alongside other bodies as making up the 'w orld ' of
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practice, turn ing the analytical focus away from the relationships between things and towards 
practical activity in its very material doing.
Following this discussion I argue tha t Heidegger's analysis o f the possible character o f the 
'w orld ' o f practice as being ready-to-hand or present-to-hand can usefully be understood as 
the routine or nonroutine character o f practice. This forms the conceptual ground from  which 
I ask the question o f how to  schedule practice as routine or nonroutine in order to  promote or 
negate its re-production.
In the final section o f this chapter, I show tha t scheduling the character o f the 'w orld ' o f 
practice as routine or nonroutine depends on the build up o f sufficient 'embodied-knowledge- 
in-practice'. This concept is elaborated in full in the fo llow ing chapter. All o f the theoretical 
suggestions made in this chapter are born o f my engagement in the rhythms o f resistance 
training, tha t is, o f an understanding o f the experience o f the material 'w orld ' o f 'lifting  
weights' and 'working out' and in scheduling the spatio-temporal rhythms o f these rhythms of 
practice.
Resistance Training
W hat I describe as resistance training is called by various other names and includes a variety of 
activities which generally take place in gyms (although certain rhythms o f resistance training 
can also take place outside, in the home and in a variety o f other settings). More often than 
not however, the rhythms of practice o f resistance training refer to  the use o f free weights, 
weight machines or cardiovascular equipment to  give resistance, whilst training through 
certain exercises and workouts to  develop strength, power, cardiovascular fitness, size, speed 
dexterity and so on. The use of this range of equipment, which includes various weight-
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assisted machines, bar bells, belts, racks, cables, weights, plates, benches, medicine balls, 
dumb bells, Swiss balls, mats, ropes, kettle bells and so forth , occurs in conjunction w ith a 
w ide variety o f programmes and timetables tha t come to schedule the rhythms o f resistance 
train ing as routine or nonroutine. That is to  say that some 'moments' o f practice become 
repeated routinely, form ing strong co-ordinated and synchronised rhythms o f practice,6 whilst 
o ther 'moments' o f practice take on a nonroutine character and thereby fail to  be repeated.
Not only is the material equipment in the gym fundamental to  establishing the character of 
'm oments' o f resistance training practice as routine or nonroutine; but so too is the wealth of 
nutritional materials and objects tha t support the dietary requirements fo r participating in 
these rhythms o f practice. These can include the taking of protein and whey shakes, vegetable 
supplements, creatines, glutamines, multi-vitam ins, high doses o f vitamin C, branch chain 
amino acids (BCAAs), steroids etc., all o f which can be subject to  demanding forms o f co­
ordination and synchronisation w ith  other bodies, things, and 'moments' o f practice, w ith 
particular workouts, rest days, rest times etc., to  the extent tha t fo r some practitioners, 
particular supplements are taken a specific number o f seconds after completing certain 
exercises in a specific order, in a bid to  maximise the ir benefits and thus results.
In order to  understand the role o f these material things in the scheduling of practice as routine 
and nonroutine and in thereby shaping the rhythms of practice in 'everyday' life, in this 
chapter I draw on my own experiences and studies o f the rhythms o f practice o f resistance 
training, sited at a small gym in Lancaster, o f which I have been a member fo r close to eight 
years. It is here, through several in depth interviews and specifically conducted participant 
observations; but also through much less formal conversations and workouts w ith  countless 
other resistance training practitioners, staff and 'gym buddies' tha t I have developed my own 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' o f resistance training, that I have built up my own
6 In Chapter Six, following Lefebvre, this strong association of rhythms is described as 'eurhythm ia'.
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understanding o f the rhythms o f practice o f 'working out', o f exercise, o f the material 
equipment o f the gym and o f a variety o f gym programmes and timetables. I have been 
involved in the rhythms o f resistance training, to  greater and lesser extents, fo r over ten years, 
beginning w ith  weights at home, before join ing this particular gym over seven years ago and 
then turn ing my attention to  the study o f these rhythms o f practice as the empirical site fo r 
my master's thesis. Since then, the research tha t I conducted in tha t study has continued in 
greater detail, fu rthe r developing both research and training relationships w ith regular gym 
attendees as well as w ith  some beginners and w ith  a renewed focus on the material 'w orld ' o f 
resistance training. Thus, throughout the course o f this study, I have had many d ifferent 
experiences w ith  and learnt from  a variety o f people engaged in these rhythms o f practice. 
Some practice religiously and every day, whilst others struggle to  maintain the ir fitness 
regimes fo r more than the firs t week o f the ir new year's resolution. Therefore, in keeping w ith 
the argument made in the previous chapter regarding my position as participant and 
researcher, I begin to  explore the differences between routine and nonroutine practice by 
considering the role o f material equipment as making up the 'w orld ' o f practice through an 
analysis of both less formal conversations and in-training experiences, as well as o f more 
formal interviews w ith  my co-practitioners and training partners.
Resistance training has proved to be a useful topic fo r various sociologists concerned w ith  a 
range o f issues. Most have focused on the embodiment o f identities, masculinities and 
fem ininities (see Broom and Tovey 2009; Jefferson 1998; Monaghan 2001). Roberta Sassatelli 
has sited her analysis of the subjective experiences o f cultural 'practices' in gyms (1999, 1999, 
2006, 2010) and perhaps most closely related to  this thesis' question regarding routine 
practice, Nick Crossley has studied the inter-subjectivity o f the reflexive gym practitioner's 
body as both subject and object (1995, 2005, 2006).7 However, the rhythms of resistance
7 Clearly the status of the body is a significant issue. I reflect on Crossley's position regarding reflexive 
body techniques as hybridising subject and object in the following chapter.
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train ing clearly present a particularly revealing site to  study the role o f material equipment in 
scheduling routine practice due to the wide range o f and close physical relationship between 
people and things as well as both the variety o f and strong com m itm ent to  routine tha t is 
required.
One example o f this relationship between material equipment and routine practice can be 
found in the rhythms o f practice o f Stephen Bracken, a cover model fo r 'M en's Health 
Magazine':
"'I've  always found the best way to  burn fa t is an early morning run', says Steven 
Bracken this month's MH cover model. 'I get up around 7am, have a black coffee and 
take my BCAAs (Branch Chain Amino Acids), then h it the streets fo r a light morning jog. 
I know I have weights and cardio to  face later in the day, so I never do more than 30 
minutes at a comfortable pace... just to  kick the day o ff.'" (Kemp 2010, 63)
In this instance there is clearly some kind o f relationship between the supplements and the 
black coffee tha t Stephen takes and the 'tim e ' o f 7am, or the pre-jogging 'tim e ', that has 
become routine fo r him. Not only this; it has also become routine fo r him to train three times 
per day as well.
However, various d ifferent kinds o f material equipment are involved in quite different rhythms 
o f practice. Moritz, another cover-model from  'Men's Health Magazine', fo r example, is a 
medical student and has d ifferent rhythms o f practice of resistance training: "'I do four 
sessions every week, and try  to  run every other day fo r an hour, w ith one long run o f tw o 
hours every weekend.'" (Kemp 2010, 56) The firs t thing to  notice about M oritz ' routine is that 
instead o f train ing three times every day like Stephen, he trains one session per day of either 
resistance train ing or running and does more exercises around other rhythms o f practice that 
he is involved in:
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"'I began w ith  simple stu ff - walking every route I could and riding my bike fo r longer 
journeys. I also set up a chin up bar at my fla t so I could do bodyweight work 
whenever I had a moment. I pride myself on training where most people don 't see an 
opp o rtu n ity / Training at home is the perfect option if, like Moritz, you're always short 
on tim e or can't get to  the gym. All you need is a pair o f dumb-bells and a chin up bar 
and you have the tools to  transform  your body into cover model proportions - and no 
excuses."(Kemp 2010, 56)
Both Stephen and M oritz have very d ifferent rhythms of practice that require d ifferent 
assemblages o f material equipment, used in quite d ifferent ways. W hilst M oritz ' chin up bar 
means tha t he can practice at home in co-ordination and synchronisation w ith  other rhythms 
o f practice, Stephen's rhythms are organised around three set 'moments', or instances of 
practice every day. That is to  say tha t the particular 'moments' o f practice tha t are repeated as 
routine and in what configuration and co-ordination w ith  other 'moments' o f practice are 
vastly d ifferent fo r both men. Nevertheless, fo r each, the d ifferent 'moments' o f practice are 
repeated and come to be scheduled as routine practice. Thus, we might do well to  ask, how 
and why are rhythms o f practice (of resistance training in this instance) different? In order to 
answer this question, I suggest that it is necessary to  investigate how 'moments' o f practice, 
involving particular material equipment, come to  'fall in', come to be experienced as routine 
and become 'moments' o f practice tha t are repeated. The first step in understanding the 
scheduling o f routine then, I argue, requires understanding the role o f the material objects o f 
practice. In order to  highlight my contribution and make distinct my argument tha t the 
material objects o f doing should be regarded as part o f the assemblages o f bodies and things 
tha t make up the 'w orld ' o f practice, I firs t contrast this suggestion w ith analyses tha t seek to 
separate out and maintain a distinction between material objects and practitioners.
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Humans and Nonhumans
One o f the most im portant fields o f study tha t is concerned w ith  understanding m ateriality is 
the field o f 'Science and Technology Studies' (STS). In this section I draw out a few  selected 
arguments from  this field in order to  show the distinction between approaches to 
understanding m ateriality tha t focus on the relationships between humans and nonhumans 
and my approach tha t seeks to  centre an analysis of material objects firm ly w ith in  what people 
do and thus w ith in  the 'w orld ' o f practice. Of course it would be fo lly to  a ttem pt a critique of 
such a wide, varied and established field o f study such as STS. A range o f authors have 
contributed a variety o f d ifferent, significant and thoughtfu l insights to  the question o f 
materiality. Instead, in this section, I intend to  highlight a few key differences between my 
own site o f analysis and some fundamental assertions that some proponents o f 'actor- 
network theory', 'material culture' and even 'theories of practice' share. I approach the topic 
in this way to  suggest to  the reader that there are fundamentally d ifferent ways in which to 
conceptualise the material equipment involved in practice and that this prompts a re-appraisal 
o f the notion o f practice tha t can be achieved through a Heideggerian understanding o f Dasein 
and 'being-in-the-world'.
I begin w ith  a description o f 'actor-network theory' (ANT) given by a central figure in 'Science 
and Technology Studies', John Law:
"[(ANT) traces] how elements in a network or a web take the form  that they do in more or 
less precarious interaction w ith one another. People, technologies, 'natural' phenomena, 
social facts, collectivities and phenomena -  all o f these are relational effects, materials 
being done in interaction." (Law 2008, 632)
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Various authors have presented answers to  the question o f how entities become ordered in 
particular ways as certain forms o f social action or practice. That is to  say tha t 'actor network 
theory ' seeks to  address how it is tha t certain human and nonhuman entities become arranged 
to  configure 'a practice'. In this sense, fo llow ing the example o f resistance training, it would be 
necessary to  explain how various resistance training practitioners, weights, machines, 
supplements and so on configure particular types o f resistance training 'practice'.
One method o f answering this question is to  fo llow  Madeline Akrich in her suggestion that 
objects are imbued w ith  particular visions o f action and come to  'script' human action in the ir 
use:
"A large part o f the work o f innovators is tha t o f 'inscribing' this vision o f (or prediction 
about) the world in the technical content o f the new object. I w ill call the end product 
o f this work a 'script'..." (Akrich 1992, 208)
In this sense, we m ight come to understand 'the practice' o f lifting weights, as 'scripted' by 
certain weights or machines, designed by innovators w ith  that particular 'practice' in mind.
Arguing fo r a similar position, Bruno Latour has suggested (and it is a suggestion that has been 
taken up by many), tha t the significance of examining human and nonhuman relationships is 
to  understand the delegations of skills, 'knowledges' and moralities to  technological artefacts:
"If, in our societies, there are thousands of such lieutenants to  which we have 
delegated competences, it means that what defines our social relations is, fo r the 
most part, prescribed back to us by nonhumans. Knowledge, morality, craft, force, 
sociability are not properties o f humans but o f humans accompanied by the ir retinue 
o f delegated characters." (Latour 1988, 310)
Thus, one might make the argument that 'knowledges' and competences, say o f squatting, can 
be found in the negotiation between the resistance training practitioner and the leg press
55
machine (a weighted exercise machine that simulates the free-weight exercise o f squatting, 
w ithou t the need fo r the practitioner to  stabilise and control a free-weight bar).
For Michel Callon, if social relations are indeed to  be found in the relationships between 
humans and nonhumans, distributed across an asymmetrical network, then the job of 
sociology becomes tha t of offering a translation o f these relationships and o f how  they 
become organised in such ways as to  constitute particular forms o f social action. In his famous 
study o f the scientific investigation o f the decline in the population o f scallops in St. Brieuc Bay, 
Callon argues tha t the three scientists, who investigated this situation, came to talk in the 
name o f the scallops, the fishermen and the scientific community, fixing each entity a position 
in this social relationship and defining each entity's ability to  affect another's:
"Translation is the mechanism by which the social and natural worlds progressively 
take form . The result is a situation in which certain entities control others. 
Understanding what sociologists generally call power relationships means describing 
the way in which actors are defined, associated and simultaneously obliged to  remain 
fa ithfu l to  the ir alliances. The repertoire of translation is not only designed to  give a 
symmetrical and to lerant description o f a complex process which constantly mixes 
together a variety o f social and natural entities. It also permits an explanation of how a 
few  obtain the right to  express and to  represent the many silent actors o f the social 
and natural worlds they have mobilized." (Callon 1986,19)
From this point o f view, it is the job o f sociology, whilst recognising its privileged position, to 
attend to  translating the complex social organisation of the situation, say, in the gym, 
constituted by the resistance training practitioners, chin up bars, treadmills and protein shakes, 
by programmes, trainers and timetables, in order to  discern which entities control others, and 
which materials 'script', human action.
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However, accounts rooted in theories o f 'material culture' o ffer d ifferent answers to  the 
question o f how humans and nonhumans become organised. For example, authors such as 
Dant and Wheaton suggest tha t objects do not simply 'script' particular and specific human 
action in a pre-determined and mechanical way. Instead they argue tha t practice is the 
outcome o f an embodied understanding of how to  adjust, manipulate and negotiate objects. 
In this case, Dant and Wheaton refer to  the embodied skill required to  perform windsurfing:
"Getting the sailboard to  move requires a fine interaction between the sailor's body 
and the kit; there is a complex 'material interaction' between the material capital that 
is in the objects o f the kit and the embodied capital tha t is in the body o f the sailor." 
(Dant and Wheaton 2007,10)
The suggestion made here is tha t whilst there may be certain 'knowledges' and skills 'scripted' 
in the technology, fo r instance, o f the barbell, that this is negotiated through the embodied 
skill o f the weight lifte r in the action of lifting the weight.
Similarly, Tim Ingold, in his (2008) essay when 'ANT meets SPIDER', is critical o f the suggestion 
from  proponents o f 'actor-network theory' (ANT) that objects can be attributed 'agency', even 
if it is 'agency' distributed across a network of both human and nonhuman entities. Rather he 
claims tha t skilled practice involves developmentally embodied responsiveness (SPIDER). Thus, 
fo r Ingold, the network itself is not an 'agent'; but rather provides the very condition fo r 
'agency'. That is, fo r Ingold, 'agency' can only be attributed to  living organisms, w ithin a 
network o f other entities:
"Our concept o f agency must make allowance fo r the real complexity of living 
organisms as opposed to  inert m atter." (Ingold 2008, 214)
Therefore, Ingold's answer to  the question of how entities become arranged in particular ways, 
is to  suggest tha t it is only living organisms through the close coupling o f bodily movement and
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perception, such as resistance train ing practitioners, personal trainers, receptionists, 
managers etc., tha t can attend to  movement and negotiate the material world in a way that 
qualifies as 'agency7. Thus, networks are defined and controlled, organised and shaped by 
humans and o ther living organisms.
Notice however, in all o f the above contributions, tha t change is situated between entities, in 
the relationships between the embodied skill o f the practitioner and the 'script7 o f the 
technology, tha t then defines the specific action or 'practice7. Thus, these authors have already 
separated out the subject and object o f action and designated 'practice7 as an outcome o f the 
negotiated relationship o f 'agency7 constructed through a network o f people and things. 
Instead I intend to  take a step back from  the question o f 'agency7 in order to  re-consider how 
we might th ink about social action. I suggest tha t instead o f asking how things become 
organised, we m ight do well to  firs t ask how things are, that is how it is that they exist. Thus, 
instead o f beginning w ith  the question o f becoming, w ith  the question o f change, it could 
prove fru itfu l to  turn to  an analysis o f being to  consider the material 'w orld7 in a 
fundamentally d ifferent way, doing so w ith  reference to Heidegger's notions of Dasein and 
'being-in-the-world7.
Dasein and Being-in-the-World
In Being and Time ([1927] 1962), Heidegger famously puts forward an analysis o f Dasein, of 
the human being as it is engaged in the 'w orld7 o f practical activity, amid material objects and 
w ith  others.8 Significantly, this study of Dasein as practical and 'everyday7 activity is both
8 It should be noted that a thorough discussion of this analysis (that I plunder from  Heidegger's magnum  
opus) cannot be sufficiently laid out, nor adequately described in the space given here. Neither could it 
be done more acutely than it is in Heidegger's original work (though many good introductions and 
commentaries on Heidegger's thought are available). Nevertheless, Heidegger's analysis presents a
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illustrated by and requires a re-framing o f how we m ight usually th ink about and study 
material things. Rather than focusing a study on the ontic question o f what there is, tha t is to  
say, what entities exist and what relations exist between them, Heidegger suggests another 
way o f dealing w ith  things, to  study tha t they are, to  ask the ontological question about the 
existing-ness o f things. This, fo r Heidegger, is the question o f being and suggests an alternative 
approach fo r considering the role o f material equipment in practice which does not require 
the separation o f humans and nonhumans or of living and nonliving things. Thus, rather than 
studying all o f the entities, bodies and things, tha t is, the beings o f resistance training, instead 
it is also possible to  turn our attention to  the study of the being o f practical, 'everyday' life, or 
in this example, o f 'moments' o f practice o f resistance training.
In order to  study the being o f practical, 'everyday' life, Heidegger grounds his analysis in the 
study o f the human entity, the human being, that which he calls Dasein.9 However, this is not 
an 'everyday' understanding of the human being; but a very particular and specific re­
form ulation. Dasein literally translates as there-being, drawing attention to  the fact that 
human beings dwell 'in-the-world '. They are always spatially situated amid and w ith  material 
entities and others as well as always temporally situated, directed towards the ir future 
projections and dealing w ith what they receive from  the past. Thus, in Heidegger's analysis of 
Dasein, things are not in 'space' out there and part o f a material 'w orld ' detached from being 
and thus capable o f being studied as so many entities tha t exist. Instead Dasein is a concerned 
user o f practical entities. As such, the Dasein o f resistance training is concerned w ith the 
whole assemblage of material entities, o f bodies and things tha t make up the 'w orld ' of
unique and pivotal entry point to think again about the pragmatic relation of doing. Any discussion of 
the actional relation of practice, of doing, could not om it reference to such a considerable divergence in 
thinking about the role of the material equipm ent of practice.
9 For now, it will be useful to follow  Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as 'being-in-the-world' and as the  
'world ' of practice; but in Chapter Five it will be necessary to leave behind the concept of Dasein 
grounded in the human entity, as Heidegger does in his later work (see Contributions to Philosophy), in 
order to fully recognise being as becoming, or as I describe, practice as change.
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resistance training. In this sense the 'w orld ' o f practice is not out there; but it is a part o f 
Dasein's being: human being is essentially therefore, 'being-in-the-world'.
In the same way neither is 'tim e ' separate from  Dasein. Instead fundamentally, all three 
temporalities occur fo r it 'a t one stroke'. That is to  say tha t in each 'm om ent' o f practice, 
Dasein is thrown  amid the material 'w orld ' that it receives from the past, is fa llen  and pre­
occupied w ith  the material 'w orld ' in its current practical and 'everyday' dealings, and projects 
itself towards its possible fu ture material 'worlds'. More is said in Chapter Four and Five o f this 
thesis regarding the spatio-temporal qualities o f 'being-in-the-world' and much depends upon 
whether we consider Dasein or practice as our principal unit o f analysis. For now though it is 
enough to recognise the spatial and temporal situated-ness of 'being-in-the-world' and it 
remains useful to  continue w ith Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, in this chapter, in order to  
develop a theoretical position that recognises the inseparability o f being and 'world ', rather 
than one that separates out humans and nonhumans, living and nonliving objects, and thus 
the subjects and objects o f action. Heidegger's analysis o f equipment can help to  draw out this 
turn to  a study of being in practical 'everyday' life as opposed to the study of beings or so 
many entities that come to  constitute 'a practice' as thing.
The first point to  make about Heidegger's analysis o f equipment is that, primarily, Dasein does 
not encounter material objects as isolated 'item s' or 'pieces'. Every object is rather relative to  
its context:
"Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. To the being o f any 
equipment there always belongs a to ta lity  o f equipment, in which it can be this 
equipment tha t it is." (Heidegger [1927] 1962, 97)
Take fo r example, the bar-bells in the gym. These range in size from  around five to  seven feet 
long and are made o f d ifferent materials, plastics and metals, to  hold variously heavy weights,
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which practitioners can lift to  perform various techniques, exercises, repetitions and workouts. 
W hilst we may say tha t the bar-bell is a 'piece' o f equipment, the resistance training 
practitioner prim arily encounters the bar-bell as part o f perform ing a particular role in 
facilitating w eight-lifting and resistance training. As a singular 'piece' o f equipment, the bar­
bell could never achieve the practice o f resistance training on its own. Dead-lifting (a type of 
leg and lower back exercise tha t one might perform w ith  a bar-bell), fo r example, requires 
variously heavy, weighted plates, clips to stop these plates sliding from  the bar, a lifting 
p latform , a weight rack, lifting straps, gloves and chalk. This might seem self-evident; but we 
also need to  take account o f the fact tha t dead-lifting requires hands and arms and legs and 
muscles and a central nervous system. It normally requires a gym consisting o f various owners, 
trainers, infrastructures and even more equipment. Even the bar-bell itself and the weighted 
plates and clips are constructed elsewhere, manufactured, produced and transported to  arrive 
at the gym and thus are part o f the 'w orld ' o f practice of dead-lifting. The metals and plastics 
too are mined and refined at even fu rthe r locales and each requires the ir own infrastructures, 
systems and equipment. All o f this is equipment fo r Heidegger, in the sense that it is 'involved' 
w ith  all the rest, an 'equipmental whole' in which everything refers beyond itself. There is then, 
no such thing as an objective 'piece' o f equipment; but rather all equipment in the 'w orld ' of 
practice is relative to  its context.
The second key point to  make is that, fo r Heidegger, equipment is primarily directed towards 
something:
"Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to'... In the 'in-order-to ' as a structure
there lies an assignment or reference o f something to  something." (Heidegger [1927]
1962, 97)
Equipment therefore, has the character o f being 'in-order-to '. We might consider that a bar­
bell is there in order to dead-lift, a treadm ill in order to  run, a protein shake in order to drink.
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For Heidegger, in our 'everyday7 (and routine) dealings w ith  the bar-bell, we do not just come 
across it and decide to  begin w eight-lifting w ith  it. Rather the bar-bell is already assigned this 
'in -o rder-to7 by the referential context o f the equipmental whole, by the 'w orld7 o f practice. 
For Heidegger, the resistance training practitioner does not encounter the bar-bell and then 
ask herself what it could be used for. Instead she sees it immediately as something w ith  which 
to  'work out7.
Eddie, an experienced resistance tra iner fo r nearly tw enty years encapsulated this 
understanding o f instrumental in tentionality during an interview we had about his training:
"I don7t  th ink about the bar... I just lift it.77 (Eddie)
Eddie is referring here to  the understanding tha t many resistance training practitioners 
comment on, tha t when perform ing a heavy repetition o f lifting a weight, that they do not 
focus on the weight or on the bar, the position o f the rack or even the necessary bodily 
technique to  achieve the lift. Indeed to  do so, would be to  the detrim ent o f the lift. Instead 
they focus on one thing: the action o f lifting. This focus on lifting, o f encountering the bar-bell 
in this way, does however require a certain type of engagement, a certain type o f Dasein. For 
Heidegger, Dasein does not look at an object; but rather circumspects equipment to  see the 
thing  in terms o f an 'in -order-to7 do this or that. Dasein therefore, is not separate from  the 
equipmental whole; but is fundamentally 'in-the-world7 o f practice as 'being-in-the-world7, 
which allows it to  encounter equipment as 'in-order-to7 do tha t particular action. In this way, a 
Dasein tha t is not engaged in the 'w orld7 of resistance training; but is engaged in say, 
hammering a nail into a wall, w ill encounter the bar-bell as not 'in-order-to7 that action and 
hence in a nonroutine way. However, a Dasein tha t is engaged in the 'w orld7 o f resistance 
training, say dead-lifting specifically, w ill encounter the bar-bell as 'in -order-to7 and in a 
thoroughly routine way.
62
The th ird  key characteristic o f equipm ent fo r Heidegger is tha t when it is in use the thing 
becomes the means and not the object o f experience. A useful example o f this is Eddie and his 
protein shake. As noted, nutrition  plays a vital role in the rhythms o f resistance training. 
Practitioners are keen to  provide the ir bodies w ith  the optimal amounts o f protein, nutrients 
and rest at the optimal times in order to  potentially maximise the ir recovery from  and the 
benefits o f the ir workouts. For this reason, resistance training practitioners tend to  be just as 
comm itted to  recovery as they are to  exercising. Eddie explained his recovery routine to  me 
during one o f our more formal interviews:
"As soon as I've finished my last rep, I'm thinking about recovery. I don 't hang around 
in the gym and all that... I go and get my shake straight away so my muscles can start 
repairing themselves." (Eddie)
In this sense, Eddie is not concerned w ith  his protein shake as such; but is instead concerned 
w ith  drinking it 'in -order-to ' recover from  his workout and potentially maximise his gains. 
Heidegger refers to  this much more 'prim ord ia l' and 'everyday' relationship to  things as the 
means and not the objects o f experience in his discussion of hammering:
"In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates 
itse lf to  the "in-order-to" which is constitutive fo r the equipment we are employing at 
the tim e; the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold o f it 
and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to  it become, and the more 
unveiledly is it encountered as tha t which it is - as equipment." (Heidegger [1927] 
1962, 98)
We can see then, that when considering the 'w orld ' o f practice, tha t is, the 'm om ent' o f doing, 
tha t we cannot look at, or theoretically observe the material objects o f doing as separate from 
what people do, as making demands o f human action, nor as an independent interaction
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between material capital and embodied understanding. Instead when considering practice as 
described in this thesis, the material objects o f practice are to  be considered as an 
equipmental whole tha t is 'in -order-to ' do those projects that are contained in the referential 
whole o f tha t equipment, contained in the 'w orld ' o f practice. Theodore Schatzki sums up this 
understanding o f equipment in his book on Heidegger and 'space':
"The world wherein a person lives at any given moment, consequently, is a nexus of 
teleologically meaningful entities. W hat it is fo r a person to  carry on in that world is 
fo r tha t person to  use that world's equipment in projects and fo r ends that are 
contained in the whole of significance tha t organises this equipment as a nexus: 
'being-in-the-world' is proceeding amid equipment according to  the teleological 
significance tha t characterizes them ." (Schatzki 2007, 38)
The 'w orld ' o f practice therefore, is made up of the assemblage o f bodies and things in the 
'm om ent' o f practice that constitutes social action or practice. For now it suffices to recognise 
Dasein, 'being-in-the-world' and my suggestion fo r considering the 'w orld ' o f practice as three 
concepts that, supported by Schatzki's above definition, allow us to  recognise the 
inseparability o f being and 'w orld '. However, as we w ill see in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, 
it w ill later be necessary to  leave behind the notion o f Dasein because it maintains its primary 
unit o f analysis as the human entity. Indeed we can already begin to turn our attention to a 
focus on the 'w orld ' o f practice, on the 'm om ent' o f doing itself as the central unit o f this 
thesis' enquiry. The follow ing section continues now to  explore how it is tha t the material 
equipment tha t makes up the 'w orld ' o f practice is experienced as 'in-order-to ' or otherwise, 
tha t is how it becomes scheduled and characterised as routine or nonroutine.
Routine and Nonroutine
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In the above section I explained tha t if we fo llow  a Heideggerian analysis from  Being and Time 
([1927] 1962) o f 'everyday' and routine practice, tha t there 'is' no such thing as an equipment; 
but tha t equipment is always relative to  its context (part o f the 'w orld ' o f practice), tha t the 
contextual and referential, equipmental whole (the 'w orld ' o f practice) assigns to  equipment 
its character o f 'in-order-to ' and tha t in use, equipment becomes the means and not the 
object o f experience. How then are we to understand the difference between 'everyday' and 
non-'everyday' involvement w ith  material equipment, that is, the difference between routine 
and nonroutine practice? W hat role does the material play in characterising the 'm om ent' o f 
practice as repeatable or otherwise? I suggest understanding Heidegger's account of the 
distinction between ready-to-hand (zuhanden) and present-to-hand (vorhanden) equipment, 
underpins this thesis' conceptual frame fo r understanding the scheduling o f routine practice.
Heidegger characterises the experience o f equipment as 'in-order-to ', o f engaging w ith the 
equipmental whole o f practice as the means and not the object o f experience, as ready-to- 
hand. When we encounter equipment as 'in-order-to ' do something, we encounter it as ready- 
to-hand, however, intriguingly, fo r equipment to  be ready-to-hand, it must at the same time 
w ithdraw :
"The peculiarity o f what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it 
must, as it were, w ithdraw in order to  be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That w ith  
which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the 
contrary, tha t which we concern ourselves primarily is the work - that which is to  be 
produced at tha t time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears w ith 
it tha t referential to ta lity  w ithin which the equipment is encountered." (Heidegger 
[1927] 1962, 99)
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As equipm ent becomes the means and not the object o f experience, technology withdraws 
and the user becomes absorbed in practice. A useful example o f this can be found in my 
discussions w ith  Lawrence. Lawrence first started resistance training in order to  improve his 
vertical jum p height fo r playing basketball. However, he became so captivated by the rhythms 
o f practice o f resistance training tha t he no longer plays basketball and fo r the last three years 
has been train ing through various power lifting programmes in the gym up to  six times per 
week. We spoke at length about the experience of lifting such heavy weights. Lawrence 
explained to  me tha t in order to  lift such vast weights up from  the floor and hold them over his 
head tha t it was impossible to  'th ink ' about lifting the bar from  one position to  the other. 
Instead his focus has to  be on particular lifting cues:
"The most im portant thing is getting someone to, or even in your own mind, saying 
cues so if you were doing a dead-lift you'd say: 'keep up my knees' or 'push hips out'. 
And you just th ink o f those tw o  things over and over again. You don 't th ink of anything 
else while you're doing the lift. Squatting is a good one 'push my knees out', 'keep my 
chest up'. Err... When I'm doing a clean or a jerk I just think 'stick', 'stick it', which just 
means balance. Don't worry so much about catching it, worry about balancing. So I 
have these kinds o f cues that I say in my head. That's how I learn it and then it 
becomes nature." (Lawrence)
Lawrence clearly, in this description, becomes absorbed in the 'm om ent o f practice'. The 
weighted bar (not described in this scenario at all) completely withdraws, so that Lawrence 
can engage in this practice quite routinely. I argue that it is only when equipment is 
experienced as ready-to-hand authentically, that is, when it withdraws, that routine practice is 
achieved, tha t practice takes place as routine.
However, equipment is not always encountered as ready-to-hand and 'moments' o f practice 
are not always scheduled as routine. Indeed, things show themselves up in our 'everyday' lives
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through the disruption o f the smooth running o f the whole, through the disruption o f routine 
practice. Fundamentally, this is not something tha t happens on occasion but is constantly 
occurring, as things presence, that is, as they are drawn out from  the equipmental whole, from 
the 'w orld7 o f practice. Heidegger refers to  the situation o f objects that are simply before us as 
the presencing o f equipment and it is in this situation that routine practice fails. Practice is 
disrupted when equipment is experienced as present-to-hand, tha t is, when it is broken, 
absent or standing in the way. In this sense, equipment only w ithdraws and practice can only 
be achieved in so far as the material equipment of the 'w orld ' o f practice functions 
unproblematically. When equipment presences and is no longer experienced as 'in-order-to ', 
practice becomes nonroutine. It w ill be useful to  briefly explore each of the three ways in 
which Heidegger describes that the smooth running of the 'w orld ' o f practice can be disrupted 
in order to  better draw out the differences between routine and nonroutine practice.
The firs t occurs when equipment breaks and the ready-to-hand becomes conspicuous. This is a 
regular problem in the gym. The very nature o f the practice places a great strain on the 
equipment in the gym. Coupled w ith general wear and tear, 'pieces' o f equipment often 
become damaged or broken. On one particular occasion, a particularly strong resistance 
training practitioner broke the dipping belt, a key component o f performing particular 
exercises and in constituting the re-production o f particular 'moments' o f practice. A dipping 
belt is made from  part leather and part chain and fits around the practitioner's waist. 
Practitioners then add weight to  the chain part o f the belt to increase the resistance in 
perform ing popular exercises like 'pull ups' and 'dips'. The gym only has one o f these belts. 
One day a very strong and particularly keen practitioner over-loaded the belt, snapping the 
chain and in the process fundamentally altered several other practitioners' rhythms of practice 
and indeed had the knock on effect o f altering the gym's rhythms of practice. W ith the dipping 
belt becoming quite clearly conspicuous and present in its breakdown, practitioners took to  all 
manner o f actions to attem pt to account fo r the presencing of the equipment and to try and
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re-establish the ir routine rhythms o f practice o f resistance training. Some attempted to lace 
the leather and chain back together w ith string, others tried to  hold weighted plates or kettle 
bells between the ir legs, whilst others still, tried to  tie weights to  lifting support belts that only 
fasten together w ith  Velcro. All attempts seemed to  fail and eventually most gave up and 
turned to  other exercises in the gym. The rhythms o f practice o f 'dipping' and doing 'pull ups' 
were severely weakened in the gym fo r around tw o weeks until the dipping belt was returned 
repaired and immediately fell back into the 'w orld ' o f practice, as rhythms o f practice of 
'd ipping' and doing 'pull ups' were resumed as routine.
A second sense in which something may announce itself as being present-to-hand is by being 
absent from  practice or unavailable:
"Again, to  miss something in this way amounts to  coming across something un-ready- 
to-hand. When we notice what is un-ready-to-hand, that which is ready-to-hand 
enters the mode o f obtrusiveness. The more urgently we need what is missing, and 
the more authentically it is encountered in its un-readiness-to-hand, all the more 
obtrusive does that which is ready-to-hand become - so much so, indeed, that is 
seems to lose its character o f readiness-to-hand. It reveals itself as something just 
present-at-hand and no more, which cannot be budged w ithout the thing that is 
missing." (Heidegger [1927] 1962,103)
David, a relatively novice resistance training practitioner, expressed to  me his frustration when 
the particular equipment tha t he required to  complete his workout was absent from his 
practice or unavailable to  him:
"Sometimes you can go in [to the gym] and there w ill be a class on and you w on 't be 
able to  use the equipment that you need, or even sometimes just one person can be
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using the thing you need but setup in a d ifferent way and you can't get done what you 
need to do... It can ruin your whole workout." (David)
David raises a common frustration fo r many resistance training practitioners; but especially fo r 
beginners, that, when particular equipment is unavailable or unusable, they can no longer 
continue w ith  the ir practice. Indeed as the equipment is experienced as present-to-hand by 
David, so too is his practice experienced as nonroutine. In this case, the presencing o f the gym 
equipment results in a break in David's routine practice.
The final way in which things come to  show themselves and disrupt the smooth running o f 
routine is when they stand in the way, obstinately, and refuse to be ready-to-hand. Eddie told 
me about a local 'strong-man' competition tha t he had entered into several years ago. He had 
only ever lifted weights in gyms but at the tim e fe lt 'very strong' and had been encouraged to 
compete. He had performed well in many o f the events that had simulated lifting weights back 
in the gym; but when it came to the final event, Eddie told me that he had really struggled. 
Eddie had never lifted Atlas Stones before (a set o f large boulders that increase in weight and 
are to  be lifted onto increasingly tall platforms). Even though the heaviest stone was o f a 
weight that Eddie could comfortably lift in the gym, the unfamiliar size and shape meant that 
Eddie could not get past the th ird  stone. He did not have the experience to lift it. Heidegger 
describes this standing in the way as a presencing that makes itself known as something to  be 
attended to:
"Anything which is un-ready-to-hand in this way is disturbing to  us, and enables us to 
see the obstinacy o f tha t which we must concern ourselves in the first place before we 
do anything else. W ith this obstinacy, the presence-at-hand o f the ready-to-hand 
makes itself known in a new way as the Being o f that which still lies before us and calls 
fo r our attending to  it." (Heidegger [1927] 1962,103-104)
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The th ird  Atlas Stone stood in the way o f Eddie finishing the event. The stone made itself 
known as something to  be attended to. Eddie to ld me tha t he did just that. He practiced and 
w ent back the fo llow ing year to  compete in the event and now has no problem lifting the 
stones. They now fall back into the equipmental whole fo r Eddie, or rather they come to make 
up part o f the 'w orld ' o f his practice. Nevertheless, the point remains that equipment can 
come to  stand in the way and disrupt the smooth running o f practice, the smooth running of 
routine; only when it is accounted fo r and attended to, can it be recovered and then 
successfully fall back into the realm o f routine practice. Importantly, I argue that fo r material 
equipment to  take on the character o f ready-to-hand, to  be experienced as routine, requires a 
sufficient amount o f 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice'. I now go on to show how 'embodied- 
knowledge-in-practice' comes to  define practice as routine or nonroutine; but a thorough 
discussion o f this concept, particularly of the role of 'knowledge' and o f the body in practice, is 
detailed at length and is the subject o f the fo llow ing chapter. For now, however, it is 
im portant to  examine how the experience o f practice as ready-to-hand or present-to-hand, for 
practice to  be repeated as routine or not as nonroutine, requires sufficient 'embodied- 
knowledge-in-practice'.
Towards Embodied-Knowledge-in-Practice
So far, I have developed an analysis of the 'w orld ' o f practice and made the argument that, 
when the material equipment that makes up the 'w orld ' o f practice is authentically 
experienced as ready-to-hand, that it w ithdraws fo r the practitioner as she becomes absorbed 
in the work o f routine practice. I have also described three ways in which Heidegger claims 
tha t equipment can come to show itself up, can presence and disrupt routine practice, 
constituting nonroutine practice. Importantly, these disruptions, these 'moments' of
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nonroutine practice, are not uncommon; but are continually occurring. This is clear in that if 
there were no 'm oments' o f disruption or breaks in rhythms o f practice, then no 'pieces' o f 
equipm ent would stand out to  us and the character o f the ready-to-hand would also remain 
concealed. Therefore, when the dipping belt breaks, not only does it reveal itself as a 'piece' o f 
equipment; but it also reveals the character o f the 'w orld ' o f 'dipping' and doing 'pull ups', 
when it is smoothly working, as routine practice. In this way, we can see tha t even though 
there are 'm oments' o f disruption and breaks in rhythms practice, these can be recovered and 
repaired so tha t what presences as un-ready-to-hand can return to being ready-to-hand.
An example o f this recovery of routine rhythms of practice and the maintaining o f the 
character o f ready-to-hand equipment, is W illiam 's ability to recover the available equipment 
in the gym to  achieve a particular workout, a particular 'm om ent' o f practice, despite the 
absence o f certain 'pieces' o f equipment:
" If the bench press is in use, I'll use dumbbells instead, or if I can't find a spare bench,
I'll do cable flys. I can always find something, or I'll do another body part that day and
do chest on another session." (William)
W hilst David (the more novice practitioner) became frustrated that the particular equipment 
he needed was unavailable and found his routine practice to  be disrupted, William is able to 
maintain his routine practice through his experience, through his developed 'embodied- 
knowledge-in-practice', o f the rhythms o f practice o f resistance training. Precisely because 
W illiam is an experienced resistance training practitioner, he has trained and developed his 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', so that these rhythms of practice have become stronger, 
even more embedded and connected and are thus, much less likely to  be broken in the same 
way tha t David's rhythms of practice break down when 'pieces' o f equipment are absent.
However, whilst on the one hand it is possible to  experience the equipmental whole as so 
authentically ready-to-hand that equipment can be manipulated to  recover it from  being 
experienced as un-ready-to-hand, so tha t routine practice can continue, as is the case for 
W illiam; it is also possible fo r equipment to  maintain the character o f present-to-hand, to  
precisely not w ithdraw  and refuse itself as ready-to-hand.
This is the case fo r Alan and his d ifficulty in establishing routine rhythms o f practice of eating 
five to  six small meals per day (a common rhythm amongst resistance training practitioners). 
Alan has been a resistance training practitioner fo r over five years; but has found it d ifficult to 
maintain these rhythms of practice. On occasion he has found himself training four times per 
week quite regularly, though more often this becomes once per week and sometimes he does 
not train  at all. In particular, he explained to  me that he attributes this to not being able to 
organise his dietary routine effectively:
"I know how to do it. I know the right things to eat and when to eat them... but it's 
just so difficult. I th ink it's the preparation, you have to make like three meals to take 
to  work w ith  you every day and they're usually cold and pretty tasteless. And I have to 
have the stu ff in to  make it up otherwise I have to  go to  the shop. I usually end up 
skipping meals because I don 't have anything in and then sacking o ff my diet. And then 
I'm like 'Well, if I'm not dieting, then there's no point in going to  the gym." So I just 
play X box instead.' (Alan)
Alan encounters various disruptions here. First, preparation is a problem fo r him. Making 
three meals per day to  take to  work presences fo r Alan, it is a constant object to  which he is 
concerned rather than a means o f 'fuelling the body' (as the gym saying goes). Second, if the 
particular food needed to make up his meals is absent from his preparation, then the 
equipmental whole again becomes present-to-hand, disrupting his rhythms o f practice of 
eating five or six meals a day. Finally, as dieting itself presences fo r Alan, he becomes unable
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to  negotiate the equipmental whole o f this practice, unable to  recover from  disruptions and 
breaks in practice, unable to  repair practice and establish this particular routine.
Catherine however, does engage in the rhythms o f practice o f eating five or six small meals a 
day and has done fo r over a year. She explained to  me her preparatory method:
"I make three boxes in the evening and take them to  work w ith  me because I have 
breakfast and dinner at home and I just eat them on my morning, lunch and dinner 
breaks. They only take me about tw enty minutes to make because I usually have the 
same thing in three boxes. It's quite easy really!" (Catherine)
Catherine negotiates the disruptions o f having to  prepare three meals by making one meal 
and splitting it into three. She experiences this as "quite easy" because she is absorbed in the 
'w orld ' o f this routine practice. She has the experience and thus the 'embodied-knowledge-in- 
practice' to  manipulate and negotiate any disruptions tha t arise. This is not a reflexive 
'knowledge' in the sense that Alan describes that he 'knows' how to engage in 'the practice'; 
but instead it is an 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' that is developed through the successful 
engagement in that 'w orld ' o f practice. Alan does not have the 'embodied-knowledge-in- 
practice', to  engage in the rhythms of practice of eating five to  six small meals per day and 
training four times a week that might fu rther support and strengthen the rhythms of practice 
o f resistance training. On the other hand, William is very much a part o f the 'w orld ' o f 
resistance training in that he experiences the equipmental whole as ready-to-hand and has the 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' to  maintain his rhythms of practice despite the absence of 
particular 'pieces' o f equipment.
'Embodied-knowledge-in-practice' and its development through embodied doing is the subject 
o f the next chapter. However, in closing, I want to emphasise my main point, that the 
scheduling o f practice as routine depends on the w ithdrawal o f equipment so that it is
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experienced as authentically ready-to-hand, whilst 'm oments' o f disruption and nonroutine 
practice occur when equipment is broken, absent or stands in the way and makes itself known 
as un-ready-to-hand. As it appears as un-ready-to-hand, equipment can be repaired and 
recovered to  fall back into the equipmental whole and back into routine practice, providing 
there exists sufficient 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice'. However, where there is insufficient 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', equipment refuses to  appear as ready-to-hand and instead 
becomes present-to-hand. As described in the example o f Alan's dietary difficulties, rhythms 
o f practice become broken and cannot simply fall back into routine.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have begun to  lay the ground fo r understanding how what people do changes, 
by positioning an analysis o f practice not as constituted as an outcome o f the relationships 
between human and nonhuman entities; but as the 'w orld ' o f practice tha t is made up of 
bodies and things. In so doing I suggested that it is possible to  offer an alternative reading of 
the role o f material objects in social action to readings that prevail in social science from 
'Science and Technology Studies' that seek to  understand the distribution o f 'agencies' across 
networks of people and things. Through a Heideggerian analysis o f the notions of Dasein and 
'being-in-the-world' I argued that we can also turn our attention not only to  the analysis o f the 
way tha t things are organised; but indeed to  the study of how they are. I showed that the 
material equipment o f practice can be viewed as making up part o f the 'w orld ' o f practice and 
tha t im portantly the character o f the 'w orld ' o f practice as ready-to-hand or present-to-hand 
fundamentally schedules the 'm oment' of practice as routine or nonroutine, as repeatable or 
otherwise. Finally, I claimed that the experience o f the 'w orld ' o f practice and the material 
equipment involved in that 'world ' depends on there-being sufficient 'embodied-knowledge-
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in-practice' developed through experience and 'training'. I move now to  position a fu ller 
discussion o f this concept through exploring the role o f the body and o f 'knowledge' in my re­
presentation o f social action, which seeks to  more fu lly capture doing or practice in its 
presence.
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Chapter Three: Embodied- 
Knowledge-in-Practice
It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that 
determines their consciousness. (Marx)
Introduction
In the preceding chapter I claimed that a firs t step in re-considering the scheduling o f routine 
practice was to  understand the material equipment involved in social action not as external to 
practice; but as making up the 'w orld ' o f practice. I claimed that the character o f the 'w orld ' o f 
practice as routine or nonroutine, that is as repeatable or otherwise, depended in particular 
on there-being sufficient 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice'. Thus, it becomes im portant to 
take account o f the role of the body and o f 'knowledge' w ithin this suggested ontology of 
practice.
I go on now in this chapter to  re-position the role o f the body as it is more commonly 
considered in social theory as either, or both, body-subject and body-object, a distinction that 
at the same externalises 'knowledge' from material doing to  abstract cognitive and reflexive 
capacities, by building an analysis o f 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', o f the 'lived body' as 
the medium and site of practice and 'knowledge-in-practice' as constituting the event of 
connections to  various other bodies, tools and machinic assemblages that constitute the 
'w orld ' o f practice.
In order to  draw out this analysis I refer to  my experiences and studies o f the rhythms of 
practice of ashtanga yoga. In particular these rhythms of practice provide a useful site of 
analysis tha t give specific attention to  the physical body, to  a focus on the learning o f bodily 
movements through specific postures and positions and is a good example o f rhythms of
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practice tha t highlight a particular re-framing o f the relationship between the body-subject 
and the body-object as both the site and medium of action.
So tha t I m ight elucidate this re-framing o f the role o f the body and thus necessarily the role of 
'knowledge', I contrast my analysis in the first instance to  selected and contemporary 
arguments from  social theory, 'theories o f practice', cognitive psychology and approaches 
based in 'in ter-subjectivity' tha t distinguish between the body as subject and object. I argue 
tha t these approaches variously distinguish social action, to  d ifferent degrees and in different 
capacities, as embodied and reflexive, as habitual and cognitive and as establishing 
alternatively the T  and the 'me' o f action. I argue that in providing such dichotomous analyses 
tha t these approaches, despite claims to the contrary, externalise 'knowledge-as-object', 
separating 'knowledge' from  practice in the 'm om ent' o f doing. Instead I suggest 
understanding the body as already in concert w ith  the material equipment that makes up the 
'w orld ' o f practice. In making this argument I fo llow  a particular reading of Merleau-Ponty's 
description o f the 'lived body' as it is described in the Phenomenology o f Perception ([1945] 
1962), as making embodied Heidegger's ([1927] 1962) notion o f 'being-in-the-world '.10 Having 
argued fo r considering the role o f the body as the 'lived body', I go on to  address the role of 
'knowledge', suggesting that we might consider 'knowledge' not as an external object that 
works on the subject-to-be-changed; but instead, fo llow ing Lave and Wenger's (1991) 
argument suggest that we can consider 'knowledge-in-practice' as a fundamental property of 
ongoing participation in practice. In the final section, I draw these tw o ideas together, o f the 
'lived body' and o f 'knowledge-in-practice', through a reading of Deleuze and Guattari's notion 
o f the 'Body w ithout Organs' ([1972] 1984, [1980] 1988) to argue that understanding 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' requires understanding the 'self', or the body, not as a 
stable entity  tha t changes; but as itself a modification (and indeed as the site o f modification)
10 This is a contested reading amongst Heidegger scholars. However, I argue that the reading of 
Merleau-Ponty, that I suggest in this text, provides a convincing and useful account of the role of the  
body in practical activity that maintains a central focus on doing.
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tha t is continually changing in its connections to  other assemblages o f bodies and things in 
constituting the 'w orld ' o f practice. First, it w ill be useful to  say something regarding my 
engagement in and study o f the rhythms o f practice o f ashtanga yoga.
Ashtanga Yoga
To draw out these ideas, first o f the 'lived body' and second o f 'knowledge-in-practice', I refer 
to  my engagement in and study o f the rhythms of practice o f ashtanga yoga. Whilst many 
variants and styles o f yoga are practiced today, ashtanga yoga in particular is often considered 
to  be a dynamic form  o f yoga tha t concentrates significantly more on 'flow ' between positions 
than it does on static postures like hatha yoga, or on meditation and breathing as in prahayana 
yoga (although these elements are not absent). Participants usually attend classes to fo llow  an 
instructor or on occasion, pre-recorded audio timings accompanied by a visual sheet of 
postures {asanas), to  move through the 'primary sequence' o f postures and positions designed 
to  improve, flexibility, strength, rotation, dexterity, balance and so on. Practitioners stand on 
specifically designed yoga mats that support postures by providing grip and sometimes utilise 
blocks, chairs ropes and other equipment to  support the ir practice. For the most part though, 
ashtanga yoga requires limited equipment and as such promotes a heightened sensitivity and 
attention to the movements of the body.
I had been practicing ashtanga yoga fo r six months prior to  recognising these rhythms of 
practice as a suitable empirical site fo r considering the role of the body in practice. I first 
attended a local class w ith  Arnold, a martial arts training partner and already respondent in 
these studies, before yoga became a regular and integral part o f my weekly schedule. At the 
height o f my engagement in these rhythms of practice, I performed the sun salutations A and 
B (see Figure 1) every day and met regularly w ith other practitioners outside o f class time to
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go over the 'prim ary sequence' together, to  work on the latest postures that we had been 
taught and discuss our experiences of these rhythms of practice. Several o f these discussions 
were recorded and subsequently transcribed to  both draw out and illustrate the theoretical 
re-positioning o f the body and o f 'knowledge' as described in this text.
Suryanamaskara A (9Vinyasas)
Suryarsamaskara 8 (17  vinyasaj)
M: (» )
Figure 1: Sun Salutations A and B in the Tradition of Sri K. Patthabi Jois
The rhythms o f practice of ashtanga yoga re-present a suitably fru itfu l site to both draw out 
and illustrate the role of the body in practice on three counts. First, these rhythms of practice 
require lim ited material equipment, thus perm itting a more concentrated focus on the body, 
away from  body-thing relationships. Second, the rhythms of practice themselves are about 
learning particular and routinised bodily movements. Finally and perhaps most significantly, 
rhythms of practice of ashtanga yoga offer, both explicitly through teachings, as well as re­
presented through the bodily and kinetic experiences of practitioners, a particular re-framing 
o f the relationship between the body-subject and the body-object, that is, a re-framing of the 
subjects and objects o f social action. In order to examine this particular re-framing o f the body 
in practice, I turn first to outline selected arguments from contemporary social theory that 
distinguish between and focus on either the body as subject or object, before offering an
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alternative reading o f these bodily experiences o f learning the rhythms o f ashtanga yoga 
practice, through Merleau-Ponty's ([1945] 1962) notion o f the 'lived body'.
Body-Subjects and Body-Objects
So tha t I m ight argue fo r an understanding of the role o f the body in social action as part o f the 
'w o rld ' o f practice and in order to  position 'knowledge' not as external to  action; but as always 
part o f doing, it w ill be useful to  firs t turn towards a few  selected arguments from  social 
theory, 'theories o f practice' and cognitive psychology in order to demonstrate the difference 
between recognising the body as subject, the body as object, or alternatively as both subject 
and object and considering the 'lived body' as the site and medium o f all practice. Here I show 
tha t these various approaches are designed to  examine how external 'knowledge-as-object' 
becomes internalised or embodied. Instead, my thesis suggests tha t 'knowledge' does not 
need to  become embodied as it is always already immediate in practice. Thus, we require an 
alternative reading of the body.
Until recently social science has seemed to pay little  attention to the body. Instead the body 
has been left to  various other academic fields to dissect and study as an objective entity. 
Biochemists study the cells o f the body, physiologists muscle groups and bone structures, 
biomechanists investigate bodily movement, while human m otor behaviourists research body 
memory and psychologists explore the mind. This highly mechanistic, rational and scientific 
view o f the body has made it absent from arguments and discussions that usually take place in 
the social sciences (Hall 1996). However, during the 1990's, as Hall states, there was an 
upsurge o f academic interest in the body, w ith a range of books and special interdisciplinary 
journals published on the topic of the body and its role in social theory. Nevertheless, Davis 
(1997) has argued that, social theory has continued to relegate the actual body to  the domain
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of those more scientific, biological fields, preferring instead to  study symbolic meanings 
attached to  the body:
"Human beings are portrayed as disembodied actors rather than living, breathing, 
flesh-and-blood organisms (Freund 1988). As O'Neil (1985: 48) puts it, sociologists 
seem to  prefer to  imagine tha t if society rules us, it does so through our minds, while 
we rule our bodies rather than being ruled by them ." (Davis 1997, 3)
In this way, readings o f the body in social theory have tended to  focus on the body-object, on 
body modification and so on, recognising the body as some-thing  worked on by distinct 
actors.11
Thus, whilst many social theorists claim to  accept criticisms levied at a dualistic split between 
'm ind ' and body (resulting from  four hundred years of fa llout from  Descartes' thesis ([1637] 
2005) and claim fu rther that social science should recognise the relationship between 'm ind' 
and body, there nevertheless remains, in a variety of social disciplines, a significant and 
dualistic split between the subject and object of social action that is called upon to examine 
how particular actions, 'practices', habits or techniques, are acquired, learnt or embodied.
For example, in a recent collection o f articles, editors Alan Warde and Dale Southerton (2012) 
draw together authors from disciplines that range from pragmatism to cognitive psychology in 
order to  promote the body as a subjective carrier o f 'practices' and thus account fo r the 
habitual and embodied character o f certain kinds o f social action. This particular enframing 
suggests tha t we ask (and need to answer) the question o f how 'a practice', o f ashtanga yoga 
fo r example, becomes habitual and embodied. Thus, what ashtanga yoga practice is, as an 
object, is conceptualised as external to  the body-subject-to-be-changed. It is through the 
performance o f ashtanga yoga that the body-subject /  carrier is imbued w ith, or takes on
11 For example see Featherstone (2010).
81
habits as particular and encoded 'knowledges' o f ashtanga yoga are internalised and 
embodied.
However, fo r Warde and Southerton's particular 'theory o f practice' as conceptualised in this 
collection (and indeed Warde and Southerton are not alone in facing this theoretical 
conundrum), a theory o f 'm ind', o f reflexivity and o f 'knowledge' as outside o f the materiality 
o f bodily doing, is required to  explain the taking up, making habitual or embodying o f 
'practices'. They w rite  in the introduction to  the collection:
"A pure theory o f habit, one which deployed exclusively stimulus-response 
mechanisms after the fashion o f Behaviourism, or which consigned all acts to  the 
category o f personal, regular, repeated, automatic and unconsidered reaction to 
situations, could never produce a comprehensive or satisfactory account. It would rely 
too heavily on unintended consequences o f action to  explain change, have almost no 
space fo r personal or collective projects designed and enjoined precisely to disrupt the 
usual and the regular, and be unable to  attribute any role to  deliberation in solving 
previously un-encountered practical or intellectual problems." (Warde and Southerton 
2012,14)
Thus, fo r Warde and Southerton, ashtanga yoga may well be a habitual, embodied and routine 
'practice' fo r experienced practitioners; but the process of deliberation to  join in such an 
activity or to  embark on a previously un-encountered project, like starting a yoga class fo r the 
firs t tim e, in this enframing, remains outside o f the materiality o f doing and instead w ithin the 
realm o f reflexivity, 'consciousness' and 'm ind'.
Thus, by moving between considering the 'm ind'-subject and the body-subject as both 
perform ing  or carrying reflexive, 'conscious' 'practices' or habitual and embodied 'practices', 
the ir theory o f action requires a scheme that can explain how 'practices' jump from the
82
reflexive to  the habitual, from  thinking to  embodied, tha t is to  say, how it is tha t 'the practice' 
o f ashtanga yoga becomes an habitual and embodied 'practice'. In recent years, some 
'practice theorists' have turned to  models from  cognitive psychology to address this 
fundamental question.12 One particularly widely cited resource is Omar Lizardo's (2009) 
'Special Psychology o f Practice'. He claims that:
"...no account that wishes to  retain the notion that practices are social can do w ithout 
providing on explicit set o f mechanisms tha t allow fo r such implicit, bodily (and motor) 
encoded objects to  "jum p from  person to person." (Lizardo 2009, 717)
Thus, Lizardo seeks to  explain how 'practices' as im plicit and bodily objects of 'knowledge' are 
transm itted between subjects. In order to  answer this question, Lizardo is forced to  split the 
subject in two, making a distinction between the reflexive, 'conscious', thinking subject and 
the habitual, embodied subject. Referring to  Wacquant's (2004) study o f boxing in Chicago, he 
suggests tha t punches, footwork and drills are at firs t reflexively thought about and practiced 
until they become routine and habitual:
"W hile beginning as a process o f conscious attention to  visually available role models, 
during the course o f training, this process o f motor-schematic m irroring comes to 
acquire a habitual and tacit cast." (Lizardo 2009, 720)
Thus, fo llow ing this fairly common sense analysis, we might consider that practitioners of 
ashtanga yoga first acquire a visual stock of kinaesthetic images and through m irroring these 
movements, develop a habitual and embodied understanding o f 'the practice'.
Nevertheless, this thesis contends that it is also possible to  understand the body in a different 
way, neither as a worked upon material object nor as 'a practice' carrying body-subject; but 
instead as part o f the 'world ' o f practice.
12 Note that this is only a fundamental question when the body and 'knowledge' are positioned as 
separate.
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However, there is one fu rther approach that, in a sense, combines the tw o suggestions above 
and it is useful to  explore this in order to  better position the central claim o f this chapter. This 
is, Nick Crossley's (2005) explicit argument tha t the body is at the same tim e both subject T  
and object 'm e'. Again, Crossley is keen to  avoid a dualistic split and suggests that 
distinguishing between the 'I' and 'me' o f social action: "does not indicate a substantial 
distinction between mind /  self and body." (Crossley 2005, 2) Nevertheless, Crossley is here 
distinguishing between the body-subject T  and the body-object 'me'.
Drawing on Marcel Mauss' (1979) concept o f 'body techniques' as: "practical and embodied 
forms o f understanding", Crossley's article emphasises the 'm indfu l' aspect o f 'body 
techniques' "whose primary purpose is to work back upon the body, so as to  modify, maintain 
or thematize i t  in some way..." (Crossley 2005, 9 emphasis added). He refers to  this 
combination o f 'm indfu l' reflexivity and Mauss' 'body techniques' as 'reflexive body 
techniques' (RBTs). Thus, RBTs are argued to be 'practices' that the 'm indfu l' subject employs 
to  modify or maintain the body object. Crossley writes:
"RBTs are generic body techniques which an agent annexes, in a specific context, fo r 
the explicit purpose of (perhaps amongst other things) modifying the ir body in a 
particular way: fo r example, in an e ffo rt to  lose weight they elect to  take a walk once a 
week." (11)
In this sense we might consider 'the practice' o f ashtanga yoga as an RBT that practitioners, as 
agents, elect to  take part in, in order to  increase, flexibility, strength, balance and so on. 
However, im portantly fo r Crossley, the 'm indful' subject does not simply 'choose' to  do yoga in 
order to  work on the body-object. Rather, RBTs such as ashtanga yoga or resistance training 
develop a sense o f 'self' as 'body sculptor' or 'yoga practitioner' that orients the body-subject 
to  the body-object in particular ways:
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"Techniques o f weight training are deployed by the bodybuilder in pursuit o f muscular 
gain, fo r example, but at the same tim e these techniques orient the agent towards the 
body, tha t o f the 'body sculptor', which the bodybuilder appropriates as they 
appropriate these techniques w ith in  the ir habitus. They heighten body and muscular 
awareness." (Crossley 2005,14)
Thus we m ight consider the yoga practitioner as employing ashtanga yoga techniques in 
pursuit o f flexib ility; but at the same tim e the performance o f these techniques develops a 
sense o f 's e lf as yoga practitioner, a body-subject, that is disposed to attending to  bodily 
movements in this way.
W riting about the 'body techniques' involved in mixed martial arts (M M A)13 Dale Spencer, 
supports Crossley's argument tha t "the actual learning o f RBTs is part o f the process through 
which our particular sense o f self is developed." (Spencer 2009, 133) Thus, through this 
analysis o f the body-subject and the body-object, both Crossley and Spencer turn their 
analyses to  the production of the 'self' and to the production o f identity. Spencer describes 
how mixed martial arts training creates the identity o f the mixed martial artist:
"...body techniques and RBTs are integral to  identity formation. We posit a self in and 
through learning and conducting RBTs. They give bodies a particular character and are 
reflected in recognisable bodily dispositions. The training integral to MMA, moulds the 
bodies o f fighters, significantly impinging on how they see themselves and how their 
identities are reflected to those w ithin and outside o f the MMA community." (Spencer 
2009,135)
Thus, an analysis of the 'I' and 'me' o f the yoga practitioner might lead us to  argue that 
through the learning o f ashtanga yoga 'practice', practitioners develop identities, the ir senses 
of 'self', as yoga practitioners. That is to say, that the learning of a set o f 'body techniques'
13 The rhythms of practice of mixed martial arts are discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
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effects and thus modifes the subject-to-be-changed. 'Body techniques' are therefore 
considered as externalised forms o f 'knowledge' from  the body-subject /  body-object.
In this way, I position my argument in contrast to  positions that work w ith  a dichotomous 
notion o f body-subjects and body-objects, that externalise 'knowledge-as-object' from the 
'w o rld ' o f practice and tha t define identities as provisionally stable entities that become 
d iffe ren t and tha t are changed. Instead, I suggest, as I commented in the introduction to  this 
thesis, tha t we take seriously Reckwitz (2002) suggestion tha t a turn to  practice requires a shift 
in understanding the 'self' and propose that considering Merleau-Ponty's notion o f the 'lived 
body', as described in the Phenomenology o f Perception ([1945] 1962) can liberate us from  
having to  position the role o f the body as necessarily subject or object.
The Lived Body
A firs t point to  note, by way o f introduction to  the notion o f the 'lived body', is to  understand 
how Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1962) re-frames thinking about 'consciousness'. Whilst Heidegger 
rejects the term  'consciousness' because o f its fam iliar and 'everyday' connotations as 
distinguished from  'un-consciousness', Merleau-Ponty takes up Husserl's concepts of the 'lived 
body' (leib), as the medium tha t sites perspective and o f 'consciousness' as a relation between 
the 'lived body' and the 'w orld ' showing instead how the tw o work together as the very 
perceiving tha t positions my body as my point o f view on the 'w orld ' and at the same time my 
body as something tha t moves towards things. In her introductory text to  Merleau-Ponty's 
work, Catherine Morris sums up this position on the body:
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"The lived body is the 'thereness' o f human reality, and the body as it is lived in 
everyday dealings w ith  the world as the centre o f the field o f perception and action." 
(Morris 2012, 49)
Just as Heidegger describes Dasein as there-being or 'being-in-the-world', so too does 
Merleau-Ponty contend tha t the 'lived body' is at once inseparable from  its 'everyday' dealings 
or practical activity and at the same time is the very site o f perception, action and doing.14
Significantly, fo r Merleau-Ponty, it is precisely because the 'lived body' is the medium o f all 
perception, already thrown amidst things and directed towards practical activity, tha t it is 
itself unperceived in 'everyday' and routine practice. In The Absent Body (1990) Drew Leder 
notices this absence o f the body, not just in its academic consideration in social theory and 
philosophy; but in 'everyday' practice. He writes:
"... one acts from the here-and-now body to  spatially and temporally noncoincident 
objects." (Leder 1990,18)
Thus, he argues that, just like the tool in Heidegger's analysis in Being and Time ([1927] 1962), 
tha t the body withdraws in routine practice. That is to  say practice is experienced as routine 
whilst the body remains unperceived and ready-to-hand. However, routine precisely breaks 
down and becomes nonroutine when the body presences, or makes itself known. In this way 
we can see that both the 'lived body' and the material equipment o f practice can be seen to 
function in the same way, establishing both routine and nonroutine practice. Hence the 
argument that Merleau-Ponty makes embodied Heidegger's notion o f 'being-in-the-world'.
Klas Nevrin, in his study on 'Empowerment and Using the Body in Modern Postural Yoga' 
(2008), builds on Leder's analysis to  argue that yoga practice in particular develops a
14 Throughout the rest of this section I will unavoidably at times refer to 'consciousness' in the same 
way that I have described M erleau-Ponty does to better explicate this argument. However, I too find the  
term  problematic and will continue in this chapter to develop the notion of 'em bodied-knowledge-in- 
practice', in order to make clearer the theoretical implications of conceiving of the body in this way.
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'heightened sensitivity' in practitioners' bodies tha t allows them to potentially re-connect the 
'lived body' (or 'consciousness') w ith  the 'w orld '. He contrasts this 'heightened sensitivity' w ith 
'norm al' or 'everyday' practice and writes:
"M ost o f the time, then, the entire corporeal regions and powers are 'absenced' b y -  
being directed toward some or other object in the outer world, which effectively 
relegates the body to  the status o f neutral background." (Nevrin 2008,126)
However, during yoga practice, the entire corporeal regions are directed toward the body. 
Rather than presencing through breakdown or failure, 'consciousness' or the 'lived body' is 
drawn to  the body itself, highlighting it as the medium and site o f human action or practice. In 
another study o f the experiential mode of yoga practice, Zarilli describes this bodily experience 
that:
"...allows fo r a shift in one's experience o f the body and mind aspects from  the ir gross 
separation, marked by the body's constant disappearance, to  a much more subtle and 
dialectical engagement o f body-in-mind and mind-in-body." (Zarrilli 2004, 661)
It is this shift in experience o f the body in 'everyday' practice either as absenced, neutral 
background or present in its breakdown, to  experienced as both the medium and site of 
practice itself, tha t particularly well illustrates, as well as drew out fo r me, through my own 
rhythms o f practice, a re-conceptualisation of the role o f the body in practice as the 'lived 
body'.
It is a shift tha t was echoed in the experiences of several class mates and training partners; but 
also one tha t was explicitly taught and sought after. Indeed one respondent, Arnold, described 
to  me his experience of this shift after one particular session, during the warm-up phase o f the 
class performing five A sun salutations and three B sun salutations (see Figure 1):
"It's  like today I d idn 't have to  th ink about what came next in the sequence, or where 
to  put my hands in downward facing dog, my body just did it and I could really just 
focus on my breathing..." (Arnold)
In this sense, Arnold describes that rather than experiencing his body as an objective set o f 
limbs, muscles and joints; tha t in this particular session, it was experienced as the very mode 
o f experiencing. Nevrin describes this experience as immersion in kinetic experience:
"A ttending to  movement in this way is to  immerse oneself in kinetic experiences that 
are fe lt to  have no goal or purpose beyond themselves, in which "the meaning of 
kinetic experience is in the movement itself." (Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 151)" (Nevrin 
2008,123).
It is this immersion in kinetic experience (that is both a common experience and an explicit 
goal o f yogic teachings), that makes yoga a particularly useful case fo r highlighting a 
conceptualisation o f the role o f the 'lived' body in practice. Importantly, though this 
suggestion becomes problematic when it is assumed that this role fo r the body only exists in 
habitual or embodied practice. Rather it must be recognised that particular rhythms of 
practice reveal the body in this way.15 Nevertheless, just like the tool, the body functions in 
the same way regardless of whether practice is experienced as routine or nonroutine. Indeed 
it is this misconception, or at least incompatible viewpoint which prompts questions such as: 
how do we 'know ' how to attend to movement in this way? How do we 'learn' to  'know' how 
to  move our bodies w ithout explicitly considering the ir position? How do we 'know' how our 
limbs are situated? Notice however, that these questions, thus framed, already separate out 
the body-subject from the body-object, distinguish between 'explicit' and embodied 
movement and thus open the door fo r such analyses that externalise 'knowledge' from
15 Indeed Nevrin (2008) suggests that other rhythms of practice such as sports, dance and martial arts, 
might also well highlight this shift in experience because of their focus on the body.
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practice as described above. Instead we would do well to  heed the lesson from the study o f 
rhythms o f practice o f ashtanga yoga in recognising the body as the medium and site of 
practice. In answer to  these questions, W ittgenstein suggests that we must recognise when we 
do not need to  ask a question. He writes:
"There need be no 'how '; we know how our limbs are situated." (W ittgenstein 1988,
90)
It is thus, fo r Merleau-Ponty, tha t the 'knowledge' in question, o f how to move the body, is 
immediate. Our body "presents us immediately w ith our bodily positions." (Merleau-Ponty 
[1945] 1962,143, note 3.) Rather than being built from  the bottom-up, from a stock o f visually 
acquired kinaesthetic images (see Lizardo 2009 fo r example), Merleau-Ponty suggests tha t the 
movement o f the body works from  the whole down to its parts as it is directed towards a 
pragmatic and bodily purpose. This is precisely why, fo r example, it is much quicker fo r yoga 
practitioners to  master a posture on one side after they have practiced it on another, because 
the body is directed towards achieving the posture, towards practical activity. If it were the 
case tha t particular and individual body parts were being positioned to  reflect a stock of 
kinaesthetic images, it would take the same amount o f time to master the pose on each side. 
Thus fo r Merleau-Ponty, the 'lived body' is always directed towards the practical activity of 
tha t 'w orld ':
"...my body appears to  me as a posture having a certain or actual task in view."
(Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962,100)
This is how our body 'knows' how our limbs are situated in 'everyday' practice, through 
routine and practical engagement in the 'w orld ' o f practice. That is not to  say that the body 
develops 'knowledge' through repetition; but that repetition itself is made possible through 
routine or 'everyday' practice, directed towards pragmatic purpose. This directing or aiming of
90
the body towards things is not a reflexive, 'conscious' or m irror image re-presentation of 
movement; rather it is a pre-cognitive and pre-reflexive engagement in and response to the 
projects o f tha t 'w orld ' o f practice:
"...to move one's body is to  aim at things through it; it is to  allow oneself to  respond to 
the ir call, which is made upon it independently o f any representation." (Merleau- 
Ponty [1945] 1962, 139)
Therefore, just as w ith  the role o f material objects, as argued in the previous chapter, the 
'lived body' is not external to  an objectifiable and outside world. Rather the 'w orld ' o f practice 
is constituted by the 'lived body' as it is engaged w ith  material objects, directed towards the 
practical activity o f that 'world '.
In this way we can begin to  consider all rhythms of practice, whether novice or expert, as 
already containing 'knowledge'. That is, rather than separating 'knowledge' from practice by 
asking 'how does the body learn to move', we can instead begin to  consider this 'knowledge' 
as immediate and that all practice, whether present or ready-to-hand, routine or nonroutine, 
is situated at the 'lived body'. This argument necessarily requires a careful consideration and 
re-framing o f how we normally th ink about 'knowledge' in 'everyday' life. I turn now to a 
suggestion from Lave and Wenger (1991) which is to  recognise 'knowledge-in-practice' and re­




Having argued fo r re-positioning the role o f the body in practice as neither body-subject nor 
body-object; but as both the site and medium of practice as the 'lived body/ it becomes 
necessary to  also position how we th ink about 'knowledge' and how practitioners learn 'a 
practice'. In this section I suggest tha t to  fu lly recognise the 'lived body' as immediately 
presenting us w ith  our bodily position directed towards practical activity requires 
understanding 'knowledge' as inseparable from doing. I draw out this argument through an 
exposition o f Lave and Wenger's (1991) analysis of 'situated learning' and my study o f the 
rhythms o f practice o f ashtanga yoga.
In a sense, Lave and Wenger work w ith  similar questions as other authors mentioned in this 
chapter. That is: how are embodied skills and 'knowledges' transferred? How do practitioners 
learn to  do practice? How do transitions in practice occur? However, rather than externalising 
and consolidating 'knowledge' o f 'a practice', by turning to  behaviouristic models o f 'conscious' 
and 'unconscious' processes, or to theories from cognitive science or inter-subjectivity that 
distinguish between the body-subject and the body-object, Lave and Wenger turn their 
analysis to  situated practice, that is, to  practice as doing, to  suggest that people do not learn 
'practice-as-an-object'; but that learning is a fundamental property o f social action. They write:
"[Ejngaging in practice, rather than being its object, may well be a condition fo r the 
effectiveness o f learning." (Lave and Wenger 1991, 93)
Thus, Lave and Wenger challenge cognitive interpretations o f learning that argue that 
practitioners acquire the specifics o f 'a practice' through observation and im itation. Instead 
they suggest that participation, that is doing, whether peripheral and novice or central and 
expert, is a way o f learning:
"...newcomers' legitimate peripherality provides them w ith more than an 
'observational' lookout post: It crucially involves participation as a way of learning -  of
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both absorbing and being absorbed in the 'culture of practice'16." (Lave and Wenger 
1991, 95)
In this way, learning becomes an ongoing process, the condition fo r practical activity at all 
levels, rather than an external 'knowledge' tha t exists outside o f practice. Reading Wacquant's 
(2004) analysis o f how boxers learn the rhythms o f practice o f boxing, through this 
understanding of what Lave and Wenger call 'knowledge-in-practice', we can argue that 
learning practice is not a process o f cognition and im itation as Lizardo (2009) reads Wacquant; 
but is rather a process o f participation and absorption in rhythms o f practice:
"...to understand what you have to do, you watch the others box, but you do not tru ly 
see what they are doing unless you have already understood a little  w ith your eyes, 
tha t is to  say w ith  your body. Every new gesture thus apprehended-comprehended 
becomes in turn the support, the materials tha t makes possible the discovery and 
thence the assimilation o f the next." (Wacquant 2004,118)
Similarly, yoga practitioners responding to  this research suggested that you do not see 
postures; but have to  fee l them through practice. In particular Rosaline summed up this 
experience:
"Yeah some things you can't learn by watching. For example, she [the instructor] is 
always going on about using your bandhas.17 At first I thought I knew what it meant; 
but it was only after I had really learnt a lot o f the postures that I could really feel how 
to  use them properly ... and I'm still working it out really..." (Rosaline)
Thus, as both Lave and Wenger and Wacquant suggest, learning practice, does not simply 
require an observational and reflexive lookout post and a body to  im itate doing. Instead 
learning evolves through changing participation as relations to ongoing communities of
16 For present purposes we can read 'world of practice'.
17 Bandhas are particular muscle groups that are contracted to support various yoga postures.
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practice change. Or we might say 'knowledge-in-practice' develops through doing, through 
being engaged in the 'w orld ' o f practice. For Lave and Wenger then, the initial participation in 
practice takes on a new significance so that previously, seemingly trivial activities like running 
errands (as apprentices do fo r the ir masters) can instead be regarded as providing a first 
approximation o f the structure of tha t 'w orld ' o f practice.
In this way, Lave and Wenger are making a distinction between teaching and learning. For 
them learning consists o f situated opportunities, a field of learning resources in 'everyday' 
practice and it is in this sense that we might consider the relationship between practice and 
change. They contrast this approach to models that deal in cognition tha t are geared fu rther 
towards understanding a teaching curriculum that is designed for the instruction of 
newcomers and is capable o f being analysed outside o f social relations, mediated through an 
instructor's participation and an external view of what 'knowing' is about. They argue that 
when 'knowledge' is considered in this way: "the focus of attention shifts from co­
participation in practice, to  someone acting on the person-to-be-changed." (Lave and Wenger 
1991,112) Significantly, this approach has im portant theoretical ramifications as it re-positions 
the learner away from  the object o f change. Instead, moving towards understanding 
'knowledge' as 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' moves analyses o f social change away from 
such simplistic re-presentations o f the subject-to-be-changed.
As such, Lave and Wenger argue that learning is not restricted to  a teaching curriculum, or to 
interpersonal relations; but must be understood in terms o f practice:
"...legitimate peripheral participation is more than just a process o f learning on the 
part o f newcomers. It is a reciprocal relation between persons and practice. This 
means tha t the move o f learners towards full participation in a community o f practice 
does not take place in a static context. The practice itself is in motion." (Lave and 
Wenger 1991, 116)
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Fundamentally, Lave and Wenger conclude tha t as social action, practice and 'knowledge' are 
mutually constitutive and tha t they are underpinned by a fundamental property o f ongoing 
change.
Thus, my concept o f 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' is an a ttem pt to  move theoretical 
analyses o f learning away from  'knowledge' as an external object tha t works on the subject-to- 
be-changed and instead positions the 'lived body' as situating both 'knowledge' and practice in 
the ir very material doing. Having described the notion of 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', I 
turn now to prepare the ground fo r the discussions tha t fo llow  in the next tw o chapters 
regarding the situated-ness and becoming-ness o f social practice. Before giving an analysis o f 
the relationship between practice and change it w ill be necessary to  say a few words here to 
fu lly  position 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', that which is commonly described in social 
theory, as above, as the 'self', not as a stable entity which itself changes (a subject-to-be- 
changed); but as both itself a modification and the site o f continual connection to  bodies and 
things as event. In order to  do this I refer to  Deleuze and Guattari's notion o f the Body w ithout 
Organs (BwO) as examined in 'A Thousand Plateaus' ([1980] 1988).
Body as Event
The 'lived body' as described in this chapter, is both the medium and site o f practice and is not 
fixed. Similarly, neither is 'knowledge' a static and external object to  practice. Rather as 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', it connects bodies and things as part o f continually 
changing rhythms of practice. That is to  say that the body is the site of connection, where 
machinic assemblages form and practical activity is achieved. In order to provide a full account 
o f 'practice as event', detailed in the follow ing chapter, it w ill first be necessary to briefly
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outline the role o f the body as the site o f these continually changing connections through a 
reading o f Deleuze and Guattari's ([1980] 1988) notion o f the Body w ithout Organs (BwO).
For Deleuze and Guattari, the function or meaning of a body does not depend upon an interior 
identity or 'self', (for which above authors go to  great lengths to  preserve by distinguishing 
between body-subjects and body-objects); but on the assemblage o f machines. This is not 
however, a simplistic or culturally pessimistic view of the domination of human life by 
machines. Neither is it a discussion o f the technical extension o f what it means to be a human 
being. Rather it is an analysis o f the 'w orld ' o f practice, noting how human beings become 
machinic in order to  form  assemblages tha t constitute social action. Raunig explains:
"It is no longer a m atter o f confronting man and machine to  estimate possible or 
impossible correspondences, extensions and substitutions o f the one or the other, o f 
ever new relationships o f sim ilarity and metaphorical relations between humans and 
machines, but rather o f concatenations, o f how man becomes a piece w ith the 
machine or w ith  other things in order to  constitute a machine. The 'o ther th ing' may 
be animals, tools, other people, statements, signs or desires, but they only become 
machine in a process of exchange, not in the paradigm o f substitution." (Raunig 2010, 
32)
Thus, the meaning or function o f the body is not static, but depends entirely on the other 
bodies or machines w ith  which it forms an assemblage in constituting the 'world ' o f practice. 
Understanding the body in this way then: "unravels the modern fantasy o f the body as a stable, 
unified, bounded entity, and gives a language to the m ultitude of connections that bodies 
form  w ith  other bodies (human and otherwise)." (Malins 2004, 85) In this way, the yoga 
practitioner's body only takes on meaning in the event of its connection to  other yoga 
practicing bodies, to  yoga mats and blocks, to  instructors, to the machinic assemblage of the 
sports complex and to the various histories and geographies of yogic practice, that is to the
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'w o rld ' o f yoga practice. In a sense, the identity o f the subject yoga practitioner only exists in 
the 'm om ent' o f its connection w ith  these particular assemblages. Indeed when they are not 
connected, the blocks and mats and histories and geographies return to  having no particular 
meaning and the body becomes connected to other machines, constituting other 'worlds' of 
practice, in becoming cyclist, student, employee or weight lifter.
For Deleuze and Guattari, the body only exists through its connections. Similarly there is no 
inner identity or 'self'. Instead o f distinguishing between body-subjects and body-objects in 
order to  locate agency, subjectivity or 'self', Deleuze and Guattari argue that the 'self' is 
merely the particular way in which bodies have become organ-ised in the social world. That is, 
tha t in order to  understand the complex and chaotic, continuously changing bodily flux of 
connections and machinic assemblages, the social world organ-ises the human body into 
discrete and constant categories o f meaning. Indeed, precisely as Lave and Wenger (1991) 
argue, as described above, it is not that the subject is changed by external 'knowledge'; rather 
it is the subject that is itself drawn and defined by its complicated and ongoing connections:
"The self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification -  this term 
designating precisely the difference drawn." (Deleuze [1969] 1994,100)
Thus, the subject, the 'self' or the body-subject, is a stratification, an organ-isation of 
'embodied-knowledge-in-practice'. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms, the 'self' or the body as 
we usually th ink about it, or as i t  is thought o f in a vast amount of social theory, is the body 
tha t has been organ-ised. It is the body with  organs:
"You will be organized, you will be an organism, you w ill articulate your body -  
otherwise you're just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and 
interpreted -  otherwise you're just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as
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one, a subject o f the enunciation recoiled into a subject o f the statement -  otherwise 
you're just a tram p." (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1988,159)
In 'everyday' life the continual connections o f the body to other machinic assemblages that 
come to constitute various 'worlds' o f practice come to  be re-presented through the 
subjectification and objectification o f social action. Instead Deleuze and Guattari resist this re­
presentation and seek to  dismantle the 'self' in order to  find the Body w ithout Organs, or in 
my conceptualisation 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', that is, the machinic body as that 
which flu id ly and continually connects w ith  other bodies and machines. They write:
"W here psychoanalysis says, "Stop, find yourself again," we should say instead, "Let's 
go fu rthe r still, we haven't found our BwO yet, we haven't sufficiently dismantled our 
self." (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1988,151)
In fact, Deleuze and Guattari refer explicitly to  yoga as a method that dismantles the 'self' on 
the path to  finding the BwO. This is precisely what is happening then when respondents 
describe a heightened sensitivity towards the body, or to be absorbed in the kinetic 
experience o f yoga practice. It is a dismantling o f the stratification o f the 'self' and the 
'everyday' re-presentation o f social action and of practice, towards a recognition of the BwO 
or 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' as the continually changing connections of machinic 
assemblages.
Significantly, both the BwO and 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' can never belong to 
someone, it is not mine or yours. Indeed it is unattainable by the subject. Rather it is a surface 
on which various machinic assemblages come to constitute 'worlds' o f practice:
" It is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a set o f practices. You never reach 
the Body w ithout Organs, you can't reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit. 
People ask, so what is this BwO? -  But you're already on it scurrying like vermin,
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groping like a blind person or running like a lunatic: desert traveller and nomad o f the 
steppes. On it we sleep, live our waking lives, fight -  fight and are fought -  we seek 
our place, experience untold happiness and fabulous defeats; on it we penetrate and 
are penetrated; on it we love." (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1988,150)
Thus, 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' or the BwO always moves towards organ-isation, 
towards stratification in order to  construct the 'I' which can meaningfully interact in the social 
world. In so doing, these complicated and ongoing connections are reduced to  a "grid of 
organisation and predeterm ination tha t limits the connections a body can make w ith other 
bodies; and reduces its potential fo r difference. Its potential fo r becoming-other." (Malins 
2004, 87)
However, whilst at the same tim e 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' seeks stratification, it 
also retains the impetus fo r form ing new assemblages, fo r becoming different. In this way, 
what sites the 'w orld ' o f practice is 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice'. It is the 'lived body' 
which is continually learning and modifying itself through its connections to  d ifferent bodies 
and things in constituting d ifferent 'worlds' o f practice. It is only in the 'm om ent' o f 
connection, in its event, that the body co-ordinates and synchronises w ith other bodies and 
things in practical activity as both the medium and the site o f practice.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have referred to  the rhythms of practice o f ashtanga yoga in order to re­
frame 'everyday' re-presentations o f the body in social theory that make a distinction between 
body-subjects and body-objects and re-presentations of 'knowledge' as separate from practice 
so that I m ight offer an alternative account of the body as 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice'.
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Through a reading o f Merleau-Ponty's ([1945] 1962) notion of the 'lived body', I argued that it 
is firs t necessary to  recognise the body as both the medium and site o f practice. I argued that 
understanding the body in this way requires recognising the immediacy o f bodily 'knowledge' 
and tha t this required a re-framing o f how we typically think o f 'knowledge' as external to  the 
subject-to-be-changed. Through an explanation o f Lave and Wenger's (1991) discussion of 
'knowledge-in-practice' I argued that we might begin to  recognise tha t 'knowledge' and 
practice constitute each other and as such are underpinned by a fundamental property of 
ongoing change. I suggested that it was useful to  combine these tw o approaches in order to 
recognise 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' as constituting 'worlds' o f practice. I turned to a 
discussion o f Deleuze and Guattari's notion o f the BwO ([1980] 1988) in order to  highlight the 
u tility  fo r resisting re-presentations o f the subjects and objects o f social action by dismantling 
the 'self' and recognising the body as the event o f connection to  other assemblages o f bodies 
and things and in constituting 'worlds' o f practice.
The ontological status o f the event is described in more detail in the follow ing chapter. 
Significantly though, it requires the understandings developed in this chapter and the previous 
one, o f the 'w orld ' o f practice and 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' as the spatio-temporal 
co-ordination and synchronisation o f machinic assemblages that come together to  achieve 
'practice as event'. It is this notion o f 'practice as event' which points the way towards a re­
fram ing of the re-production o f practice through repetition and difference and later to  the 
scheduling o f routine through the shaping o f rhythms o f practice.
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Chapter Four: Practice as Event
The situation of human activity and interaction in time and space makes them dependent not upon universal 
conditions and laws, not upon essences, not upon the articulation and conjunction of transhistorical and 
transgeographical social forms but upon the actual now-here, upon the historically and geographically particular 
context of presences and absences.{ Pred)
Introduction
This chapter develops an understanding o f the spatio-temporal dimensions o f the 'w orld ' o f 
practice, as it is constituted by the co-ordinated and synchronised assemblage o f bodies and 
things through the idea of 'practice as event'. It builds on the concepts o f the 'w orld ' of 
practice and 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' as detailed in the previous tw o chapters 
respectively. In particular, I contrast my understanding o f event as situated and becoming to 
understandings of practice as performance and entity. Further, I compare this analysis to 
Schatzki's account o f the event in The Timespace o f Human Activity  (2010) in order to  throw  
light on my particular framing of 'practice as event' that, I argue, offers the opportunity to re­
th ink traditional conceptualisations of the relationship between social action and social 
change and to  theorise alternative possibilities fo r sites and methods of 'in tervention ' and for 
shaping rhythms of practice.
These arguments are illustrated throughout this chapter w ith  examples from  investigative 
research and field work conducted w ithin the 'w orld ' o f stock car racing, a site that is replete 
w ith  complex spatial co-ordinations and temporal synchronisations tha t occur at a variety of 
scales.
From here I describe the various kinds of assemblages, of bodies and things, that constitute 
the 'w orld ' o f stock car racing, before outlining an understanding of these kinds of 
assemblages, so described, w ith reference to an analytical distinction between practice as
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performance and entity. I then contrast this view w ith  my concept o f 'practice as event', 
fo llow ing Allan Pred (1990) in recognising the situated-ness and becoming-ness of social 
practice. Finally I compare my interpretation o f event w ith  Schatzki's and argue tha t it is 
necessary to  liberate thinking about 'practice as event' from  understandings o f linear and 
objective 'tim e ' in order to  re-frame questions o f persistence, maintenance and decline of 
'practices' and to do so in terms of repetition, difference and ongoing change.
Stock Car Racing
It is useful to  begin by saying something about the 'world ' o f practice o f stock car racing. Stock 
car racing involves the driving o f various kinds o f motorised vehicles around a quarter-m ile 
long, oval track fo r the purposes o f demonstration, competition and destruction. The histories 
and geographies o f these rhythms of practice dates back to  the 1920's in the United States, 
where today the North American Stock Car Association o f Racing (NASCAR) boasts that it 
represents the fastest growing and most profitable sport in the country. This highly popular 
fo rm  o f racing in the U.S. has several variants; but generally consists of purpose built machines 
tha t resemble 'stock' cars, or sedan like factory made family cars. In the U.K. however, there is 
quite a d ifferent trad ition o f stock car racing. The rhythms of practice o f stock car racing only 
became established in the U.K. during the 1950's; but quickly became dominated by machines 
built from  scratch known as 'The Seniors' or 'Senior Stock Cars' (see Figure 2) which, indeed, 
bore very little  resemblance to  road vehicles, rendering the label 'stock', as in unaltered from 
its factory configuration a complete misnomer.
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Figure 2: F I 'Senior Stock Cars' at Warton
Instead o f the more sedan like touring machines in the U.S., F I Stock Cars in the U.K. are highly 
sophisticated and finely tuned, purpose built machines tha t comprise, amongst o ther technical 
specifications, a V-8 engine, quick change axles and a braking system tha t is specifically aligned 
fo r constant left tu rn ing  (stock car races, not banger or super races, are always conducted 
counter-clockwise). Similar to  these FI machines are the smaller F2 or 'Junior Stock Cars', 
which are powered by a smaller tw o  litre 'Ford Pinto' engine.
Clearly NASCAR in the U.S. and F I and F2 stock car racing in the U.K. are tw o  d iffe ren t 'worlds' 
o f practice. W hilst they may contain similar materials and 'knowledges' and it may well be 
more or less easy to  transition between the tw o, I stress tha t these tw o  'worlds' are quite 
distinct. A partic ipant in e ither 'w o rld ' would have lim ited 'knowledge' o f the other. No doubt 
a partic ipant m ight have technical 'knowledge' tha t could be employed in the o ther setting; 
but only to  the extent tha t they would be able to  employ tha t 'knowledge' in o ther forms o f 
m oto r racing, say Formula One or m otorbike racing. This thesis argues indeed tha t the 
'em bodied-knowledge-in-practice' and what it means to  participate in each o f these 'worlds',
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tha t is, what constitutes each o f them as experienced as authentically ready-to-hand by any 
such participant, is specific to  each 'm om ent' o f practice.
Furthermore, stock car racing in the U.K. itself is not a unified 'practice'. In fact on any given 
race day several categories o f stock cars compete. These include Ministox, Senior Minis, Junior 
Minis, F I Stock Cars, F2 Stock Cars, Supers, Bangers, F I Fleritage Stock Cars and F2 Fleritage 
Stock Cars amongst others. A crude, but more simplistic distinction to  make between the 
d ifferent kinds o f races is between racing stock cars, heritage cars and bangers. As described 
above, the highly specialised and finely tuned FI and F2 stock cars are purpose built and 
specifically engineered machines that are raced in serious competition throughout the season. 
Heritage cars have a more irregular pattern and are driven around the track only fo r 
demonstration purposes, to  show o ff the ir refurbishments, traditions and histories, whilst 
bangers are raced somewhat fo r competition; but mostly fo r the purposes o f destruction. 
These are road vehicles that have failed the ir M.O.T.s and that have been brought to  the track 
to  race in a demolition derby, usually as a grand finale which, fo r many spectators, is the 
highlight o f the days' racing. In the same way that there are similarities between NASCAR and 
stock car racing in the U.K., there are similarities between the racing o f stock cars, heritage 
cars and bangers. However, the particular technological specificities, skills, materials and 
meanings, tha t is, the 'w orld ' o f each type of racing is distinct, in the same way that NASCAR is 
distinct from  stock car racing.
In order to  illustrate my conceptualisation o f 'practice as event' in this chapter I therefore 
refer to  the 'world(s)' o f stock car racing in the U.K. and in particular draw on examples taken 
from  field work and my own rhythms o f practice o f spectating this sport at 'W arton Stock Car 
Club' during the seasons o f 2011 and 2012. Due to the role of the empirical material, here 
used to illustrate and develop an argument that considers 'practice as event', that is, as a 
happening or doing that constitutes and is constituted by the 'world ' o f practice, I refer fo r the
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most part to  my own observations and experiences, although I support these observations 
w ith  more informal discussions w ith participants, drivers, owners, mechanics and spectators, 
tha t have helped to  fu rther my understanding of these 'worlds'.
Throughout the season that begins in March and runs until October, 'W arton Stock Car Club' 
meets fortn igh tly  to  race and display these various types o f automobile around its purpose 
built tarmac track only a short drive away from the small village of Warton. Every other 
Sunday Warton is a quiet country village whose thin and winding roads remain, fo r the most 
part, empty bar those taking a walk in the surrounding countryside. On race days however, the 
village is awoken early by a continuous stream o f racing vehicles, tow  trucks, vans full o f 
equipment, tractors (used fo r dragging broken down cars from  the track), mobile catering 
facilities and cars full o f spectators all eager to  set up work stations, shops, stalls and viewing 
platforms at the most prime locations. On arriving at the site one is met w ith a wall o f sound 
not only o f the revving of racing engines; but o f the engines o f all the auxiliary vehicles and 
spectators' cars.
The race track itself is built into the remains o f an old quarry. Surrounding it on one side, a 
gravel car park provides the best viewing platform fo r early arrivers to  view the afternoons' 
competitions, whilst behind the opposite side of the race track, close to  four hundred vehicles 
make up 'the pits'. This space is open to  spectators who can wander between the various 
racing cars, breakdown vehicles, heritage car displays, shops and stalls. Many spectators 
gather around to watch particular teams prepare their vehicles fo r racing or chat to  heritage 
car owners about the particular refurbishment techniques that were used to restore their 
classic vehicles. Races begin promptly at noon and continue into the early evening whilst the 
officials maintain a strict and organised schedule of races. As one race finishes, the drivers and 
vehicles fo r the follow ing race are lined up outside the track entrance, ready to move into
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position as soon as the track has been cleared, thus maintaining a smooth transition between 
races.
I describe this scene in some detail to illustrate both the complexity o f co-ordinating up to  one 
hundred drivers and racing machines, the ir teams and technicians, officials, announcers, 
spectators and vendors in achieving this afternoon of action; but also, to  consider its routine 
happening. All o f these events run smoothly. During their fo rty  years of racing at this particular 
location, 'W arton Stock Club' has never cancelled an event. In fact, over this time, the season 
length has expanded to  incorporate more and more race days. Whilst officials conduct and 
organise the event, the day's racing tends to  continue uninterruptedly. Drivers race, 
mechanics repair, officials direct and spectators watch and consume. Despite the complexity 
o f the material co-ordination and temporal synchronisation o f such a vast number o f bodies 
and machines, the event happens and it happens every other Sunday, throughout the entire 
season, year after year.
It is necessary at this point to make a caveat, and demarcate the scale at which I am referring 
to  the event. In The Timespace o f Human Activity  (2010)18, Schatzki distinguishes between the 
event and an event. He writes:
"The event is singular in the sense that myriad events occur in the same timespace 
and thus belong to the same one happening -  the same one there is -  o f that 
timespace." (22)
Schatzki's distinction in the above quote, quite rightly recognises that a myriad of events 
belong to the same one happening, the same there is, the same 'w orld ' o f that particular 
'timespace'. For example then, if we consider the 'world ' o f 'Warton Stock Car Club' on race 
day there is an immeasurable number o f events, o f actions that happen in that 'world '. Races
18 Throughout this chapter I refer in detail to Schatzki's concept of 'timespace', as it appears in this title, 
not to criticise it, nor indeed to criticise other framings of 'practice' or social action; but instead to 
provide points of comparison and th ro w  light on my own conceptualisat ion o f  'practice as event' .
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are won and lost, tyres are changed, drivers are injured, cups o f tea and sandwiches are 
consumed, people cheer and applaud, vehicles crash and fires are put out. Nevertheless, as it 
seems to  me, if we were to reduce our scale and centre our analysis on one of these myriad 
events tha t constitute the 'w orld ' o f 'W arton Stock Car Club' on race day, we would find a 
myriad o f events tha t make up that particular 'w orld ' as well. If we were to  consider the 'w orld ' 
o f the crash, we m ight recognise any number of events tha t occur in tha t same 'timespace' 
and come to constitute the 'w orld ' o f the crash. One driver turns, another accelerates, the cars 
change direction and velocity, fuel ignites, motor-neuron signals fire, spectators watch and 
step back from the safety fence, other cars slow down, safety flags are raised and wrecked 
cars are removed. This is the event of the crash. Similarly we could increase our scale of 
analysis and focus on the event o f automobile racing more generally, o f which the event of 
'W arton Stock Car Club' on race day would only be one of many racing events. Or indeed at an 
even w ider scale, we could analyse the event o f western consumer culture and regard stock 
car racing as one of many events that make up what it means to be in tha t particular 'world '.
My point is, that whilst I agree w ith Schatzki that there is a necessary distinction between the 
event (that is the there is, the 'world ' o f a particular 'timespace') and an event (that occurs as 
one of a myriad o f events of that one same happening), that this distinction is a m atter of 
analysis and depends upon the frame of reference and the position o f the observer to situate 
tha t particular happening, that particular 'w orld ' as the event. It is in this sense that I recognise 
the concept of event as particularly useful fo r thinking in terms of practice. Thus, it is 
im portant to  recognise, that whilst at what scale we consider action affects our analysis of it, 
the concept o f event allows us to  potentially move beyond, or at least recognise these 
constraints.
Thus, in order to  show up the event-like character o f practice, it is first necessary to describe 
how practice is most often understood w ithin 'theories of practice' as distinct between
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performance and entity. This w ill be a particularly useful contrast to  make to highlight the 
differences to  the fo llow ing discussion of becoming situated practice and w ill support a more 
nuanced critique o f this particular distinction, in turning to  Schatzki's discussion o f the 
Timespace o f Human Activity  (2010).
Practice as Performance and Entity
'Theories o f practice' are m ultiple and diverse and various authors employ a variety of 
concepts o f practice in d ifferent ways to  achieve a wide range o f intellectual goals. Whilst this 
lack o f coherence can be problematic, I believe tha t it is this diversity that allows practice to be 
such a useful concept w ith which to explore the relationship between social action and social 
change. It is in this fashion that the follow ing section outlines tw o related concepts o f practice, 
tha t is practice as performance and practice as entity, in order to  offer a comparison between 
thinking about 'practice' as a provisionally stable thing  and thinking about 'practice as event'. 
This comparison is not a critique, nor a pointing to  a 'correct' way of thinking about social 
action; but a demonstration o f a fu rther possibility fo r using the concept of practice so as to 
frame social action in a d ifferent way.
First then, it is useful to  consider the work of one key exponent o f 'theories o f practice', Alan 
Warde. In particular I refer to  Warde's (2005) discussion o f consumption in relation to 
'theories of practice'. In this text, Warde suggests that: "'W hy do people do what they do?' 
and 'how do they do those things in the way that they do?' are perhaps the key sociological 
questions concerning practices..." (140). In this particular text, social action is framed as 'what 
people do.' It is people that are doing some-thing. Thus, Warde makes a distinction between 
people and what they do. However, this is incompatible w ith the position already established
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in Chapter Two and Chapter Three o f this thesis that recognises practice as 'being-in-the- 
w orld ', tha t is, tha t human beings cannot separate themselves from  the doing that is the 
'w orld ' o f practice. Rather we are always amidst material objects and engaged in doing, 
directed towards practical activity. However, Warde's analysis necessarily separates out 
people as individuals from 'the practices' (things) that they do in order to  understand how 
people come to  perform a role required by a particular 'practice'. He writes:
"It remains as vital as ever to  ask how are individuals positioned in the practices in 
which they are engaged, and especially how homologous are the ir positions across the 
range of the ir practices. But, more than ever before, the question 'what level of 
com m itm ent is displayed to d ifferent practices?' becomes focal, and w ith  it a grasp of 
how 'careers' w ithin practices take off, develop and end, o f how people come to an 
understanding of what is required by the practice and the ir role w ithin it." (Warde 
2005,149)
Thinking about practice in this way recognises a provisionally stable entity, say stock car racing 
(note there is limited room here to  accommodate the significant differences between NASCAR, 
FI stock racing, heritage car demonstration, etc.) and individual people who are able to 
recognise stock car racing, the ir own role w ithin stock car racing and re-produce or perform 
tha t role, say as a racing driver.
However, as Chapter Three argued, 'knowledge' as I have described it, is not external to 
practice; but rather can be thought of as 'embodied knowledge-in-practice'. That is to  say, that 
the stock car driver does not first understand how to race a stock car, when to  brake, when to 
accelerate, when to overtake, when to turn and then performs this understanding. Instead 
what it is to  race is only understood in the racing itself. 'Knowledge' is not external to, but 
rather is the very condition of practice. It is this separation of people from the practices (things) 
that they do that also externalises 'knowledge' from practice. It is a separation that also leads
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Warde to  suggest that people's engagement in certain practices is motivated by internal 
psychic reward. Referring to  similar rhythms of practice, he writes:
"Stock car racing may not have the same aura as vintage car collecting, but it is 
unlikely that the experience o f improving and becoming expert is very much d ifferent 
in the tw o separate practices. Someone who values the practice o f stock car racing, 
and has the possibility o f engaging in it as a competent or excellent practitioner, 
probably has access to  the psychic rewards tha t psychologists attribute to  the process 
o f self-development. In other words, no m atter where a practice fits in a hierarchy of 
prestige, there are internal goods to  be derived from it fo r individual practitioners." 
(Warde 2005,148)
The individual practitioner here is framed as an agent who is engaged in 'practices' fo r the 
sake o f receiving internal rewards. Warde affords the racing driver a degree of 'agency' in 
recognising the reflexive and '(un)conscious' processes tha t may or may not motivate her to 
engage in racing.
This is a recurring approach w ithin 'theories o f practice'. For example, follow ing Warde, Inge 
R0pke (2009) recognises consumers as practitioners who are motivated or not to  engage in 
practice depending on the various social meanings attached to them.
"Consumers may be motivated to  undertake various symbolic actions to  demonstrate 
the ir "green" exposition, but most valued practices are performed w ith little  or 
marginal considerations fo r the environment. Practices are motivated by core 
concerns in everyday life, and people take a strong interest in being competent 
practitioners." (R0pke 2009, 2946)
Again, the framing of the practitioner as a consuming agent results in understanding practices 
as objects. I do not deny that this framing can be useful. It allows questions about transitions
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in practice to  be answered w ith  reference to  more fam iliar understandings of 'conscious' and 
'unconscious' processes, o f the transference o f 'practices' through 'motor-schematic m irroring' 
e tc.19 Nevertheless, this thesis has already laid out its foundations o f understanding the 'w orld ' 
o f practice and 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' and therefore cannot f it  w ith  
understandings o f practice that separate people from  what they do and the material things 
tha t are involved in tha t doing.
Intriguingly, other writers have approached these questions from  a d ifferent angle and 
developed discussions in very d ifferent fields. Rather than claiming that practitioners are 
motivated or not to  do practices, Shove and Pantzar, fo r example, have argued that 'practices' 
"are made by and through the ir routine reproduction." (2005, 44) In this sense practices 
require continual re-production through those tha t do them and how they are done in turn 
defines what 'a practice' is. For Shove and Pantzar, "practices are inherently dynamic." (61) 
This suggestion seems to move us away from the attribution o f 'agency', or motivation and 
desire located w ithin the practitioner and towards a focus on the dynaminicity o f 'practices' 
themselves. In fact, this framing reverses the contention that recruitment to  'a practice' is 
about individual identification or social or psychic reward. Instead of holding 'the practice' as a 
constant and asking who does it and why, Shove and Pantzar pose the questions of: "how 
practices-as-entities are made and reproduced by the ir carriers?" and "how do practices 
capture and retain the resources and energies of active practitioners on whom the ir survival 
depends?" (2007, 155). This reversal leads them to centre the ir analysis on practice as entity 
and on asking how it is that 'practices' retain recruits (individuals) and what 'practices' 
demand of those recruited.
Clearly here, Shove and Pantzar focus on practice as entity. Whilst they recognise the 
relationship to  practice as performance and acknowledge that once recruited a practitioner
19 For a discussion of Omar Lizardo's (2009) argument regarding 'motor-schematic mirroring', see
Chapter Three, section on: 'Body-Subjects and Body-Objects'.
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already changes what 'a practice' is, they nevertheless argue (somewhat provocatively and 
purposefully) that: "we might th ink o f practices as vampire like entities capturing populations 
o f suitably committed practitioners (i.e. hosts and carriers) in order to  survive." (2007,166) In 
this sense stock car racing could be considered as an entity tha t captures drivers, mechanics, 
spectators etc. Nevertheless, this framing, whilst opening an alternative way o f thinking about 
practice still maintains a subject /  object divide, and still maintains a distinction between the 
thing  tha t is doing and the thing  that is done20.
As it seems to  me, drawing the boundaries around what people do and labelling and
consolidating doing as an entity, is analytically problematic. I question whether it is particularly
useful to  define such a th ing , such a coherent entity as stock car racing and when and how it is
useful to  th ink about 'a practice' in this way. As discussed above stock car racing is a
completely d ifferent kind of endeavour in the U.S. when compared w ith the U.K and stock car
racing in the U.K is itself is made up o f several kinds of racing; but is also made up of
demonstrations and types of 'practice' that are not competitive racing at all. Rather they are
opportunities to  display a trad ition or heritage of material artefacts, or indeed sometimes
simply to  destroy those material artefacts. When does it make sense to draw a boundary
around all these d ifferent types of doing and label them as stock car racing? Are the materials,
skills and meanings rather specific to each, thus constituting distinct 'moments' o f doing?
From an analytical standpoint is it useful to demarcate a provisionally fixed 'practice' that
encompasses both the highly tuned racing machine and the skills o f the driver and the
refurbished and restored classic piece of stock car heritage and the skills of the restorer?
Alternatively, when is it useful and necessary to  distinguish between these separate 'worlds'?
20 I stress th a t language becomes difficult here. W e talk every day in terms of subject and object, of one 
who does and of things that are done. That is precisely why we find it very difficult to talk from  the  
perspective of doing. I argue then, that a turn to recognising practice as situated in the m om ent of doing 
provides a language for understanding the happening-like quality of practice. However, in making this 
theoretical turn, I recognise that I re-present my own frame, my own set of questions and my own 
theoretical suggestions for thinking with(in) 'theories of practice'.
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Perhaps if we were to  consider drawing the boundary around m otor racing 'practice', types of 
'practice' as d ifferent as Formula One, M oto GP, stock car racing and monster truck would be 
all part o f the same 'practice'. Therefore, my question is: 'When does it make sense to label 
and fix what people do as one type o f 'practice' or another?' I argue tha t thinking about 
practice in this way is inherently problematic and turn at this point to  describe practice in a 
d iffe ren t way, as tem porally and spatially situated and as always becoming.
Becoming Situated Practice
Rather than developing an account o f stock car racing that depends on analytically 
consolidating practice as an entity, I turn in this section to  an understanding of 'practice as 
event'. That is, I consider practice as situated in the here-now 'w orld ' o f practice, as 
tem porally and spatially specific. In this sense I re-frame practice from  'the thing that people 
do', to  a temporally and spatially situated happening. In this way stock car racing, heritage car 
display and speed boat racing are not taken to  be bounded together as fixed entities, nor 
separated and distinguished as individual 'practices'. Rather each specific context o f doing is 
always temporally and spatially situated, made up o f specific 'embodied-knowledge-in- 
practice' developed from its context specific histories and geographies which are themselves 
constantly changing, constantly becoming through the ir doing.
Here I fo llow  Allan Pred's argument, outlined in Making Histories and Constructing Human 
Geographies (1990). This involves deconstructing the barriers between 'tim e', 'space' and 
social being by emphasising the historically and geographically particular context o f presences 
and absences at the situation o f human activity (the 'world ' of practice) in constituting
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'practice as event'. Thus, I suggest that it is possible to  consider practice as a particular and 
situated happening that is both enabled and constrained through its particular social context. 
For Pred, human doing, or practice, is always already shaped by existing geographical and 
historical relations that are humanly built into given social contexts. He writes:
"The production of space and place is both the medium and the outcome of human 
agency and social relations, and it occurs w ith the making o f histories." (Pred 1990, 10)
In this way, we might consider the histories and geographies, that is, the specific social 
contexts o f F I stock car racing, banger racing or NASCAR as spatially and temporally specific 
'm oments' o f doing. Each specific context both enables and constraints human action; but are 
each also constructed through social action. Therefore, heritage car demonstration, M oto GP 
and ministox are not usefully thought o f as absolute entities in themselves; but are instead 
better understood as 'moments' o f temporally and spatially situated doing tha t are both the 
medium and the outcome o f human agency and social structure. Fundamentally however, 
these 'moments' o f doing are not static or frozen. Pred argues that each particular context (or 
'w orld ') o f situated practice:
"is not something which merely exists in an inert frozen state,
fixed and immutable,
but something tha t constantly becomes
through situated human activity and social intercourse." (Pred 1990,11, original 
'textual landscape'.)
Clearly then, each 'm om ent' o f doing, say o f racing FI stock cars or demonstrating heritage 
cars, is a particular and situated practice of something; but it is also constantly becoming, 
constantly transform ing through the interplay of social structure and human agency:
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"Social structures, however defined, are grounded in temporally and geographically 
specific human activities and discourses, are produced reproduced and transformed 
by knowledgeable, capable human agents practicing in place." (Pred 1990,12)
Human agents reproduce and transform social structures through 'embodied-knowledge-in- 
practice' employed in the ir ongoing doing. In developing this position, Pred has a particular 
understanding o f 'knowledge7 which is akin to  my discussion o f 'embodied-knowledge-in- 
practice7 as set out in Chapter Three.
Pred argues tha t most social studies have to come back to  the question o f the relationship 
between human agency and social structure and therefore position change as an outcome of 
the two. We might consider Warde7s (2005) analysis of people being motivated or not to  
perform a particular 'practice7 as an example o f this. That is to  say that in tha t framing, 
whether 'a practice7 is performed or not is the outcome o f a negotiation between the 
perform er and the f/i/ng-to-be-performed. Instead, Pred7s account challenges these kinds of 
assertions by arguing that institutions and biographies are re-produced historically and 
geographically through the 'timespace7 o f specific 'moments7 o f practice and through the 
institutional projects o f practitioners in 'everyday7 life. For Pred, people engaged in racing 
stock cars, are made subject to  the 'w orld7 of stock car racing through doing it; but 
fundamentally, the 'w orld7 o f stock car racing thoroughly depends upon what people do. Pred 
explains this argument w ith reference to daily paths and institutional projects, claiming that 
what people do in the ir 'everyday7 lives, daily paths, perhaps in this case, restoring classic 
racing vehicles, is structured by long term  institutional commitments say, to  the 'w orld7 of 
heritage stock cars. However, the opening and closing of these commitments depends on the 
building of 'knowledges7 and embodied dispositions ('embodied-knowledge-in-practice') at 
the daily path level, that is, through situated practice.
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For Pred, 'knowledge' is at the same tim e, the means by which human activity is undertaken 
and is itse lf acquired and transformed through activity. Thus, just as practice is always situated 
in 'tim e ' and 'space', so too is 'knowledge'. Therefore, restoring heritage cars is not a static or 
external object o f 'knowledge' but:
"... instead, in a constant state o f becoming as a part o f active social being in particular 
historical and geographical contexts in contexts that are themselves reproduced and 
transferred through that very same being." (Pred 1990,18)
Clearly this model o f 'knowledge' is compatible w ith, my re-presentation of 'embodied- 
knowledge-in-practice' in the previous chapter and goes some way to  underpin my discussion 
o f 'practice as event'. We can now consider 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' as constituting 
the 'w orld ' o f the event. That is to  say tha t practice is both situated, a particular 'm om ent' o f 
doing and becoming and is as such constantly changing.
The character o f this becoming-ness and the relationship between repetition and difference or 
re-production and change w ill be described in the follow ing chapters on 'tim e ' and change 
respectively. For present purposes it is enough to  note tha t 'practice as event' recognises the 
happening like quality o f doing as both situated and becoming.
The Timespace of Human Activity
I move now to compare my understanding of 'practice as event' to  a similar notion of event 
described by Schatzki in The Timespace o f Human Activity  (2010). Whilst Schatzki tackles 
similar questions and addresses many of the themes considered in this thesis, I argue that 
Schatzki's reluctance to  move beyond thinking about practice-as-entity prevents him from 
fully realising the potential o f the notion of event. Instead I claim that his work falls back on
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precisely the objective account o f 'tim e ' which he claims to  reject and re-produces the 
problematic reification o f practice-as-entity as distinguished from  my concept o f 'practice-as- 
event'.
First it is im portant to  note tha t Schatzki claims that his notion o f 'timespace' is not a 
configuration o f temporal and spatial properties that is built up through activity. Indeed, 
Schatzki is adamant that his concept o f 'timespace' should be thought o f as constitutive of 
activity as it comes to  be, as it is opened w ith, activity itself. That is tha t 'timespace' is tha t 
'timespace' o f 'being-in-the-world' and o f the 'w orld ' o f that event. To make this argument, 
Schatzki opposes his view o f 'timespace' to  three notions o f objective, subjective and social 
'space-time' (that is space-time as tw o separate and then conjoined phenomena rather than 
the unified phenomenon of 'timespace').
First Schatzki contests various notions o f objective 'tim e ' and 'space', as 'tim e ' and 'space' 
existing independently o f human perception, understanding and action. He argues that:
"I conceive o f experiences and activities naturalistically meaning tha t they are part o f 
the world and not, as is often thought at least about experiences alongside or outside 
the w orld." (3)
Nevertheless, in claiming to  ignore debates about objective 'tim e ' and 'space', Schatzki 
nevertheless maintains that they remain significant fo r the analysis of social life and never lets 
go o f an understanding of linear and objective temporality. He clearly argues that:
"Objective tim e is central to  social life and analysis." (7)
Following this (contradictory) rejection of objective 'tim e' and 'space', Schatzki opposes his 
view o f 'timespace' to  what he defines as subjective 'space-times' that depend on 'conscious' 
subjects. This is a line of thought, a la Kant, that considers both 'tim e ' and 'space' as a priori 
forms o f intuition, as mental re-presentations that are imposed on objects of experience.
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Kant's view therefore, does not deny an objective reality; but infers tha t any such reality must 
be independent o f the subjects' mental re-presentations o f 'tim e ' and 'space'. Thus, Schatzki 
opposes his argument to  notions tha t consider 'tim e ' and 'space' existing only as perceived.
A final and kinder comparison tha t Schatzki makes is to  social understandings of 'space-time'. 
He applauds thinkers from  David Harvey to  Henri Lefebvre fo r recognising 'space-times' as 
m ultiple; but critiques understandings o f 'space' as separate from  'tim e ', arguing instead fo r 
the unity o f tem pora lity and spatiality. Thus, he also accuses all literature on social 'space-time' 
(including Lefebvre's w ork21) o f adopting an understanding of successive and thereby objective 
'tim e '. Indeed this is a critique tha t Schatzki levels at Lefebvre's w riting on rhythms and a 
critique which I contest in Chapter Six o f this thesis.
Nevertheless, Schatzki claims his notion o f 'timespace' is neither objective, subjective, nor a 
conjunction o f 'spaces' and 'times', nor does it rely on an understanding o f successive 'tim e'. 
However, I show in this section tha t whilst Schatzki may well conceive o f 'timespace' as a 
unitary phenomenon drawn from the event; his analysis does in fact rest on a distinction 
between subjectivity and objectivity and on an understanding o f linear, successive and thus 
objective 'tim e '.
To justify this claim I need to  set out Schatzki's argument in order to  show how it differs to my 
understanding o f 'practice as event'.
In order to  develop his notion o f the 'timespace o f human activity', Schatzki turns to  a 
particular reading o f certain parts o f Martin Heidegger's philosophy. First, he develops a 
notion o f 'timespace' from Heidegger's later work Contributions to Philosophy (1999); but 
argues tha t this thesis, due to  its abstract context is not particularly useful fo r understanding 
and theorising human activity. He therefore abandons Heidegger's ontological concerns
21 See Chapter Five, sections on: 'Subjective and Objective Time' and 'Eternal Return' and Chapter Six, 
section on: 'Rhythms of Practice'.
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regarding 'being', 'the clearing' and 'tru th ' and returns instead to  a model o f action described 
in Heidegger's earlier work Being and Time ([1927] 1962). Whilst we may question this kind o f 
pulling together o f various arguments from  Heidegger's oeuvre as method, fo r now, it is more 
pertinent to  show tha t these theoretical discussions do not hang together. To make this case I 
tu rn  now to  show tha t Schatzki's account o f 'timespace' as event and 'being-in-the-world' as 
human activ ity  are incompatible when considering the relationship between what people do 
and the 'w orld ' as made up o f bodies and things directed towards the practical activity o f that 
'w orld '.
Schatzki describes 'timespace' as unified (not as conjoined as it is apparently conceptualised in 
social theory) in its emergence as the happening o f 'the clearing' (for present purposes we can 
read 'the clearing' as the 'w orld ' as revealed in its readiness-to-hand [in its routine-ness]). He 
writes:
"The event, the happening o f the clearing, is the happening o f the timespace in which 
events happen or take place; it is there being places and times fo r events." (Schatzki 
2010, 22)
'Timespace' then, originates from the event, the happening o f 'being-in-the-world'. However, 
Schatzki has a particular interpretation o f 'being-in-the-world' as human activity which is 
slightly but im portantly divergent from the notion o f 'being-in-the-world' as described in 
Chapter Two o f this thesis. He writes:
"I think, however, that Heidegger's analysis of such phenomena as being-in and world 
can -  and should -  be taken as analysis principally o f human activity. In any event, this 
is the use to  which I put them in this book. It is important to  add that Heidegger's 
analysis o f 'being-in-the-world' should be taken as an account, more specifically, of 
experiential acting." (2010, 27)
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Aside from  tha t we might question whether it is plausible to  pu t Heidegger's analysis to use in 
such and such a way, it must be noted firs t that here Schatzki separates 'being-in' from  'world '. 
Fundamentally, this is an error. As I described in Chapter Two, being cannot be separated from 
'being-in-the-world '. Indeed, the hyphens are intended to  denote a notion tha t language finds 
so d ifficu lt to  express. However, Schatzki puts this separation to  use in order to  support his 
claim tha t 'being-in-the-world' should be taken as an account o f experiential acting:
"By "experiential activity" I mean tw o things: first, tha t people experience, or live 
through how they proceed in the world [being-in] and, second, that a person's 
experience occurs w ithin the ken o f his or her activity [world]." (Schatzki 2010, 27-28)
This separation o f 'being-in' and 'w orld ' is caused by and through Schatzki's unit o f analysis. 
Schatzki takes what people experience as the central unit o f his enquiry. It is this approach 
which prevents him from recognising the 'being-in-the-world' o f the event and from  taking 
'practice as event', to  be the central unit o f enquiry.
Furthermore, Schatzki's understanding o f the present-to-hand mode o f 'being-in-the-world' 
conflicts w ith  his understanding o f 'timespace' as the happening o f the event. He describes the 
breakdown o f activity in the follow ing way:
"For instance, when the tip  of the pencil I am using breaks off, leaving me, say, looking 
at the pencil in my hand, the pencil is encountered as in my hand, useless. No longer 
involved in my activity, the regional place that the pencil form erly occupied in my ends, 
tasks, and actions has dropped away, and the pencil is now encountered simply as 
occurring at a spot (Stelle) in objective space: in my hand." (Schatzki 2010, 33)
Schatzki here suggests that when equipment breaks down, that objective reality, that is, 
objective 'tim e ' and 'space', are revealed. However, according to  Heidegger, it is not possible 
fo r human beings to  step outside the 'world '. Certainly when equipment breaks down
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happening moves from  writing to  sharpening a pencil; but neither the pencil nor the w rite r 
step out o f the happening o f 'timespace', out o f the 'w orld ' o f practice. Rather, tha t 'w orld ' 
becomes characterised in a d ifferent way. In this way, we can consider present-to-hand and 
ready-to-hand as simply the routine and nonroutine characterisations o f the 'w orld ' o f 
practice. In any event, Schatzki's rejection of objective 'tim e ' and objective 'space' and his 
notion o f 'timespace' as the happening o f the event are incongruent w ith  his account of 
'being-in-the-world '.
Thus, the incongruency between Schatzki's account o f 'timespace' and his account o f human 
activity leads him to  conceptualise 'a practice', that is human action, as an entity and forces 
him to  maintain a distinction between actions which are performed and events tha t happen, 
which Heidegger does not. Schatzki recognises this:
"Now, an im portant characteristic o f Heidegger's event, that is o f the happening o f a 
clearing [we can read 'w orld '], is tha t a clearing just happens, it is not a doing or a 
performance. Because, moreover, humanity must stand into a clearing fo r the clearing 
to  happen, clearings befall humans: standing into a clearing happens to  people as a 
feature o f the happening o f tha t clearing. Standing into a clearing is not something 
tha t people do." (169)
Despite this recognition o f Heidegger's conceptualisation o f event, Schatzki nevertheless 
applies the befalling feature o f the 'w orld ' o f the event to  performances:
"Performances, as events, befall people, that is, they happen to people. A person, to 
be sure, performs or carries out, an action. She does not, however, perform, or carry 
out, the performance: the performance befalls her. Its befalling her is, at once, her 
carrying out the action." (170)
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Again, this analysis recognises the performance as a thing, e ither as 'a practice' which befalls a 
person, or as some-thing  tha t people do, centring once again the unit o f analysis on the 
individual. In this way stock car racing in its event, either becomes reified as 'a practice' that 
befalls people, tha t captures people, or as a thing  tha t people perform. This analysis o f the 
event stands in stark contrast to  the discussion of the 'w orld ' o f practice as described in 
Chapter Two which makes no such distinction between the subject and object o f doing. Indeed, 
it seems to me tha t Schatzki has missed Heidegger's key point: that the event is not something 
tha t people do, because people cannot be anything other than doing.
This has particularly significant ramifications fo r thinking about the relationships between 
practice, 'tim e ' and event. Considering social phenomena as 'practices' that are bounded, 
separate and distinct performances establishes 'tim e ' as linear, objective and successive, 
precisely the notion that Schatzki begins his discussion of 'timespace' by rejecting. He writes:
"Each o f the performances into which the continuum o f voluntary doing [activity] is 
segmented is an event. Each such event occupies a certain length or moment o f time 
and also has a past, present and fu ture ." (194)
In this work Schatzki develops an in depth discussion of Bergson's account of 'tim e ' as duration 
and 'flow ' (an account that is critiqued in the follow ing chapter), as "flow ing ensembles o f 
changing extensive, action-relative entities..." (197). He contrasts this to  a Deleuzian 
conception o f continual changing (or becoming as described above) employed by authors such 
as Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift (2000) and Doreen Massey (2005) to  theorise change, diversity, 
difference and the presence of the past in social life. He writes:
"Theorists such as Masssey and Crang carry the dynamization of the social too far. A 
human life, fo r instance, embraces continuous happenings. It is not, however, 
constant movement or transition. Nor, pace Deleuze, is it constantly becoming
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d ifferent (except in trivia l regards, fo r example a person's objective past continuously 
expanding)... An event is not ipso facto  a becoming or a change: only some events are 
occasions o f change or becoming. Indeed human lives and the timespaces that 
characterize them usually contain more continuity and sameness over tim e than they 
do difference, change and becoming." (Schatzki 2010, 200)
Therefore, whilst Schatzki recognises that social affairs consist o f multitudinous events, he 
nevertheless argues that sameness and stasis mark the ir course as much as difference and 
change do. Notice that in this argument again Schatzki takes the unit o f 'timespaces' that 
belong to  an individual life and considers the length of the ir persistence over an objective 
am ount o f 'tim e'. My account, in comparison argues precisely that an event is ipso fac to  
change, because change is not external to  an objective 'tim e '. Rather 'timespace' as Schatzki 
describes it, defines change. In sum, it has to  be noted that Schatzki's separation o f 'timespace' 
and human activity, bounds 'practice' as a thing, whose movements, transitions and 
connections have to  be considered over objective 'tim e'. This is clear when he considers ideas 
such as:
"Indeed, over any period o f tim e human practices link and form  gigantic nets ..." (209)
That is not to  say that I disagree entirely w ith Schatzki's account. In fact I recognise many of 
the same problems, questions and framings in this thesis:
"Social phenomena, accordingly encompasses multiple organised, unfolding activity 
event configurations tha t transpire amid inter connected arrangements. Practices and 
social phenomena more generally -  and not just social "events" such as race day -  are 
event like in character." (209)
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However, Schatzki does not go as far to  recognise the event like character o f practice as 
situated and becoming and instead maintains an understanding o f 'practices'-as-things tha t 
arise, evolve, connect and dissolve over 'tim e'.
Therefore, in my conceptualisation o f 'practice as event', I maintain the understanding o f the 
'w orld  o f practice' as described in Chapter Two, recognising the event as situated in 
'timespace' and not distinct from  its temporally and spatially situated-ness. As described 
above, not only is practice situated but it is also constantly changing and becoming.
The notion o f repetition and difference as continuous changing is outlined in the follow ing 
chapter and contrasted against Bergson's understanding o f the temporal distinction between 
'real' and 'spatialised' 'tim e'. In tha t chapter I show why thinking o f becoming pace Deleuze, as 
becoming different, is not simply an issue o f objective succession; but re-presents a 
fundam entally alternative understanding o f change to  the notion tha t Schatzki describes 
above.
Conclusion
In sum, this chapter has sought to  re-frame and re-think assemblages of bodies and things in 
the ir spatial and temporal co-ordinations and synchronisations as coming together as event. I 
began by exploring common conceptualisations o f practice as performance and practice as 
entity. Through illustrative examples taken from  the 'w orld ' o f stock car racing, I compared 
these kinds o f framings w ith an understanding o f practice derived from  Allan Pred's work as 
always temporally and spatially situated and always becoming. I argued that thinking about 
practice in this way helps us get away from an account o f social action as motivated 
performance or a reversed capturing o f performers and to move beyond framings that 
maintain a reliance on subjects and objects, or on things and performances and to  move
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towards an understanding o f social action as situated in the here-now o f 'being-in-the-world', 
as continual changing in the 'm om ent' o f doing, that is as 'practice as event'. In the final 
section o f this chapter I referred to Schatzki's notion o f the event as described in The 
Timespace o f Human Activity  (2010) to  provide points o f comparison as well as to  distinguish 
my thesis from  his. I claimed tha t by separating 'being-in' from  'w orld ' and separating human 
activity from  his notion o f 'timespace', Schatzki effectively maintains an understanding (albeit 
a sophisticated one) of 'practice' as entity. In tracing the movements o f fixed 'practices', 
Schatzki necessarily rejects a Deleuzian notion o f tem porality and instead falls back on an 
analysis o f the emergence and desistance o f fixed 'practices' as entities over objective 'tim e'. 
In contrast, my reading of event maintains the notion o f 'being-in-the-world' as described in 
Chapter Two. I move now to  develop this idea further in the fo llow ing chapter by contrasting 
more fam iliar understandings o f 'tim e ' considered as 'flow ' (Bergson) w ith  a Deleuzian 
tem pora lity o f repetition and difference.
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Chapter Five: Practice in the Moment 
of Doing
Being is nontime, time is nonbeing insofar as being already, secretly has been determined as present, and beingness 
(ouisaj as presence. As soon as being and present are synonymous, to say nothingness and to say time are the same 
thing. (Derrida)
Introduction
In this chapter I move to provide a more thorough treatm ent of the temporal-spatial 
implications o f the previous account of 'practice as event' through a discussion of 'practice in 
the moment o f doing'. I suggest that this requires a significant shift in thinking from  both 
'everyday' and academic re-presentations o f 'tim e ' that maintain a distinction between 
subjective and objective 'tim e', that is, between the experience o f 'tim e ' and measured 'tim e '. 
As in the epigraph above, having argued tha t we might shift our understanding of 'practice' 
from  a thing  tha t is present to practice in its event, or presencing it is necessary then to  also 
re-consider 'tim e '. Thus, I o ffer a reading o f Nietzsche's notion o f the 'eternal re tu rn '22 so that 
we might move beyond more simplistic re-presentations of linear succession and develop an 
understanding o f 'tim e ' as constituted through a Deleuzian understanding of repetition and 
difference ([1969] 1994) based on understanding 'practice in the moment of doing' as 
fundamentally structured by its division between it future and its past (Derrida 1982; Derrida 
[1967] 2001; Hagglund 2008, 2012). As such this chapter builds towards one of the central 
claims o f this thesis, that analyses o f the relationship between social action and social change 
would do well to  recognise that being is becoming, doing is difference and that practice is 
change. Thus, I make the argument that 'tim e' is not a mere medium in which 'practices'
22 From a particular reading of 'Of the Vision and the Riddle' from Thus Spake Zarathustra  (Nietzsche 
[1883-85] 1961) Although this idea is expressed in other ways and in other volumes and is a reading that 
is debated amongst Nietzsche scholars, nevertheless, it is a useful thought to draw out a transvaluation  
of our 'everyday' understanding of 'time'.
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unfold; but 'tim e ' is both constitutive o f and constituted by the 'm om ent' o f practice as 
presence.
In order to  make this argument I refer to  the rhythms o f practice o f computer gaming. This is a 
particularly suitable empirical site through which to  investigate the relationship between 'tim e' 
and practice because not only are games often described as immersive and capable of 
d istorting experiences of 'tim e '; but games designers specifically study and aim to  create 
games tha t provide this kind o f experience. After introducing the rhythms o f practice of 
computer gaming I outline the details o f my rhythmanalytical study at this site and introduce 
in particular one case study, 'Larry's Story', as a means of exploring these highly synchronised 
and co-ordinated rhythms o f practice. I show how games designers, heavily influenced by 
psychological theories of 'flow ' (see Csikszentmihalyi 1990), conceptualise Larry's rhythms of 
practice as distinct between 'in flow ' and 'out o f flow ', that is between subjective and 
objective 'tim e ' and how this conception of 'tim e ' pervades social theoretical accounts of 
changing rhythms o f what people do. I then contrast these accounts to  my notion, follow ing 
Nietzsche, Deleuze, Lefebvre and Hagglund, o f 'practice in the moment o f doing' to 
demonstrate tha t Larry's changing rhythms o f practice can be better conceptualised through 
an understanding of doing that is ipso facto  change. First it w ill be useful to  introduce the 
rhythms o f practice of computer gaming and Larry's story.
Computer Gaming
In one o f 'game studies" most cited texts, Jane McGonigal (2011) claims that across the world 
over three billion hours per week are spent on computer gaming. Nevertheless, w ithin this 
three billion hours o f practice, just as described in the case of stock car racing, there is a wide
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diversity o f d ifferent rhythms o f practice o f gaming, that vary in accordance w ith  the types o f 
technologies used, types o f games played, meanings attributed, platforms, places, players and 
so on. For example, companies such as Nintendo have developed in home, fam ily-friendly 
games tha t are played on accessible platforms and can easily be controlled through the 
movements o f the body, whilst in other instances of gaming, players develop extreme 
proficiency and technical skill at using the keyboard and mouse on a PC to control their 
characters through highly exclusive and prestigiously ranked 'Multiplayer-Online-Battle-Arenas' 
(MOBA's) where any deemed lack o f skill by other participants results in sw ift exclusion from 
play.
These diverse, growing and popular rhythms o f practice have received a fa ir amount of 
a ttention from academics and as such, 'game studies' has become a discipline in its own right. 
Traditionally divisions in 'game studies' mostly centre around a debate between ludologists 
and narratologists on what fundamentally constitutes 'gaming': the structure and rules o f the 
game itself, or the subjective narrative tha t narratologists argue underpin all types o f media 
including film , music and games (see Frasca 1999). Similarly there are many discussions 
between technological determinists and social constructivists which centre on the 
relationships between technologies and users, between humans and nonhumans (see Hjorth 
2011,11-17).
However, questions regarding what can be considered to  constitute 'a game' and the degree 
o f 'agency' users have in engaging w ith  particular technologies (that is how to  frame the 
subject and object o f doing) have been discussed at length in Chapter Four and Chapter Two 
respectively. Having understood practice, in this case, gaming, as event and the technological 
equipment (here of gaming) as part o f the 'w orld ' o f that practice, this chapter turns its 
a ttention to  the relationship between practice and 'tim e' and seeks to  explore how an
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understanding o f this relationship can inform our grasp o f the relationship between social 
action and social change.
'Game studies' have also been divided in terms o f the ir methodological approach to  studying 
gaming 'practices'. Most commonly, this division has existed between textual analysis o f 
games and ethnographies o f gaming practice (Hjorth 2011, 17). Those engaged in textual 
analyses o f games, have treated games as objects, as texts that can be read and interpreted in 
various ways depending on the ir various contexts (e.g. Dovey and Kennedy 2006). More 
ethnographic approaches have shifted the focus away from  the game as a textual object and 
towards players, towards the ir subjective experiences o f playing games and towards the ir 
'agency' and identity as 'gamers' (e.g. Taylor 2006). In keeping w ith the philosophical task of 
this thesis, its theoretical foundations and the methodological concerns as outlined in Chapter 
One, I have moved beyond a methodology that takes either the object game or the subject 
player as its main focus. Instead I have struggled to engage in the rhythms o f practice of 
gaming, to  learn by doing and playing w ith others. At the same tim e I have kept records o f my 
own experiences of gaming and have recorded in-depth interviews w ith variously 'serious' and 
more 'novice' gamers. Significantly this involved spending time at a growing independent 
Manchester based games design studio (Black Paper Games Ltd.23) and interviewing games 
designers, tw o of whom also lectured in Gomes Theory and Design at the university and 
proved to  be significant resources fo r research into this field. I also spent a good deal o f 'tim e' 
both interviewing and playing w ith one particular gamer whom I came to know quite well and 
whose story I introduce now in order to begin to consider, as well as to  illustrate the question 
o f the relationship between practice and 'tim e'.
Larry has been playing the massively multiplayer online role playing game (MMORPG) World o f 
W arcraft (WOW) since shortly after its release in 2004, that is, now, fo r over eight years.
23 This is a pseudonym.
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WOW is a highly successful game tha t has somewhere in the region o f ten m illion subscribed 
players who pay a monthly fee to  play the ir character(s) through the World o f Warcraft's 
v irtual world  of 'Azeroth'. Players' characters navigate the world to  perform quests and 
interact w ith  other characters, in order to  increase the ir experience points, improve the ir 
levels and to  buy and trade equipment, armour and weapons amongst other things. On 
reaching a sufficient level, characters can join  raiding parties made up o f other players' 
characters to  take on highly problematic and technical 'instances' or 'dungeons', tha t require a 
team o f players w ith variously specific skills to  work together to  defeat that level's 'boss' in 
order to  acquire rare and prized 'drops' o f specialised weapons or armour and to  increase the 
rank o f the ir raiding party or guild on that particular server.
Larry's 'm ain' character 'Conan' (at the time of our last interview) is a level ninety, dwarf, holy 
paladin, whose particular speciality is to heal and revive other players. 'Conan' in particular is 
equipped w ith  some of the most prestigious and sought after equipment fo r healing not just 
on his specific server; but across the whole o f the WOW game. It is this combination o f such 
high level, skill and prestigious equipment, that has meant Larry's character 'Conan' has been 
particularly sought after and touted by various high ranking and prestigious guilds that want 
Larry to  support the ir raiding parties w ith powerful 'heals' and 'buffs' as they attack some of 
the most high level 'dungeons' on the game.
Larry's rhythms of practice of computer gaming, including raiding w ith various guilds, 
maintaining his characters' level and equipment, his 'daily' quests and so on have changed 
greatly over the course of eight years, w ith rhythms of computer gaming becoming ever more 
dom inant rhythms of practice around which other rhythms in his 'everyday' life are organised. 
When he firs t began playing, Larry worked part time in a shop fo r a few hours per week and 
played WOW during the evenings after work. A fter tw o years of play and of building up his 
characters' experience, Larry was working on those evenings and raiding every other morning
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w ith  a guild based in the United States. A fter three more years of playing w ith his character at 
the highest level possible in the game, Larry, like many other players, was booking his holidays 
from  work to  coincide w ith the release o f various expansion packs so that he could attain the 
new highest level in the game as quickly as possible and was in fact by this tim e regularly 
scheduling other rhythms o f practice, such as sleeping and eating, around his rhythms of 
practice o f gaming. For example, it is now routine fo r Larry to  order takeaway online between 
'instances' and answer the door, when his food arrives, as quickly as possible, to  return to  eat 
at his computer desk thus minimising the amount of tim e that his 'm od' (modification to  the 
game) has to  'auto-run ' his character whilst he is 'AFK' (away from  keyboard).
These rhythms o f practice o f computer gaming, as exemplified through Larry's story 
immediately invite a plethora o f questions about conceptualising the relationship between 
'tim e ' and 'practice as event'. How is it, fo r example, that fo r Larry the event o f gaming 
became repeated so routinely? How did other rhythms of practice such as sleeping or eating 
and even working become re-scheduled or indeed become precisely nonroutine fo r him? In 
answer to  these questions I firs t describe how computer games designers seek to inscribe 
specific rhythms in the games tha t they create and then show how a theoretical distinction 
between subjective and objective 'tim e ' underwrites computer games design as well as more 
sophisticated social theoretical analyses o f the ordering o f 'practices'.
Flow
During my visits to  'Black Paper Games Ltd.', a fledgling and independent games studio based 
in Manchester, I was intrigued to  find tha t the question o f 'tim e ' was central to  all the 
designers both in the ir attempts at building entertaining and immersive games, as well as in
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the ir 'everyday' lives. Many shared concerns about making 'tim e ' fo r gaming and not getting 
'sucked into playing a game' at the expense o f household chores or doing other 'w ork'. Brad 
described this concern regarding the powerful effect o f computer gaming:
"Because I work from  home a lot, I have to  be careful about when I go online. Because 
once I start a quick game I can be going fo r hours and then never get any work done." 
(Brad)
This is a common description o f gamers' experiences o f 'tim e '. In an online article tha t several 
o f the designers suggested tha t I should read after discussing notions o f 'tim e ' w ith  them, 
Sean Baron describes an experience o f gaming he claims that all readers w ill be fam iliar w ith:
"You sit down, ready to  get in a few minutes of gaming. Hours pass and suddenly you 
become aware that you're making ridiculous faces and moving like a contortionist 
while trying to reach that new high score. You ask yourself: where did the time go? 
When did I sprain my ankle?" (Baron 2012,1)
In this article, titled: 'Cognitive Flow: The Psychology o f Great Game Design' (2012), Baron 
goes on to  analyse this experience of immersion in and then sudden reflexive awareness of 
computer games through Csikszentmihalyi's (1990) theory o f 'flow ', a theory that has similarly 
been suggested w ithin certain 'theories of practice' to  provide a suitable temporal framework 
in which to  situate 'theories of practice' (see Rettie 2001). Baron goes on to suggest that great 
game design can be achieved by follow ing the four characteristics of tasks outlined by 
Csikszentmihalyi in The Psychology o f Optimal Experience (1990) to  promote, or rather induce 
'flow '. That is, a so described 'engaged-state' where gamers experience extreme focus on a 
task and maintain a sense o f active control whilst simultaneously experiencing a loss o f 'se lf-  
awareness and a 'd istortion ' o f the experience of 'tim e'. It is this analysis then that computer 
games designers at 'Black Paper Games Ltd.' use to understand experiences like Larry's, such
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tha t when in 'flow ', gamers' subjective experiences become distorted as they become 
immersed in 'the practice' o f gaming and they become less aware o f o ther 'practices' or 
activities.
Csikszentmihalyi in the same book refers to  several extracts from interviews w ith  various 
people engaged in all kinds o f rhythms o f practice, from  reading w ith  one's daughter to  
playing chess, tha t can all achieve an experience of 'flow '. One significant extract taken from 
an interview w ith  a climber and poet, describes particularly well the type o f experience of 
which Baron, Csikszentmihalyi and the games designers spoke and helps explain why this 
'op tim al' experience is described as 'flow ':
"The mystique o f rock climbing is climbing; you get to the top o f a rock glad it's over 
but really wish it would go on forever. The justification o f climbing is climbing, like the 
justification o f poetry is w riting; you don 't conquer anything except things in yourself... 
The act o f w riting justifies poetry. Climbing is the same recognizing that you are a flow. 
The purpose of the flow  is to  keep on flowing, not looking fo r a peak or a utopia but 
staying in the flow. It is not a moving up but a continuous flowing; you move up to 
keep the flow  going. There is no possible reason fo r climbing except the climbing itself; 
it is a self-communication." (Climber and Poet in Csikszentmihalyi 1990, 54)
This may well be the experience o f someone engaged in an 'optimal experience' o f 'a practice'; 
but what happens when the experience o f 'a practice' is less than optimal, when one is 
engaged in activities that one does not want to  do? For Csikszentmihalyi, the answer is that if 
we are not engaged in 'flow ', we become bored because the task is too easy or anxious 
because the task is too difficult fo r our level o f skill and we return to  a more 'normal' state of 







Figure 3: 'Flow' Diagram Adapted from Csikszentmihalyi (1990)
In order to  achieve and maintain the experience o f 'flow ', Baron, follow ing Csikszentmihalyi, 
argues tha t it is necessary fo r games to: 1. have concrete goals w ith  manageable rules, 2. 
demand actions that f it  a players' capabilities, 3. give clear and tim ely feedback and 4. 
diminish extraneous distraction (Baron 2012, 2). If these four characteristics can be applied to  
the rhythms of practice o f gaming, then, as these writers and designers have described, 
players w ill experience an altered state of 'consciousness', that is, 'flow ', and w ill want to 
continue playing games fo r hours on end.
However, this conception o f 'tim e ' and 'consciousness', is not a conception tha t is compatible 
w ith  the arguments laid out thus far in this thesis. Indeed notice the similarities between 
Csikszentmihalyi's and the computer games designer's analysis o f Larry's rhythms of gaming 
practice and Lizardo's (2009) analysis of how boxers learn to  box, as discussed in Chapter 
Three. Just as in Lizardo's argument, routine practice and nonroutine practice are divided 
between the 'conscious' and the 'unconscious', between being 'out of flow ' and 'in flow '. In 
addition, both rest on a division between 'm ind' and body, between cognition and
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embodiment and between reflexive and habitual action. This is an analysis that was disputed 
in Chapter Three through a discussion o f 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice'.
Further to  this concern, it is now possible to  discern that these understandings of 'flow ' and an 
altered sense o f 'se lf not only rest on a distinction between body-subjects and body-objects; 
but tha t they necessarily also imply a significant distinction between subjective and objective 
'tim e ', tha t is 'tim e ' as experienced and 'tim e ' as measured and quantified. I show in the 
fo llow ing section tha t this re-presentation o f 'tim e' is predicated on an ontology that pervades 
not only 'everyday' understandings o f 'tim e '; but also social theoretical analyses that equate 
being w ith  what is present and tha t re-present doing as an identifiable thing; rather than 
recognising being as presence, tha t is the becoming-ness o f 'moments' o f practice.
Subjective and Objective Time
It is im portant to  recognise that the distinction between subjective and objective temporality 
tha t gives rise to  contemporary analyses o f 'tim e', as described above, is a thoroughly modern 
phenomena and stands in relation to various conceptions o f 'tim e' that have existed 
throughout 'history'. Aristotle, fo r example, considered 'tim e' to be the 'tim e' o f the natural 
world and as such was readable through and made understandable by the changes in 
planetary motions, the changing of the seasons and so on (see Charlton 1970). Medieval 
scholars derived the ir conception of 'tim e' from theological study, recognising time as given by 
God and as such existed as a fin ite  and fixed substance (see Warner 1963). Following 
Descartes ([1637] 2005) and Kant (Kant [1781] 1998), modern scholars have tended to 
contemplate 'tim e' as depending on the cognitive structures existing in the 'm ind' of the 
rational observer. Both contemporary lay and academic thought now tends to examine 'tim e'
as made up o f several o f these elements that are often divided into tw o senses as 'scientific' 
and 'experienced' 'tim e'.
This distinction was firs t conceptualised in social theory by Henri Bergson in Time and Free Will 
([1889] 2008). In this work, Bergson claims that the study o f the positive sciences is concerned 
w ith  understanding 'tim e ' spatially, as a set o f quantifiable movements such as clock hours 
and calendar months. For Bergson, this is how conceptual analysis must grasp 'tim e', as linear 
and as underpinning systems o f cause and effect.
Im portantly, however, he argues tha t this conceptual analysis o f linear 'tim e' stands in 
contrast to 'real' or 'thick' 'tim e', the 'tim e' o f 'consciousness', o f human experience, that 
resists both scientific measurement and conceptual analysis. Bergson's understanding o f 'tim e' 
recognises the unfolding o f the 'duration ' o f 'consciousness', fo r example, Larry's immersion in 
playing WOW, as ungraspable in its unfolding by conceptual analysis. For Bergson though this 
'real' 'tim e ' unfolding of 'consciousness' is 'tim e', which conceptual analysis has to  come to re­
present through spatialisation, qualification, division and measurement, fo r example, by 
counting gaming hours or recognising a period of gaming as distinct from and ordered in 
relation to  other activities.
W hilst Bergson maintains a distinction between 'real' and 'spatialised' 'tim e', subjective and 
objective 'tim e', as well as a focus on the role o f 'consciousness', what is significantly 
im portant and useful is his conceptualisation o f the unfolding, unsegmented and changing 
understanding o f the notion o f 'duration ' (la duree). That is to say, understanding how Bergson 
and others interpret the ongoing change o f Larry's rhythms o f computer gaming can help to 
point the way towards and distinguish thinking about 'practice in the moment o f doing'.
For Bergson, in Time and Free Will ([1889] 2008), the past, present and future of activity only 
exist as separate and distinct, preceding and follow ing 'moments' in 'spatialised' or
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quantifiable 'tim e '. In subjective, or 'real' 'tim e ' they occur 'all at one stroke'. That is, thai 
unfolding 'duration ' is to be considered as: "the continuation o f what precedes into whal 
follows... uninterrupted transition, m ultip lic ity w ithout divisibility, and succession w ithoui 
segmentation." (Bergson in Schatzki 2010,189)
For example, Larry's experience o f completing a 'raid ' w ith  his guild, checking his statistic 
updates, going to  the auction house to  sell his 'drops', answering the door to  collect his 
takeaway, running back upstairs to  get the right change w ith which to  pay and quickly 
returning to  gear up fo r the next 'ra id ', are not experienced by him as distinct 'practices'; bui 
instead as continuous unfolding, or in Bergson's terms 'flow ing '. It is only in conceptual 
analysis, as I ask him to  describe his evening and as I w rite  it here, tha t this experience 
becomes divided into distinct events. W hilst Bergson has been critiqued fo r his focus on the 
role o f intellect and 'consciousness', his work has nevertheless been taken up by many authors 
including 'practice theorists', in attempts to  synthesise the  notion o f unfolding or ongoing 
change w ith  an account tha t can nevertheless map the emergence, persistence and 
disappearance o f 'practices' over measured 'tim e'.
In an example o f such a work, Schatzki provides in The Timespace o f  Human Activity  (2010), an 
argument that attempts a symtbesiis o f both unfolding and distinct 'm oments' o f 'tim e ' through 
the distinction o f practice as performance and entity. Here he points to  the u tility; but also the 
problem w ith  taking up Bergson's notion of 'duration '. He writes:
"Ongoing life may flow , bu t 'it 'instantiates Bergsonian duration only if it evinces 
uninterrupted transition and development, as w ell as succession w ithout separation; 
as life unfolds, w hat is subsequently remembered as earlier actions or phases of actior 
must not be distinct from  What is likewise subsequently recalled as later actions oi 
phases.” (Schatzki 2010, T931)
Here, Schatzki, brings to  the fore the problem of succession. If practice is unfolding and 
ongoing, how can we say where 'one practice' stops and another begins? How can we examine 
how practice repeats and how it becomes different? How can we recognise change? Schatzki 
considers two possible responses to the problem o f succession. The firs t is to  recognise the 
segmentation o f Larry's evening o f raiding, questing, upgrading, eating etc. as a product o f 
memory and intellect and a la Bergson to argue that: "as it unfolded it was a thick duration, an 
undivided amalgamation o f action, sensation, and memories." (Schatzki 2010,193)24
The second way to deal w ith the problem o f succession is to argue, as Schatzki does, that 
memory and intellect do not introduce segmentations but remember segmentations that were 
actually there in the evening (i.e. 'practices-as-entities'). For Schatzki, whilst Larry's actions, 
completing his raid, selling his drops, eating his takeaway, etc. may well have been 
experienced as a continuous unfolding, it was a continuous unfolding of those particular 
'practices':
"True, both my performances of these actions and my lived-through experiences of 
this series were continuous. But the continuous performance of action was of 
precisely these actions, and my continuous performance took precisely those turns." 
(Schatzki 2010,193)
It seems that when it comes to the question of succession, Schatzki wants to  have his cake and 
eat it. He both wants to  maintain a Bergsonian notion of continuous unfolding, whilst at the 
same tim e to distinguish between specific 'moments' o f action w ithout resorting to  an 
objective sense of 'tim e' that is built on a typical understanding o f befores and afters.
Schatzki thereby attempts to  synthesise a segmentation o f particular actions ('practice' as 
entity) w ith an understanding of continuous unfolding as continuous performance ('practice'
24 As we will see later, Deleuze ([1969] 1994) might argue that Larry's evening as it unfolded contained 
differences but none of the describe and named actions existed as distinct and segmented 'moments'.
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as performance) by transposing these adjustments onto Bergson's distinction between 'real' 
(subjective) and 'spatialised' (objective) tim e:
"I am transposing this thought to  human action, contrasting performing, voluntary 
doing (activity), to  actions as performed accomplishments. Ongoing life is marked by 
continuous performing, continuous voluntary doing. What in human existence, 
consequently, promotes Bergson's idea of an interpenetrating, separation-less flow  is 
the continuousness o f performance, in conjunction w ith the continuousness of 
attention and the fleetingness o f the details o f action and experience. Ongoing activity, 
however, is not Bergsonian duration. It is segmented into distinct episodes 
(performances o f action) that do not instantiate his notion o f qualitative m ultiplicity in 
succession." (Schatzki 2010,194)
For Schatzki then, continuous performance or doing is segmented into particular bounded 
'practices' that occupy a certain length o f 'tim e '; but are also characterised by the ir past, 
present and future dimensions that orient what is done and why. This is a significant 
contribution and synthesis o f both subjective and objective 'tim e'; but nevertheless fails to 
th ink about 'tim e ' in a way much different to the readers of Csikszentmihalyi (1990), who 
maintain tha t they can induce 'flow ' or the experience of continuous performance (of 
computer gaming fo r example) by configuring certain 'practices' in particular ways. That is to 
say that Schatzki maintains a distinction that allows an analysis o f Larry's rhythms o f computer 
gaming to  be scheduled and organised by his subjective experience of 'tim e', of continuous 
performance tha t affects the length o f 'tim e' fo r which he plays computer games.
By identifying Larry's rhythms of computer gaming as 'a practice' that is as present thing  
Schatzki repeats and builds on an analysis of social action and social change that pertains in 
social theory and that re-presents 'practice' through the subjects and objects of social action, 
of one who performs computer gaming or is recruited by this 'practice'. Instead to consider
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practice as presence, in its happening like quality tha t resists this kind o f re-presentation, I turn 
now to a transvaluation of our 'everyday' notions o f 'tim e ' as distinct between experienced 
and measured through a discussion o f Nietzsche's concept o f 'eternal return'.
Eternal Return
Following the suggestion in Chapter Four that we might consider thinking about 'practice as 
event', the task tha t now stands before us is no longer to  provide an analysis o f how Larry's 
gaming 'practice' as a bounded entity is ordered across 'tim e' (understood as some kind of 
temporal container) and 'space'; but instead to consider the becoming-ness o f each 'moment' 
o f his temporally and spatially situated practice. This requires, taking from Derrida, a de­
construction o f 'tim e ', a destruction of temporal succession and a re-construction o f 'tim e' as 
both constitutive o f and constituted by practice. In particular, adopting Friedrich Nietzsche's 
([1883-85] 1961) self-proclaimed highest thought of 'eternal return', can help to re-frame the 
'm om ent' o f practice away from  our 'everyday' recuperative and re-presentative 
understandings of the present 'm oment' as existing in a series of temporal instants and 
entities and towards an understanding of the presencing o f the 'moment of practice' as a self- 
exceeding, opening out onto what is other, a continual becoming.25
First it is necessary to  recognise that an 'everyday' understanding o f 'tim e ' that distinguishes 
between subjective and objective time serves to maintain a unity of the identity of events, 
things and beings (or 'practices'). David Wood offers a useful summary of the logic of this 
relationship in his book The Deconstruction o f Time (2001):
25 Note that the 'm om ent' is never present in itself; but always negates itself in its very presencing. See 
this chapter, section on: 'Tracing Rhythms'.
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"... the distinction between subjective and objective time is a conceptual labor that 
ensures under each heading the preservation o f the unity o f the temporal series, and 
tha t this is achieved precisely by making this distinction. All events can then be located 
in one or other category by distinct rules o f integration (such as narrativity for 
subjective time, seriality fo r objective tim e)." (Wood 2001,13)
For Wood, this 'everyday' understanding o f 'tim e ' is necessary fo r our understanding of the 
identity o f things, to  recognise beings and the ir presence. W ithout this understanding of 'tim e' 
we could not recognise what Larry does as 'a practice'. Fundamentally then this shows us that 
'everyday' 'tim e' is as much ontological (a way o f bringing things into being, o f showing things 
as they are) as it is temporal.26 Even more importantly we have to recognise that ontological 
concerns are tied up w ith temporal concerns, that questions about 'tim e' and being ('tim e' 
and practice) cannot be separated. It is fo r this reason then that I continue to describe 
'practice in the moment of doing', maintaining the notion of practice built up in the previous 
chapters including 'the world o f practice', 'embodied -knowledge-in-practice' and 'practice as 
event'.
In moving beyond notions of 'tim e ' associated w ith the unity of identity and entities, Nietzsche 
proposes a transvaluation o f 'tim e ' through the notion of 'eternal return'. This idea appears at 
various points in Nietzsche's writings, disparately as a scientific account of 'tim e', a 
psychological motivation and ontological instruction (see Wood 2001). For current purposes 
and issues o f space I provide an ontological reading o f 'eternal return' though it should be 
recognised that this thought is not readily separated out from its other implications. Through 
the idea o f 'eternal return', Nietzsche seeks to destroy our 'everyday' and common sense 
understanding o f linear 'tim e' that underpins our 'being-in-the-world' and to construct a new 
vision o f tem porality as circular in order to  re-think our understanding of (among other things)
26 Hence Heidegger's early interest and title of his magnum opus ([1927] 1962).
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being. As noted, Nietzsche presents this idea variously as a 'scientific' proof o f infin ite 'tim e' 
and 'space', and a psychological test o f the affirmative w ill, (to w ill tha t which returns); but in 
a particularly famous and poetic section o f Thus Spake Zarathustra  ([1883-85] 1961), he 
presents a vivid image o f the 'eternal return' and the 'm om ent' which warrants quoting at 
length:
""Then something occurred which lightened me: fo r the dwarf jumped from my 
shoulder, the inquisitive dwarf! And he squatted down upon a stone in fron t o f me. 
But a gateway stood just where we had halted.
"Behold this gateway, dwarf!" I went on: " it  has tw o aspects. Two paths come 
together here: no one has ever reached the ir end.
"This long lane behind us: it goes on fo r an eternity. And that long lane ahead o f us -  
tha t is another eternity.
"They are in opposition to  one another, these paths; they abut one another: and it is 
here at this gateway that they come together. The name o f the gateway is w ritten 
above it: 'M om ent'.
"But if one were to  fo llow them fu rther and ever further and further: do you think, 
dwarf, that these paths would be in eternal opposition?"
"Everything straight lies," murmured the dwarf disdainfully. "All tru th  is crooked, time 
itself is a circle."
"Spirit o f Gravity!" I said angrily, "do not treat this too lig h tly !...
"Behold this m om ent!" I went on. "From this gateway Moment a long eternal lane
runs back: an eternity lies behind us.
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"M ust not all things tha t can run have already run along this lane? Must not all things 
tha t can happen have already happened, been done, run past?
"And if all things have been here before: what do you think o f this moment, dwarf? 
Must not this gateway, too, have been here -  before?
"And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this moment draws after 
it all its future things? Therefore draws itself too?"" (Nietzsche [1883-85] 1961, 178- 
179)
Nietzsche thus presents a most vivid account of the thought of 'eternal return'. The dwarf 
summarises disdainfully: "... tim e itself is a circle." This is an argument that is often discussed 
as m atter o f fact in social scientific research on tim e. But we would do well to  heed 
Zarathustra's warning and recognise the significance o f the implications o f this suggestion: 
"Spirit o f Gravity!" I said angrily, "do not trea t this too lightly!" And we should not, because to 
th ink tim e as circular, as we shall see, requires a re-conceptualisation o f being, o f identity, of 
repetition and of difference indeed of the notion of change, that is, o f becoming itself.
Thus, in my view, in this passage Nietzsche provides a successful transvaluation of our 
'everyday' understanding o f 'tim e ' in two important ways, first he provides a re-focusing of 
'tim e ' from  the present, to the 'm oment' as presence and second he shows up being as 
becoming. Both o f these concepts are extremely significant fo r recognising the relationship 
between practice and 'tim e ' as well as the relationship between social action and social 
change.
First, by recognising tim e as a circle rather than re-presented as a series o f 'nows' that come 
from  the future, exist in the present and pass into the past, Nietzsche demonstrates that 
thinking about 'tim e' cannot be done as linear progression; but has to be recognised as coming 
to  presence in the 'moment':
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And if ail things have been here before: what do you think o f this moment, dwarf? 
Must not this gateway, too, have been here -  before?"
When we consider tha t 'tim e' is no longer a line stretching out over 'history'; but is instead a 
circle tha t repeats itself fo r eternity, it no longer makes sense to  understand the passing 
present but instead only to  consider the 'm om ent' as presencing and similar to  Bergson's 
description o f unfolding 'consciousness', as combining all three temporal modalities, past, 
present and fu ture all at once.
This focus on the 'm oment' then, leads us to  the second significant proposition that being, 
'practice in the moment o f doing', is never present in itself; but is always becoming, always 
drawing itself into the next 'moment':
"And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this moment draws after 
it all fu ture things? Therefore draws itself too?"
Nietzsche demonstrates here then, that being is becoming, doing is difference and that (in this 
ontological scheme) practice is change. In this way, the 'moment of practice' in-itself can never 
be fu lly present: rather it is always already divided between its future and its past. To consider 
'practice' as a thing  is to re-present it. Instead, and this is fundamental to  the argument of this 
thesis, we can only recognise 'practice in the moment of doing' in its coming to presence. 
Practice does not exist as a fixed entity or identity separated from other entities or identities 
by difference or change. Instead practice is change, is difference itself. This thought requires 
fu rther elaboration through a discussion of Deleuze's work on repetition and difference and 
then Derrida's notion of 'the trace'. However, first it w ill be useful to contrast Heidegger's 
reading of Nietzsche's idea in Being and Time ([1927] 1962)27, in order to show how Heidegger 
(in Being and Time at least) and subsequently Schatzki (in The Timespace o f Human Activity 
(2010)), fail to  go beyond an understanding of being as present, that is, practice-as-entity and
27 A reading he argued in his later work failed to think this idea of being as becoming.
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are therefore are unable to  reach the conclusion o f being as becoming, to  recognise being in 
its presencing, as drawing itself, already divided between past and future.
Heidegger then, in Being and Time attempts an analysis o f 'tim e' through discussion o f the 
tem pora lity o f 'being-in-the-world' or more correctly Dasein. As I have described more 
thoroughly in Chapter Two, Dasein (or there-being) is a re-conceptualisation of what it is to be 
a human being. Indeed the human entity, though radically and particularly re-thought, is the 
very entity w ith  which Heidegger sought to  study the ontological question o f being, that is 
how things (in this case humans) are, how they come to be. Again in Chapter Two I showed 
how Heidegger argued that the particular way that humans are, is 'in-the-world ', that is, 
always engaged in practical activity, amid and directed towards the material equipment of 
practice. Up until this point in the thesis it has been sufficient to  recognise 'being-in-the-world' 
and what I have called practice, or doing as relatively similar ideas. However, it is now possible 
and extremely im portant to  discern a significant difference between these tw o concepts, 
namely tha t 'being-in-the-world' is grounded by and maintains its focus on a human entity, 
whilst practice does not. That is to  say that Heidegger uses the human entity to  study the 
structure o f being, whilst my discussion of practice studies doing.
On his reading o f Nietzsche and Bergson (whose works were both particularly influential on 
Heidegger's thought), Heidegger takes the notion of 'eternal return', the concept o f time as 
cyclical and applies it to Dasein (the human entity as 'being-in-the-world') in the 'moment'. As 
such Heidegger proposed that Dasein has its being in 'tim e', that is to  say, that its mode of 
being is structured by the fact that all three temporalities occur for it at once. Therefore, at 
each 'm om ent' Dasein experiences: 1. 'thrownness', (already in-the-world and dealing with 
what it receives from the past) 2. 'projection', (Dasein is never fully "at this moment" because 
it recognises and lives 'at this moment' its future projections) 3. 'falleness', (Dasein is 
continually concerned w ith dealings as they arise, the 'nows' of the ready-to-hand world).
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Nevertheless, notice that in this form ulation tha t it is Dasein tha t holds together these three 
temporalities. Heidegger's notion here is that 'tim e ' is not a mere medium in which things 
unfold; but is the thing that constitutes being, that constitutes identity. Therefore despite 
Heidegger's attempts to avoid this problem, he nevertheless promotes the human entity, 
although a modified human entity as 'being-in-the-world,' as the thing, the entity that returns 
in each 'm om ent' and the being that is present and thus capable of analyses. Indeed this is the 
very argument from  which Schatzki formulates his discussion of distinct 'moments' o f practice 
and thus positions his analyses o f 'practice' as the ordering o f 'practices' across 'space' and 
'tim e ' thereby externalising change, or becoming from  practice or being itself.
As the opening quotation from Derrida suggests and as we w ill see, fo r Deleuze, this has 
serious implications fo r understanding the relationship between social action and social 
change and fo r positioning ideas about how rhythms of practice are shaped. Instead of asking 
the question o f how Larry's gaming 'practice' is ordered across 'space' and 'tim e', we can 
instead turn our attention, follow ing Nietzsche's suggestion, to  gaming 'practice in the 
moment o f doing' and investigate how it is repeated and how it becomes different.
Repetition and Difference
For Deleuze, in Being and Time at least, Heidegger has misinterpreted the idea of 'eternal 
return ' by foregrounding his analysis in being as present, in something that is, e.g. Dasein.
"And in this sense it must not be interpreted as the return o f something that is, that is 
"one", or the "same". We m isinterpret the expression "eternal return" if we 
understand it as "return of the same." (Deleuze [1962] 1983, 48)
Thus, Deleuze argues, (as does Derrida), that Heidegger has misread the relation of the
'm om ent' to  itself as present, past and future, as grounding being and that it is being, the one
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same thing, tha t returns. Instead, Deleuze argues that it is returning itself that returns. 'Eternal 
return ' then is an answer to  the problem o f passage and the relation between 'moments', not 
to  the question o f being. That is to  say that 'eternal return' is not compatible w ith a view that 
seeks to  understand 'practices' that are present, but rather suggests how practice as 
presencing relates to  other presencing 'moments'.
Indeed, just as Nietzsche does, Deleuze attributes to  being, the value o f becoming, of 
difference in itself whilst sameness is attributed to  becoming, that is fo r Nietzsche and Deleuze, 
becoming is the one thing that never changes. This is the central suggestion o f this chapter, 
tha t practice as doing, as event (but not as human entity), is itself continual change, continual 
difference.
In Difference and Repetition ([1969] 1994), Deleuze suggests thinking about 'tim e' not as 
grounded or brought together by some being; but as through the notions of repetition and 
difference, which are quite d ifferent from our normal 'everyday' understandings o f these 
terms. What we commonly consider to be repetition, Deleuze argues, is a re-presentation of 
various objects, events, people etc. that occur at d ifferent spatio-temporal positions. Deleuze 
instead wants to  argue fo r a repetition that is fo r itself. He writes:
"Our problem concerns the essence o f repetition. It is a question o f knowing why
repetition cannot be explained by the form o f identity in concepts or representations;
in what sense it demands a superior "positive" principle." (Deleuze [1969] 1994, 22)
This superior principle then is that repetition is not the returning of the same; but a repeating 
o f difference itself. This too requires a new understanding o f difference away from difference 
as the negation o f identity. Deleuze refers to  this as difference in itself, pure difference and 
intensity to  distinguish it as becoming, as the very thing that allows beings to appear. So, for 
Deleuze, 'eternal return' is not a return of the same as it is in Heidegger's Being and Time
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([1927] 1962). Instead it is the fundamental structure o f returning itself that constitutes 
difference. Therefore, Deleuze in my view successfully argues that identities, entities, beings, 
'practices', are not fixed points that are required to understand differences, that is, external 
change. Rather it is the fundamental structure o f 'tim e ' as becoming, as divided between its 
fu tu re  and its past, as changing, that provides the possibility fo r things to  appear over and 
again and to  be given identity. David Wood summarises this point succinctly:
"Time, then, is not only constitutive o f identity, rather than a mere medium in which 
things unfold, but is itself constituted by its role in supporting identities and 
differences." (Wood 2001, 31)
That is to  say tha t Heidegger may well be correct in asserting that things ('practices') do not 
simply unfold in a container o f 'tim e '; but that the three modes of temporality occurring all at 
once come to constitute identity. However, it is also necessary to  go one step further and to 
recognise that it is returning itself that constitutes being in its becoming. Therefore, it is 
through the very structure o f becoming that it is possible to  recognise different beings (or 
'moments' o f practice). Significantly Derrida's notion o f the 'trace' provides a sophisticated 
account o f both the fundamental structure of the 'm oment' o f practice as well as a structure 
fo r considering how 'moments' o f presence relate to each other.
Tracing Rhythms
W hilst an in depth exposition of Jacques Derrida's work, particularly around temporality and 
'differance', is beyond the scope of this chapter and indeed beyond the rem it of this thesis, I 
show in this section that Derrida's notion of the 'trace' can provide the theoretical link 
between recognising 'practice in the moment of doing', in its fleeting presence and the 
continuity of rhythms of practice. In particular Martin Hagglund provides an accessible but yet
148
vital analysis o f Derrida's work on 'trace' w ith  which it is both possible to  th ink about practice 
as presence and bridge the gap to  a discussion of how rhythms of practice are shaped, which I 
consider in the fo llow ing chapter.
Just as in the epigraph to this chapter (from Derrida), Hagglund (2012) seeks to  resist 
understanding the identity o f beings, even human beings in forms such as Dasein, as present 
and fixed. He refers to  a speech by Diotima o f Mantineia recounted by Socrates in Plato's 
Symposium (2001) which I th ink particularly well shows up this re-presentation of the human 
entity as stasis and sameness, as the fixed point to  which things return:
"...someone is said to  be the same person from childhood till old age. Yet for all we call 
him the same, every bit o f him is different, and everyday he is becoming a new man, 
while the old man is ceasing to  exist, as you can see from his hair, his flesh, his bones, 
his blood, and all the rest o f his body. And not only his body, for the same thing 
happens to  his soul. And neither his manners, nor his disposition, nor his thoughts, nor 
his desires, nor his pleasures, nor his sufferings, nor his fears are the same throughout 
his life, fo r some of them grow, while others disappear... This is how every mortal 
creature perpetuated itself. It cannot, like the divine, always be the same in every 
respect; it can only leave behind new life to fill the vacancy that is left behind in its 
species by obsolescence." (Diotima of Mantineia in Socrates in Plato in Hagglund 2012, 
6 )
In this extract, Diotima of Mantineia depicts a way of thinking about the human being as never 
present in itself; but as always ceasing to  be as soon as it presences. In the same way Hagglund 
argues that 'moments' o f practice cease to be in their very coming to  presence. He writes:
"For one moment to  be succeeded by another, it cannot f irs t be present in itself and 
then cease to  be. A self-present, indivisible moment could never give way to another
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moment, since what is indivisible cannot be altered. The passage of time requires not 
only that every moment be superseded by another moment, but also that this 
alteration be at work from the very beginning. Every moment must negate itself and 
pass away in its very event. If the moment did not negate itself there would be not 
time, only a presence forever remaining the same." (Hagglund 2012, 3)
Thus we can consider tha t the 'm om ent' o f practice is never present in itself before it ceases to 
be. Rather, every 'm om ent' o f practice is already divided between its future and its past. In 
this way, 'a practice' is not repeated across 'space' and 'tim e ' constituting a rhythm along an x 
axis; but the very structure of doing as presence is itself already rhythmical, negating itself in 
its very happening. Thus Hagglund, via Derrida, points the way to  a d ifferent solution to  the 
question o f continuation, that is, to  the question of how any 'moment' of practice can 
resemble a previous 'm om ent' if it can only be considered in its event. The answer is to move 
away from  an analysis o f what is present, from  an analysis of 'practice'-as-a-thing and from an 
analysis o f identities asking how they change and stay the same. Instead we would do well to 
recognise 'practice in the moment o f doing' as already divided between its past and its future, 
thus already inscribed by, what Derrida calls a 'trace' and what Lefebvre would call rhythm. In 
this sense practice as presence, 'practice in the moment o f doing', is in its very structure, 
rhythmical, changing and dynamic. Hence Lefebvre's suggestion that: "The act of 
rhythmanalysis... transforms everything into presences, including the present...” ([1992] 2004, 
23)
Thus, Hagglund and Derrida both resist the logic of identity, arguing that understanding the 
co-implication o f 'space' and 'tim e ' through the notion of the 'trace' as "the becoming-space 
of tim e and the becoming-time of space..." (Hagglund 2012, 15) means that it is impossible to 
consider an indivisible present. That is to say that an analysis that fully considers 'space' and 
'tim e' together denies the possibility o f conceptualising 'a practice'-as-entity. Instead the
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division between the past and the fu ture  is inherent in every 'm om ent' o f practice, whilst 
spatiality and tem porality provide the very conditions fo r the synthesis of this division in the 
'trace'. Hagglund writes:
"The synthesis o f the trace follows from the constitution o f time we have considered. 
Given tha t the now can appear only by disappearing - that it passes away as soon as it 
comes to be -  it must be inscribed as a trace in order to be at all. This is the becoming- 
space o f time. The trace is necessarily spatial, since spatiality is characterised by the 
ability to  remain in spite o f temporal succession. Spatiality is thus the condition for 
synthesis, since it enables the tracing o f relations between past and future. Spatiality, 
however, can never be in itself; it can never be pure simultaneity. Simultaneity is 
unthinkable w ithout a temporalization that relates one spatial juncture to another. 
This becoming-time o f space is necessary not only for the trace to be related to other 
traces, but also fo r it to  be a trace in the first place. A trace can only be read after its 
inscription and is thus marked by a relation to the future that temporalizes space. This 
is crucial fo r Derrida's deconstruction o f the logic of identity. If the spatialisation of 
tim e makes the synthesis possible, the temporalization o f space makes it impossible 
fo r the synthesis to be grounded in an indivisible presence. The synthesis is always a 
trace o f the past that is left fo r  the fu ture. Thus, it can never be in itself but is 
essentially exposed to that which may erase it." (Hagglund 2008,18)
This re-framing o f the 'moment' o f practice and of our 'everyday' notions of sameness and 
difference moves us away from  an analysis o f identities, entities and beings that are present, 
in describing the relationship between social action and social change, by offering us the 
opportunity to  consider difference from  the perspective that practice is change. However, one 
might be concerned as to how one can account for any kind of continuity if practice is 
inherently dynamic and ask the question (as Schatzki does in The Timespace o f Human Activity
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(2010) as described above): if practice is change, why do so many 'practices' seem to  stay the 
same in so many ways? This is an im portant question and one that cannot be readily and 
simply dismissed as stemming from a divergence in ontological orientations. Nevertheless, a 
key starting point is to note tha t the question o f continuity and persistence (of 'a practice' or 
‘a moment o f practice') is thoroughly rooted in an ontology that recognises and deals in things 
tha t are present. In contrast, this thesis seeks to  address the 'm oment' o f practice as presence 
(i.e. not as a thing). Thus, considering 'tim e' in the way argued fo r in this chapter, is not an 
answer to  the question o f being, to  the question o f 'what a practice is' and how i t  is d ifferent 
to  other 'practices-as-things'. Instead it is an answer to the question o f passage, to  the relation 
between 'moments' o f practice as presence.
This difference in approach can be demonstrated by considering Shove, Pantzar and Watson's 
analysis o f the re-production o f 'practices' in The Dynamics o f Social Practice (2012). They 
argue tha t to  understand how certain 'practices' continue, persist and change, that we have to 
understand how such provisionally stable 'practices' relate to  each other over 'tim e'. They 
w rite:
"... to  understand what snowboarding 'is' at any one moment... we need to identify 
the means by which different versions of the practice-as-entity relate to each other 
overtim e ." (2012,102)
What snowboarding 'is' then, in contrast to  skiing, ski-blading, skateboarding or surfing, is 
defined by contested meanings, changing technologies and developing competencies. 
Contemporary snowboarding can then be mapped historically, linearly and progressively 
across 'space' and 'tim e'. The implication here is that we can recognise key developments or 
'changes' in technology, meaning, or skill that affect the identity of a particular kind of doing 
which make it recognisable as surfing, skiing or snowboarding, so that we can analyse how 
long that particular form of doing has been recognised and identified as such. However, note
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tha t this analysis o f 'practice'-as-entity maintains that change is external from practice and 
rests on a relationship o f 'agency7 that exists between human and non-human actors (see 
Chapter Two).
Further, Shove, Pantzar and Watson argue that 'practices7-as-performances condition each 
other. That is to  say they argue that not only are 'practices7-as-entities defined by the 
configurations o f the ir various elements (thus accounting fo r continuities and persistences); 
but also tha t the scheduling and synchronisation o f 'practices7-as performances both produces 
and is produced by, what they describes as, 'circuits of reproduction7.
Drawing on Dale Southerton7s (2003) examples of domestic time management, Shove et al. 
argue that some performances of 'practices7 can be 'rushed7 in order to  'make tim e7 for a more 
relaxed enactment o f other 'practices7. However, we might also recognise that this analysis 
maintains the same distinction between subjective and objective 'tim e7 that Csikszentmihalyi7s 
(1990) argument (as described above) does, by suggesting that individuals7 changing 
perceptions or experiences of 'tim e7 affect the ordering of 'practices7-as-entities over objective 
'tim e7 and vice versa. This framing of ' practices7-as-things and the examination of the relations 
between them over linear 'tim e7 lead the authors to suggest that 'circuits of reproduction7 are 
both produced and re-produced by the relationships between 'practices'.
However, this proposed analysis o f how provisionally stable 'practices7 are both produced and 
re-produced over 'tim e7 and 'space7 through 'circuits of re-production lacks an answer to the 
question of how things that are the same become different. As Hagglund writes: "A self­
present, indivisible moment could never give way to another moment, since what is indivisible 
cannot be altered.77 (2012, 3) Thus, if 'a practice7 or 'a moment of practice7 is conceptualised as 
an indivisible and unified self-present that persists over 'tim e7, as an is that is present, then it 
can never give way to another 'practice7 because it is whole, unfragmented and unified. 
Instead one 'practice7 has to end (e.g. skiing) and another has to begin (e.g. snowboarding).
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The problem from such a position is how to  account fo r how materials; skills and meanings are 
'carried over' from  one 'practice' to  the next.
In this way, just as the theoretical position o f Shove et al. lacks an explanation fo r the 
mechanism o f change because it deals in entities, beings and identities, so too does the 
theoretical orientation that I am proposing fail to o ffer a model o f continuation, precisely 
because it deals in difference, 'trace' and rhythms.
The idea o f the 'trace', that 'moments' o f practice are fundamentally divided between their 
futures and the ir pasts, provides the answer as to why 'moments' o f practice (as presence) do 
not have to  be assembled from scratch at each 'moment'. There is no 'carrying over' of 
materials, skills or meanings from one 'm om ent' to  the next because no 'm oment' has either a 
beginning or an end. Rather than requiring an explicit mechanism to account fo r how 
'knowledge-as-an-object' is transferred from one 'practice' to  another, we can recognise 
'knowledge' as both situated and ongoing (see Chapter Three). The idea o f the 'trace' is not a 
mechanism fo r understanding 'carrying over' or transference, rather it shows us that it is 
possible to  consider things, 'practices' and identities as becoming continually different. From 
this perspective our attention need not be on where one thing  ends and another begins, on 
key moments o f 'change'; but rather on the mechanisms and processes o f change itself.
Thus, from this theoretical orientation, it may well prove to  be a useful endeavour to consider 
re-production in a different sense to Shove, Pantzar and Watson. Rather than considering 
'circuits of reproduction' as an episteme object in the same way as Knorr Cetina (1997), as 
being both produced by and producing relations between 'practices' over 'tim e', we might 
consider that it is the 'trace', the rhythm of 'moments' o f practice, that is, the very condition 
o f spatio-temporality that allows the possibility for things to appear again, to  repeat. W ithout 
this spatio-temporal condition, we would only experience a continuous presence where all 
things appeared 'the same' (Hagglund 2012, 3).
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Thus, from  this perspective, shifting from  the question of the continuity and persistence of 
particular 'practices' to  an analysis o f the 'trace', to  a focus on the spatio-temporal rhythms of 
practice in 'everyday' life, suggests that it may well be illuminating to  build a more detailed 
picture o f ongoing change, o f the processes tha t shape relations between rhythms o f practice 
tha t make up the 'polyrhythm ia' o f the 'everyday'.
Conclusion
In sum this chapter has offered a critique o f various notions of 'tim e ' as distinguished between 
'tim e ' as experienced and 'tim e' as measured in order to  try  to capture an alternative method 
o f thinking about the relationship between practice and 'tim e'. I argued that it is possible to 
re-think the notion of 'tim e' as succession through Nietzsche's ([1883-85] 1961) understanding 
o f the 'eternal return' and re-focus attention on the 'm oment' o f practice. That is not as the 
present 'm om ent' that forms part o f a succession o f nows; but as the presencing 'moment' 
that always ceases to be as soon as it comes to be. Revealing 'tim e' in this way shows it to  be 
something other than a container in which 'practices' unfold and instead shows that 
understanding the structure of 'tim e' is inseparable from understanding the structure of doing, 
o f practice. 'Time', therefore, is both constitutive of and constituted by 'practice', because it 
continually returns different (i.e. it is continually becoming).
If we take this recommendation seriously, that practice is ongoing change, then the question 
arises o f how (and if it is even possible), to  organise what people do, if, conceptually, there is 
no fixed 'practice' in relation to  which one might locate an 'intervention'. The following 
chapter offers a solution through an analysis of rhythms. I argue that it is possible through a 
'syncopation' o f rhythms to affect the 'polyrhythm ia' o f practice, to interrupt, to strengthen
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and to  weaken rhythms, to  schedule routine and shape rhythms o f practice and thereby affect 
ongoing change.
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Chapter Six: Shaping Rhythms of 
Practice: Arrhythmia, Training and 
Syncopation
Mere repetition of rhythmic, calculated movements robs... movement of its 'aiiveness' and 'isness'... (Lee)
Introduction
In this final chapter of the thesis, I build on each of the arguments presented in the previous 
chapters to  develop an analysis of the potential fo r shaping rhythms o f practice, steering 
ongoing change, and scheduling routine. In a sense, whilst each chapter has made a particular 
argument in order to  position specific elements o f the account given in this thesis regarding 
the relationship between social action and social change, everything that has been said so far 
has been to prepare the discussion, to  prepare the reader, fo r an analysis of the rhythms of 
practice in 'everyday' life. This ontological framework, so described, poses significant problems 
fo r traditional models of policy 'intervention'. Most problematically, there is no stable thing 
into which one can 'intervene'. Practice, is constantly becoming, constantly becoming different. 
Change is no longer located in between tw o fixed states, in between two 'practices'; but has 
become practice itself. To do therefore, is to  enact 'in-the-world ' and make things different. 
Doing, therefore, is change. Even more abstractly and a problem that might be even more 
d ifficult to  reconcile, is that the position o f 'intervener' has also been compromised. If we 
consider 'practice in the moment of doing', it is not possible to  distinguish between political 
landscapes and on the ground actions, between global infrastructures and handy tools, 
between bodily actions and 'knowledge' institutions. Rather each of these makes up the 
'w orld ' o f practice. The notion o f practice, thus described draws the micro and the macro 
through the lens o f the 'everyday'. Of course the scale o f this lens can be adjusted to focus on 
institutional, bodily, community or other locally situated rhythms; but to adjust our focus is
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not to  exclude the rest o f that 'world '. In this sense, as the positions o f potential 'intervener' 
and object o f intervention are both entangled in the 'w orld ' o f practice, any body that seeks to 
shape rhythms o f eating practice fo r example, has to be understood as already implicated in 
the 'w orld ' o f this practice, tied up in its rhythms of repetition and difference.
Therefore, to  address these problems, in this chapter I return to  Lefebvre's notion of 
rhythmanalysis ([1992] 2004). It is an analysis that has been critiqued by some for maintaining 
an objective understanding of 'tim e ' through a distinction between cyclical and linear 'tim e'. 
This argument is predicated on a suggestion that whilst rhythms repeat in a cyclical fashion, 
social 'practices' are instants o f succession that occur over linear time. Of course, I have 
already shown throughout this text that Lefebvre is not concerned w ith 'practices'-as-things 
tha t are present; but is concerned w ith  capturing presence, that is social action or doing in its 
happening like quality, free from re-presentation and mediatisation. Thus, it is key to flag up 
from  the outset critiques which rest on an understanding of the returning of the same, of 
identities and follow ing Nietzsche and Deleuze, Lefebvre's critique o f identities as things. Thus 
cyclical and linear rhythms as described by Lefebvre are both constituted by repetition and 
difference as described in the previous chapter. Rather the distinction between cyclical and 
linear is an analytical one that allows Lefebvre to describe how mechanistic rhythms of 
production come to dominate the becoming rhythms o f human social life. He clearly writes:
"Cyclical repetition and the linear repetitive separate out under analysis, but in reality
interfere w ith  one another constantly." (Lefebvre [1992] 2004, 8)
Indeed, this is a fundamental assertion that w ill necessarily be returned to throughout this 
chapter; but fo r now it is important to  recognise that whilst critiques of Lefebvre's work exist, 
several o f these mistake the notion of rhythmanalysis and the reason fo r distinguishing 
between cyclical and linear rhythms (i.e. not 'times').
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As a means o f showing how the changing rhythms of 'everyday' life might be analysed and 
understood, I refer to  the fast growing sport and ever changing multiple rhythms of mixed 
martial arts practice. My experiences of training and competing in these rhythms of practice 
allows me to develop three conceptual tools: 'arrhythmia', 'training' and 'syncopation' 
(although there are undoubtedly further ways of conceptualising these ideas) that I suggest 
not only point the way to  a re-conceptualisation o f shaping rhythms of practice through 
scheduling routine; but also offers those interested in steering ongoing change, that is 
changing what people do, three pragmatic tools that 'overcome', or at the very least are 
capable o f taking account o f the compromised position o f 'intervener', by fully recognising the 
re-production of historically and geographically situated 'moments' o f practice. It w ill be useful 
then to  begin by saying something about the rhythms o f practice o f mixed martial arts, to 
demonstrate why these changing rhythms offer such a useful example fo r interrogating 
mechanisms and processes o f ongoing changing social action.
Mixed Martial Arts
In one out o f only a handful o f academic writings on these rhythms o f practice, Dale Spencer, 
in his book Ultimate Fighting and Embodiment (2012), describes mixed martial arts (MMA) in 
the follow ing way:
"M M A competitions feature competitors in a ring or a caged-in area, inflicting pain on 
their opponents, inter alia, by punching, kicking, elbowing and kneeing their 
opponents into submission." (Spencer 2012, 3)
In this way, many commentators focus on the 'pain' and 'violence' o f the sport. United States 
Senator John McCain at one time referred to  this sport as 'human cockfighting' and it is
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commonly referred to, in order to  simultaneously deride and promote the sport, as 'cage 
fighting' by various media institutions. However, despite its superficially unsavoury image, 
mixed martial arts now claims to be the fastest growing sport in the world. In 2010, the most 
popular o f innumerable promotions that stage mixed martial arts events was estimated to 
have a worldw ide fan base o f over 65 million people (Philpott 2010). The 'U ltimate Fighting 
Championship' (UFC) now airs its events on America's largest sporting network alongside 
American Football, Ice Hockey, Baseball and Basketball games (Klemko and Non 2011) and to 
demonstrate its rising mainstream popularity even further, top athletes fighting in the UFC are 
now sponsored by huge multi-national companies such as 'Nike' and 'Burger King' (Burke 2011, 
2012).
Whilst its 'vio lent' image pervades and continues to draw attention from a handful of 
academics and a large section o f the media, what is interesting, fo r this chapter about mixed 
martial arts, is its multiple changing rhythms of practice. In particular the rhythms of mixed 
martial arts are not only continually developing and changing; but mixed martial arts itself 
fosters an 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' that recognises this continual adaptation and 
adjustment not only in rhythms of training and fighting; but also in the identity o f the practice 
itself.
As it is practiced today MMA is built upon the central disciplines o f Thai Boxing (a standing 
fighting system that employs kicking and punching techniques), Wrestling (a set o f grappling 
techniques that mediates the position of fighting from standing to  fighting on the ground) and 
Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu (a ground fighting system comprising various locks and chokes). Whilst bodily 
techniques and movements from all (martial) arts can be employed in MMA competition, 
currently it is the integration o f techniques from these central disciplines that have formed a 
core syllabus of moves and positions, consolidating mixed martial arts a discipline in its own 
right. Competitions have become organised and sanctioned through a unified set of rules,
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upheld by various athletic commissions, so that mixed martial arts is now taught and practiced 
in gyms and dojos, as well as in universities and schools across the world, w ith children as 
young as five years old learning, training and competing in mixed martial arts.
Whilst these rhythms o f practice (to some extent) have been legitimated, are growing at an 
exponential rate and are now taught as a consolidated and regulated discipline, mixed martial 
arts is rarely defined and rarely understands itself as 'a practice'. Just as in the example of 
stock car racing given in Chapter Four, each 'm oment' o f practice of mixed martial arts can be 
considered as a particular co-ordination o f bodies and things that come together to form the 
event o f that practice. This can be particularly well exemplified w ith reference to the various 
forms that fighting practice has taken. Indeed the label 'mixed martial arts' was only coined 
tw o  years after the first UFC event held in 1993; but various forms of 'the practice' had been in 
existence fo r a long time before that. Nash suggests that, if we consider Mixed Martial Arts to 
be something like: competition between two unarmed combatants, studying disparate styles, 
where victory can be obtained through effective striking or grappling, that there are endless 
examples o f what might well be labelled as 'Mixed Martial Arts' practice that can be seen 
throughout 'history'. (Nash 2012)
For example, as far back as 600 BC, Pankration was practiced as a requisite in Ancient Greek 
m ilitary service and was obligatory fo r obtaining citizenship in the Greek Polis. This particular 
sport was a combination of grappling and striking and a popular event at the Olympic Games 
(Grant 2011). During the medieval period there are examples in both Europe and the Far East 
o f the emergence of warrior classes, such as Knights and Samurais, who trained in Karate and 
Jiu-Jitsu in Japan and in Europe what was called 'wresting-at-the-sword', to  practice disarming 
opponents and defending themselves when they were unarmed. Competitions in these styles 
were often held fo r the pleasure and enjoyment o f noble classes (Grant 2011). Other examples 
include, during the 18th century, the proliferation of 'rough-and-tumble' fighting in the
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American Frontiers and the emergence o f Prize Fighting in Europe, which after being 'cleaned 
up' by the Marquis de Queensbury Rules would become our modern day Boxing (Nash 2012). 
The 20th century saw the emergence o f challenges between various styles, particularly in Japan 
and Brazil before the firs t 'U ltim ate Fighting Championship' was held in the United States in 
1993.
Nevertheless, MMA as it is done today is unrecognisable from the first UFC competition in 
1993. It is unrecognisable in terms of the kinds o f techniques and strategies that are utilised in 
the ring, the levels of athleticism that are displayed, the marketing and advertising o f fights 
and fighters, the salaries and healthcare that fighters receive, the extreme training and dieting 
regimes that fighters endure, the increased 'knowledge' o f the fan base regarding particular 
techniques, the way that injuries are managed, careers, losses and victories and the enforcing 
o f the strict rules and regulations o f the governing bodies. All o f this and more has changed 
and continues to  change significantly, making it very difficult to  fix mixed martial arts as 'a 
practice'. Indeed this is what makes mixed martial arts a perfect case w ith which to analyse 
and describe the mechanisms and processes of shaping unfolding and continually changing 
rhythms o f practice.
In this chapter 1 draw on my own 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', my own experiences of 
the rhythms of mixed martial arts in order to inform this chapter's discussion of the shaping of 
rhythms o f practice. I have always dabbled in various martial arts; but in 2009 at the beginning 
o f w riting this thesis, I took up mixed martial arts more seriously, became progressively more 
and more engaged and committed to various training and eating routines and ended up 
competing in 2012. These experiences are supplemented w ith a huge amount of ethnographic 
work in the gym during the countless training sessions, several in-depth interviews with 
training partners and fellow practitioners as well as w ith a developed understanding, a la 
Wacquant (2004), o f the 'world ' of this practice. It is w ith reference to examples from these
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rhythms o f practice that I move in this chapter to  suggest a conceptualisation of shaping 
rhythms o f practice through the ideas o f 'arrhythm ia', 'training' and 'syncopation'. First, 
however, it w ill be necessary to  examine in fu rther detail, Lefebvre's ([1992] 2004) account of 
rhythms o f practice.
Rhythms of Practice
In the introduction to Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life ([1992] 2004) Lefebvre 
clearly sets out his intention:
"... to  found a science, a new field o f knowledge [savoir]: the analysis of rhythms; with 
practical consequences." (3)
This 'new field o f knowledge' is part o f Lefebvre's e ffo rt to  make the present, presence. This 
can be achieved both as a project o f 'overcoming' the banality and mundanity of 'everyday' 
life; but also as a socio-theoretical endeavour that seeks to resist the re-presentation and 
mediatisation o f things and recognise the 'moment 'o f practice as presencing, as fleeting and 
becoming. Indeed in this way, Lefebvre is indebted to  Nietzsche's understanding of 'eternal 
return' and to  his theory of the 'moment'. For Lefebvre though, a focus on the 'moment' is not 
intended to describe an epistemology, nor an ontology; but instead draws attention to  the 
study o f the 'everyday'. That is to  say that thinking about the 'moment' demonstrates that the 
individual cannot be separated from society in any way, a notion which directly challenges any 
strict divisions between sociology and philosophy:
"A sociologically grounded notion, it nonetheless claims philosophical status; it is 
important in thinking the everyday nature of the everyday, that is the temporal 
dimension and the importance of repetition; and although explicitly temporal is
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transformed in the analysis o f the event, a more situated concept. For Lefebvre, 
however, the moment is not the same as the situation, but it creates them ." (Elden 
2004,173)
Stuart Elden draws attention to the critical point tha t Lefebvre thinks about 'tim e' and 'space' 
together.28 It is only through the analysis of the 'm om ent' tha t things and bodies can be co­
ordinated in doing. Thus Lefebvre develops an analysis, from Nietzsche (and others), that 
exactly challenges abstract and reductive understandings of 'tim e' and 'space'. This analysis is 
based on the study o f repetition and difference (Deleuze [1969] 1994). As described in the 
previous chapter, this is a distinctive way o f thinking about 'tim e'. Nietzsche frames this as 
'eternal return' o f the same, whilst something other occurs. Lefebvre claims that this initially 
seems to us as a paradox: the generation o f difference through repetition. However, as 
Deleuze ([1969] 1994) describes, this requires a re-framing o f difference, not as the negation 
o f identity, but as pure difference or becoming and of repetition as the fundamental structure 
of 'practice in the moment o f doing' that constitutes difference. Lefebvre describes this in the 
follow ing way:
"No rhythm w ithout repetition in time and space, w ithout reprises, w ithout returns, in 
short w ithou t measure [mesure]. But there is no identical absolute repetition, 
indefinitely. Whence the relation between repetition and difference. When it concerns 
the everyday, rites, ceremonies, fetes, rules and laws, there is always something new 
and unforeseen that introduces itself into the repetitive: difference." (6)
Rhythm then, consists o f repetition, the repetition o f 'moments'. However, there is no 
absolute repetition, this is only a fiction of mathematical thought. For Lefebvre even if X = X, 
the second X is always already different, because it is second. He writes:
28 Despite views to the con tra ry  (see Schatzki 2010, 13).
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"N ot only does repetition exclude difference, it also gives birth to  them; it produces 
them ." (7)
Clearly then, Lefebvre's understanding o f rhythm is a far cry from understanding scientific, 
linear or objective 'tim e'. Instead, 'tim e ' (as described in the previous chapter) is constituted 
by the production o f difference through repetition. Rhythm is not, as is most often understood 
in social scientific literature, a mapping o f 'practice'-as-a-t/j/ng over linear time, over an x axis, 
in a drawing out o f 'history'. Indeed Lefebvre's understanding of rhythm precisely challenges 
our traditional understandings of 'history' and in fact signals a departure from thinking in 
terms o f linearity and 'history'.
However, as described in the introduction to this chapter, critics have drawn attention to  the 
fact tha t Lefebvre makes an important distinction between the cyclical and the linear to 
suggest tha t he thought of 'tim e ' objectively and thus considers 'tim e' and 'space' as separate 
phenomena. For example, in The Timespace o f Human Activity  (2010) Schatzki writes:
"Lefebvre distinguished between tw o types of rhythms: cyclical and linear... According 
to Lefebvre, linear rhythm, the repetition of the same, originates in human activity or 
social practice. It opposes becoming because it is constituted by return." (Schatzki 
2010,13)
Clearly, this is not the case. As described above the repetition of the same exactly produces 
difference and therefore, fo r Lefebvre is becoming. This contention rather rests on Schatzki's 
analysis o f 'practice' as requiring a fixed identity that returns. As I showed in Chapter Five, in 
the section on 'Eternal Return', fo r Nietzsche, Deleuze and subsequently Lefebvre, it is not a 
fixed identity, or the same that returns; but returning itself which is the fundamental 
constitution o f becoming. Thus, in making this analytic distinction, Lefebvre is not 
distinguishing between different understandings of 'tim e'; but different structures of rhythm.
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Both linear and cyclical rhythms are constituted by the production o f difference through 
repetition; but they do this in d ifferent ways. Whilst cyclical rhythms are o f biological and 
cosmic origins, linear rhythms are born o f the technical and the social. Yet these tw o rhythms 
are not distinct; they constantly interfere w ith  one another:
"... the cyclical and the linear, exert a reciprocal action: they measure themselves
against one another; each one makes itself and is made a measuring-measure;
everything is cyclical repetition through linear repetitions." (8)
The relationship between social, technical rhythms and 'natural' rhythms is a constant theme 
throughout Lefebvre's work. Indeed this is precisely why his concept of rhythm is situated at 
the level o f the 'everyday', in order to  explore the extent to which capitalist linear rhythms of 
production and exchange condition our bodily and 'natural' rhythms o f becoming.
Therefore, having made absolutely clear that rhythm is not a linear and objective extension of 
'practice' as entity over linear 'tim e ' and to have signalled that there are different kinds of 
rhythms, it w ill be useful to briefly outline Lefebvre's notions of 'polyrhythm ia', 'eurhythm ia' 
and 'arrhythm ia', before illustrating these concepts, in the follow ing section, through the 
changing rhythms of mixed martial arts practice, in order to  build a thorough picture of the 
mechanisms and processes involved in shaping rhythms of practice.
Fundamentally, a rhythm is never understood in the singular; but always w ith its contextual, 
supporting and connecting rhythms. Lefebvre describes this w ith reference to examining a 
garden. He claims that most often we recognise a garden as having a singular rhythm, moving 
through the seasons, through day and night fo r example. The trees, the lawns and the groves 
are taken in a spatial simultaneity, that is, as having a permanent coexistence. However, 
Lefebvre argues that we should recognise each being as having its own rhythm, which is itself 
made up of several d ifferent rhythms (of its flowers, seeds, fruits etc.):
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"Continue and you w ill see this garden and the objects (which are in no way things) 
polyrhytm ically, or if you prefer symphonically. In place of a collection of fixed things, 
you w ill fo llow  each being, each body, as having its own time above the whole. Each 
one therefore having its place, its rhythm, w ith its recent past, a foreseeable and a 
distant fu ture ." (31)
To understand rhythms is to  understand them 'polyrhytm ically7, to  understand that each 
analysed being has its own 'tim e7 (divided between its past and its future), its own rhythm; but 
is also a part o f longer rhythms and made up of smaller rhythms depending on the scale at 
which our analytical lens is set. This scale is determined through the body of the 
rhythmanalyst, from lived experience. It does not require an understanding o f subjects, 
objects and the ir relations:
"The observer in the w indow knows that he takes his time as first reference, but that 
the first impression displaces itself and includes the most diverse rhythms, on the 
condition that they remain to scale. The passage from subject to  object requires 
neither a leap over an abyss, nor the crossing of a desert. Rhythms always need a 
reference; the initial moment persists through other perceived givens." (36)
This reference point therefore is always the body (as described in Chapter One and Chapter 
Three). The body has its own rhythms (biological, psychological etc.); but is also the site of 
connection to  all other rhythms. It unites all other rhythms in 'everyday7, routine practice. This 
is what Lefebvre calls 'eurhythm ia7:
"Polyrhythmia? It suffices to consult one's body; thus the everyday reveals itself to be 
a polyrhythmia from the first listening. Eurhythmia? Rhythms unite w ith one another 
in a state of health, in normal (which is to  say normed!) everydayness..." (16)
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Eurhythmia then, is the co-ordination and concordance o f rhythms in the ir 'normal' state, in 
the 'everyday', as experienced as ready-to-hand, that is to  say, routine practice. However, 
rhythms can also breakdown:
"[W ]hen they are discordant, there is suffering, a pathological state (of which arrhythmia 
is generally, at the same time, symptom, cause and effect). The discordance of rhythms 
brings previously eurhythmic organisations towards fatal disorder." (16)
'Arrhythm ia' is the de-synchronisation of rhythms, it is the extra-'everyday', the nonroutine, 
precisely in the sense o f present-to-hand as described in Chapter Two. However, it should be 
well noted tha t 'arrhythm ia' does not refer to  a stepping out o f rhythms, to an end of 
'polyrhythm ia'. Rhythms are always 'polyrhythm ic'. Instead it is a re-alignment, a re­
synchronisation o f rhythms of practice. It is only a breakdown of the previous 'eurhythmia'. 
Another 'eurhythm ia', a different 'eurhythm ia', immediately aligns. Indeed, this suggestion 
tha t the 'polyrhythm ia' o f 'everyday' life is ongoing, points to significantly interesting 
opportunities fo r conceptualising shaping the rhythms o f practice by scheduling 'moments' o f 
practice as routine and nonroutine through shaping relations between 'moments' of practice 
as 'arrhythm iatic' and 'eurhythm ic'. However, first it w ill be useful to better illustrate these 
ideas through a reading o f the 'polyrhythm ia' o f mixed martial arts practice.
The Changing Rhythms of Mixed Martial Arts
The changing rhythms of practice of mixed martial arts presents a particularly useful case for 
both thinking about and illustrating Lefebvre's analysis o f the rhythms o f 'everyday' life at 
several d ifferent scales. From the bodily rhythms of 'drilling' techniques over and over so that 
they become 'ingrained ' and 'natural', to the rhythms of sparring and fighting, the rhythms of 
training several d ifferent martial disciplines, strength and conditioning, eating, stretching and
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recovering, to  the rhythms of the gym, including d ifferent timetabled classes, the rhythms of 
the training session and the intensity of preparing athletes fo r competition, to  the rhythms of 
the changing popularity o f certain techniques and styles, all the way to  the changing rhythms 
o f rule sets, governing bodies and martial arts' ethos and image. Indeed the way in which 
various configurations o f these rhythms o f practice have occurred particularly well exemplifies 
Lefebvre's concept o f rhythm as the production of difference through repetition. As described 
above, the 'history' o f the rhythms o f mixed martial arts practice is not one that can well be 
described as a traceable lineage tha t has progressed over 'tim e'. Each described practice is a 
form  o f 'm ixed' martial art tha t only existed in that 'm oment' as a situated practice, w ith its 
own particular histories and geographies. However, each situated practice is not "fixed and 
imm utable" (Pred 1990, 11); but in its doing, in its repetition, is continually producing 
difference. Whilst it is commonly presented otherwise, that is, as a progression o f all combat 
styles towards an evolution of the 'u ltim ate ' martial art (see Jordan 2008), MMA as it is 
practiced today can be argued to be entirely situated, enabled and constrained by its own sets 
of (changing) rules and its own (changing) histories and geographies. Many of the 'moments' 
o f situated practice described above develop separately and disparately, w ithout coming into 
contact w ith  each other, and continue their own repetition and production of differences, just 
as MMA does today. Until recently, fo r example, Wrestling dominated contemporary MMA 
training and competition. The ability to control whether the fight took place on the ground or 
on the feet was seen to  be the most important and effective element o f fighting. However, as 
these rhythms o f practice are repeated, differences emerge. There seems to be a shift in the 
rhythms of practice of mixed martial arts towards good footwork and avoiding wrestling range 
to enable effective striking. To this end there has been a resurgence o f techniques employed 
from traditional martial art styles, in particular the Karate fron t kick, fo r example, rarely, if 
ever used before 2011 in MMA competition, has become a staple technique after two top 
athletes had great success in finishing their fights w ith this particular move.
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The rhythms of mixed martial arts practice then are not adequately re-presented as a 
progression over linear 'tim e'. Instead each 'm oment' o f practice is a 'm oment' o f situated 
doing, enabled and constrained by its histories and geographies. Nevertheless difference does 
not exist between tw o separate and identifiable 'moments'. Rather, each 'm oment', as divided 
between its past and its future, is fleeting, ungraspable, making itself different in its very doing, 
in its repetition. The concept o f rhythm is not intended to  capture change over linear or 
objective time; but to capture the form  of the production of difference through repetition, i.e. 
the rhythm.
Of course as described above, the rhythms of practice o f MMA do not exist in isolation. The 
move from  wrestling to  striking as a more dominant element is tied into and synchronised 
w ith  all other kinds o f rhythms o f 'drilling', sparring, fan 'knowledge', particular 'embodied- 
knowledge-in-practice', promotions and advertising and so on. All rhythms are 'polyrhythm ic' 
according to  Lefebvre. To fu rther explore this idea I offer a reading o f my own engagement in 
these rhythms o f practice.
When I firs t began practicing MMA, I trained once per week on a Thursday night and 
continued my normal gym routine quite separately, lifting weights about three times per week.
I ate fairly typically but was trying to  eat 'healthier' foods during my three meals. Four years 
later, in the middle of an eight week training camp to prepare fo r my first competition I was 
consistently eating six meals a day (each o f which was made up o f a specific portion and ratio 
o f protein, carbohydrates and fats), I trained twice every day and my weights routine had 
become completely adapted and strictly timetabled in synchronisation with my MMA training 
sessions, now incorporating hill sprinting, and swimming amongst other things, to enable my 
technique and fitness to peak, as well as fo r my body weight to  hit an exact 70kg, on the day of 
competition.
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My bodily rhythms had been completely transformed. I became hungry at d ifferent 'times', 
tired at d ifferent 'times', energetic at d ifferent 'times'. What I was doing was different as well. 
As my rhythms o f practice of mixed martial arts changed, as I began training more often and 
developed better technique, my eating rhythms changed, my sleeping rhythms changed, my 
working rhythms changed, my 'free-tim e' rhythms changed. These rhythms supported each 
other and held each other together. It would be impossible, fo r example to prepare fo r a MMA 
competition and only train once a week, just as it would be unlikely that someone would train 
more than once a day and only eat three meals. Instead the rhythms o f MMA practice 
supported particular 'normal' and 'everyday' rhythms of training, eating and sleeping. This is 
exactly what Lefebvre refers to  as eurhythmia:
"Eurhythmia (that o f a living body, normal and healthy) presupposes the association
o f d ifferent rhythms." (67)
Nevertheless, whilst rhythms of practice, draw in and are drawn, are synchronised and 
synchronise w ith  other rhythms, they also exclude certain other rhythms o f practice. For 
example, when training fo r competition and indeed training more generally, athletes and 
fighters tend not to  consume alcohol. Lefebvre describes this as 'arrhythmia'.
"In arrhythmia, rhythms break apart, alter and bypass synchronisation ..." (16)
In this case drinking alcohol, which may have been a previously synchronised part of 'everyday' 
life fo r a practitioner, is bypassed, de-synchronised and broken apart from the 'normal' 
'eurhythm ia' o f routine practice. Considering the 'polyrhythmic' structure of rhythms of 
practice then, provides a significantly d ifferent conceptualisation of the relationship between 
social action and social change. I continue now to further develop this framework, as 
illustrated through the example o f rhythms of practice of MMA, in order to suggest three 
related conceptual tools: 'arrhythmia', 'training' and 'syncopation' that describe the
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mechanisms and processes that occur in the scheduling of routine and that might well be 
considered in potentially shaping rhythms of practice in 'everyday' life.
Arrhythmia
The firs t point o f departure fo r conceptualising shaping rhythms of practice is to  consider the 
role o f 'arrhythm ia'. 'Arrhythm ia', it must be noted is at the same time a break in 'eurhythmia', 
in the synchronisation and concordance o f rhythms as 'everyday' and routine; but it is also 
frequent, repeated and remains in the 'everyday'. In a sense, disruption and pain (breaks in 
rhythm) repeat to  constitute the 'eurhythm ia' o f 'everyday' life:
"Pain returns. It repeats itself, since the repetition of pleasure gives rise to  pain(s)." 
(12)
'A rrhythm ia' returns, as it is only through the repetition o f breaks in rhythm that difference is 
constituted. This notion can be clearly illustrated through the experience o f Alan, a fellow 
train ing partner in MMA and interview respondent who had been becoming more and more 
involved w ith  mixed martial arts training until he injured his knee whilst practicing a wrestling 
'take-down'.
"A fter I had hurt my knee and the doctor said I had to  rest it fo r at least eight weeks I 
was sure 1 was going to  come straight back to  training. He gave me some exercises to 
do to help rehab it and I thought I was going to do them every day until I got back to 
training... But w ith one thing and another I d idn't really do my exercises. It's harder to 
be motivated when you're just on your own. Then other stuff just seems to take over, 
I'm working more now and I like staying in w ith my girlfriend... I feel like I don't really 
have time to go training now..." (Alan)
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Due to  the rigours o f the sport and the high intensities of training, injuries can be fairly 
common in MMA and up to  a particular level, they tend to have similar impacts on rhythms of 
practice. In Alan's case, his injury, this 'arrhythm ia', led to  the breaking apart o f the rhythms of 
M MA practice from  his other rhythms. Instead working rhythms and rhythms of spending time 
at home have come to  form another 'everyday' 'eurhythm ia' tha t itself is now difficult to 
break. Let me stress again that Alan's injury, whilst a 'm om ent' o f 'arrhythm ia', never stopped 
being 'everyday'. Rather, 'arrhythm ia' simply works to  re-configure the 'eurhythm ia' of the 
'everyday'.
As such, not all 'moments' o f 'arrhythm ia' lead to  the desistance o f rhythms o f practice. Some 
breaks in rhythms o f practice are not enough to  radically alter 'eurhythm ia'. Shane, a 
professional mixed martial artist w ith  over five years experience described how he deals w ith 
injuries:
"Injuries are just a part o f the job. You just have to  learn how to  manage them and 
learn how to  work around them. If I have hurt my leg, I come in and work my boxing or 
if my arms are hurt, I come and train my kicks. If I've knocked my head I don't spar but 
I work on my technique and my cardio. A lot o f injury management and prevention is 
about listening to  your body to  know what to  work and when." (Shane)
Shane's job is to  be a mixed martial artist, to  train every day and regularly compete. He 
recognises that injuries, we might say 'arrhythm ia', have to be accommodated and that they 
are a part o f the rhythms of mixed martial arts practice. Indeed, through his experience of 
these rhythms o f practice Shane has developed sufficient 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' to 
negotiate the 'w orld ' of practice in exactly the same way that I described William is able to 
negotiate the 'w orld ' of resistance training. Thus by accounting for 'arrhythmia' (nonroutine) 
in this way, Shane's 'eurhythm ia' (routine) becomes re-established. Lefebvre describes this as 
one way of thinking about 'intervention', that is to strengthen eurhythmia:
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"Intervention through rhythm... has a goal, an objective: to  strengthen or re-establish 
eurhythmia. It seems tha t certain oriental practices come close to  these procedures, more 
so than medical treatments." (68)
Lefebvre then offers a critique o f reactive 'intervention' (say o f treating patients after they 
become ill) because it recognises change, or 'in tervention', as situated between two fixed 
states (well and unwell). He is instead calling fo r a re-consideration o f continually changing 
rhythms tha t can be supported to strengthen or maintain 'eurhythm ia'. When thinking about 
the relationship between social action and social change therefore, as opposed to thinking 
about changing what people do, one alternative method fo r conceptualising 'intervention' 
m ight be to  recognise that what people are doing is continually changing and that this 
continual changing can be strengthened and supported by accommodating breaks, by 
recognising that they actually constitute doing itself. However, breaks in rhythms present 
other potential strategies fo r shaping rhythms of practice that are also signposted by Lefebvre. 
One fu rthe r method is the imprinting o f rhythms through 'training'.
Training
Lefebvre describes that every tim e there is 'arrhythmia', a break in rhythms of practice, there 
is the opportunity to imprint a rhythm, that is, to  shape rhythms o f practice. He clearly states:
"Objectively, fo r there to  be change, a social group, a class or a caste must intervene 
by imprinting a rhythm on an era, be it through force or in an insinuating manner. In 
the course of a crisis, in a critical situation, a group must designate itself as innovator 
or producer o f meaning. And its acts must inscribe themselves on reality. The 
intervention imposes itself neither m ilitarily, nor politically nor even ideologically.
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Occasionally, a long time after the action, one sees the emergence of novelty. 
Perspicacity, attention and above all an opening are required." (14-15)
For Lefebvre then, it is possible fo r a social group to 'intervene' in rhythms of practice, at the 
point o f 'arrhythm ia' and to  imprint a rhythm. However, it cannot be over stated that the 
results o f attempts at imprinting rhythms are unpredictable. Only occasionally w ill 'novelty' 
emerge. This is due to  the 'polyrhythm ic' nature of rhythms that always seeks to maintain 
'eurhythm ia' and the fundamental structure of the 'moment' as situated practice.
Nevertheless, Lefebvre notes that 'everyday' life is structured by rhythms which are 
themselves ordered and structured by other rhythms (cyclical and linear). In particular 
throughout his work Lefebvre is concerned with "the way in which social rhythms and the time 
o f work and production is imposed over the physical rhythms of human life." (Elden 2004,197) 
This idea is discussed in chapter four of Lefebvre's Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday 
Life (Lefebvre [1992] 2004J, under the notion of 'dressage', or here, 'training':
"Humans break themselves in [se dressent] like animals. They learn to hold 
themselves. Dressage can go a long way as far as breathing, movements, sex. It bases 
itself on repetition. One breaks-in another human living being by making them repeat 
a certain act, a certain gesture or movement." (39)
Indeed mixed martial arts 'training' is organised precisely around this principle. So many of the 
classes at the gym that I attended were organised around 'drilling', practising a technique over 
and over and over again until it became reaction, 'ingrained' and 'natural.' Even the free 
sparring, always done at the end of a session was conducted in a drill like form. Three lots of 
four m inute rounds, first o f kickboxing, then wrestling, then ground fighting. Michael summed 
up this repetitive 'drilling':
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"I don 't really learn anything new anymore. In fact, I could probably tell you what drills, 
in what order we're going to  do tonight... But it's not boring, it's just getting your body 
to  react so you can do your technique w ithout even thinking about it." (Michael)
This sense o f the routinisation o f action through 'training' or 'drilling' does not just apply to 
bodily movements but to  weekly timetables as well.
"No, I never ask myself whether I want to  go training. It's just what I do. If it's a 
training night, I come home from work get something to  eat and head o ff to the [gym]." 
(Kerri)
Clearly then, through the ir repetition, rhythms o f practice become characterised as routine. 
Indeed fo r Lefebvre it is 'training', dressage (exactly in the Foucauldian sense of disciplining 
'docile bodies' (Foucault 1975)), that comes to organise the 'eurhythm ia' o f the 'everyday', to 
determ ine the majority o f rhythms and to  schedule routine practice:
"This rhythmic model, in use throughout the world, establishes itself over the course 
o f dressage, and subsequently perpetuates itself. Is it not convenient for armies, 
religious and educational establishments, fo r offices and monasteries alike?" (Lefebvre 
[1992] 2004, 41)
Thus, it is 'tra ining' through repetition that schedules routine practice. Rather than simply 
telling someone that they have to change their rhythms o f practice, 'training' requires 
repetition of doing that practice, whilst at the same time accommodating breaks in rhythm in 
order to  strengthen its 'eurhythm ia'. Flowever, I am going to suggest in the following section, 
that it is also possible to  'intervene' in a third way, by emphasising 'arrhythmia' and the 
nonroutine in order to  'syncopate' and re-configure the rhythms of 'everyday' practice.
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Syncopation
The final conceptual tool I want to  present to  both further develop the potential fo r thinking in 
terms o f rhythms o f practice and fo r shaping rhythms o f practice is my own analysis of 
'syncopation'. In musical terms, 'syncopation' refers to  a disturbance o f the regular flow  of 
rhythms as emphasis is placed on the off-beat o f the rhythm to  create an unexpected rhythmic 
pattern. I suggest that having understood 'arrhythmia' and 'training' as described above, that 
the 'syncopation' o f rhythms offers an intriguing notion for considering the shaping and 
moulding o f rhythms of practice at a variety of scales. Of course as Lefebvre argues this above 
all requires an opportunity, a 'moment', a break in practice in which to  'intervene'. It also 
requires an understanding of the rhythms of that practice to  be altered as rhythms that are 
'tra ined', tha t is, repeated to  the extent that they are experienced by the practitioner as 
routine and as 'everyday' practice. It is then potentially possible to recognise the extra- 
'everyday', the nonroutine and that which has not been 'trained' or disciplined in the same 
way and to  emphasise, to  highlight or to accent this 'moment' o f practice, this 'arrhythmia', in 
order to  overcome the 'everyday' and the disciplined. Repetition of this 'moment' of 
'arrhythm iatic', o f nonroutine practice through 'training' would then allow this rhythm to 'fall 
in', fo r itself to  become recognised as the 'everyday' and as routine. For Lefebvre, this is the 
importance of and the goal o f rhythmanalysis. To move away from re-presentation, the 
continual study of the mediated present and to recognise things in their becoming, in their 
presence. He argues:
"The rhythmanalyst could, in the long term, attempt something analogous: works 
[oeuvres] might return to and intervene in the everyday. W ithout claiming to change life, 
but by fully reinstating the sensible in consciousness and in thought, he would accomplish 
a tiny part o f the revolutionary transformation of this world and this society in decline. 
W ithout any declared political position. (26)
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However, it is important to  recognise tha t any attempted 'syncopation' is still built on the 
understanding o f rhythms as constituted by difference through repetition and that o f course 
the production o f difference as 'polyrhythm ic' and existing across multiple scales is not 
predictable nor is it open to  design. Merely it is possible to  recognise 'arrhythm ia' and attem pt 
'tra in ing ' tha t m ight im print a rhythm. Lefebvre warns us:
"But it should not be necessary to  see in these innovations... only progress, creations. 
This positive aspect is not w ithout the so-called negative side: impoverishment, 
weakening, through the loss o f spontaneity, etc." (64)
As conceptual tools, 'syncopation', 'tra ining' and 'arrhythm ia' are ways o f getting a handle on 
continual change, on becoming. They do not offer an analysis o f how to change one state of 
affairs into another; but rather suggest how continual change, that is, rhythms o f practice 
m ight be steered. Nevertheless, rhythmanalysis recognises tha t events happen and practice 
changes. As Rob Shields describes o f Lefebvre's conceptual tool kit:
"In the end, he leaves us w ith  something like the scissors-and-rock game played in school­
yards and seems to almost shrug, saying, 'events overturn theory' (1968)." (Shields 1999, 
74)
Conclusion
In sum, this chapter has sought to  th ink through the implications o f an analysis o f rhythms. If 
practice is both situated as event and continually becoming in the 'm oment' o f practice, the 
study of rhythms provides a particularly intriguing field in which to  examine the various ways 
in which repetition comes to constitute difference. After an elaboration of Lefebvre's schema, 
as outlined in his proposed 'new science' of rhythmanalysis, that recognises all rhythms as
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essentially 'polyrhythm ic', comprised o f 'eurythmic', 'everyday', routine practice as well as 
'm oments' o f 'arrhytm iatic' and nonroutine practice, I proposed a conceptualisation of 
shaping rhythms o f practice by scheduling routine through thinking w ith the ideas of 
'arrhythm ia', 'training' and 'syncopation'. Indeed these ideas can be taken as building together 
to  suggest tha t it is possible to  recognise 'moments' of breakdown and imprint rhythms 
through repetition and 'training', so that emphasis is placed on nonroutine practice and the 
syncopation o f extra-'everyday' rhythms. However, it was noted that 'syncopation' across 
'polyrhythm ia' and multiple scales is neither causal nor predictable. Rather any 'syncopation' 
o f rhythms o f practice can only hope to  prepare the ground from which further rhythms of 
practice m ight spring.
This account o f change and of managing change then has significant implications both for 
academic considerations of transitions in practice, in understanding how what people do 
changes and fo r those seeking to  affect what people do, to shape rhythms of practice. In the 
fo llow ing conclusion o f this thesis I address the implications of this research in both these 
regards and suggest how this ontological framework of practice might be mobilised in further 
empirical studies o f the rhythms of 'everyday' life as well as some of the conceptual problems 
tha t it would be im portant fo r fu rther research to  consider.
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Conclusion: Towards a Sociology of 
Becoming and Strengthening 
Eurhythmia
Summary
This thesis began by proposing a particular methodology fo r studying doing, that is, through 
analysing the spatio-temporal rhythms o f practice in 'everyday' life. I argued that the premise 
o f this thesis, to  recognise 'practice as event', in its presencing and 'in the moment o f doing', 
w ithou t re-presenting practice through the subjects and objects o f action, required a 
theoretically informed methodological approach that could marry this account to a practice 
informed empirical study o f doing. I therefore contrasted my suggested methodological 
approach first to an account that understood talking about 'practice' as distinct from practical 
activity (see Giddens 1984; Hitchings 2012) and second to an account that required the 
management and negotiation of jumping from the inside to  the outside of observed bodies 
(see Bourdieu 1999). Thus, instead of trying to  reduce as much as possible my own impact as a 
researcher in order to  get to  the 'tru th ' o f 'the practice' under study by swinging between 
'self'-reflection and tota l immersion, I argued that in this research I would take an 
interpretative position, recognising the historically and geographically situated-ness of my 
position as both researcher and participant w ithin the rhythms of practice described in these 
pages. Following Lefebvre ([1992] 2004) I argued that this position could best be understood 
as the position of the rhythmanalyst. In the same way that Wacquant (2004) turned his 
attention to  the study of his own rhythms of boxing that he found himself engaged in, I too 
employed an analysis of my own (more and less strong) rhythms of practice to re-think the 
relationship between social action and social change. However, I also argued that
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rhythmanalysis, as it is re-presented in this thesis, goes one step further than Wacquant's 
analysis, by recognising my own rhythms o f practice o f academia, studying and thinking as 
inseparable from  my rhythms of mixed martial arts, yoga and computer gaming practice. 
Indeed Wacquant's deliberation over whether to  leave an academic career to  pursue a career 
as a professional boxer demonstrates his methodological separation o f these rhythms of 
practice. Instead I argued that the rhythms of practice as detailed in this thesis (including the 
rhythms o f thinking and writing the thesis) must be understood as a 'polyrhythm ia' sited at the 
body o f the rhythmanalyst.
Having defined the position and the methodological approach of this thesis I moved in Chapter 
Two to propose an understanding of the 'w orld ' o f practice, of 'being-in-the-world', 
constituted by and amid the material equipment of that 'world ', as opposed to an 
understanding of 'practice' as constituted by the relations between various human and 
nonhuman objects. Through analyses and examples of resistance training, I argued that one 
way to consider the 'world ' o f practice was to  take a step back from re-presentations of 
subjects and objects o f social action and to re-focus attention on doing, on practical activity, 
tha t is on practice as the central unit o f enquiry. I suggested that Heidegger's ([1927] 1962) 
notions o f Dasein and 'being-in-the-world' could provide exactly the conceptual ground on 
which to build a social ontology free from re-presentation.29 It was through analyses of 'being- 
in-the-world ' and the examples of resistance training that I proposed that experiencing the 
equipment o f practice as ready-to-hand and present-to-hand, was to  experience the 'w orld ' of 
practice as routine and nonroutine respectively. It was w ith this framing of routine and 
nonroutine that I went on in the rest of the thesis to  investigate the scheduling of routine and 
the shaping of rhythms of practice in 'everyday' life.
29 Of course later it was necessary, as Heidegger himself notes in his later work, to leave behind Dasein, 
or the being of the human entity, in order to recognise the becoming-ness of social being. See Chapter
Five, section on: 'Tracing Rhythms'.
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In light o f these claims I argued that it was necessary to  position the role o f the body and of 
'knowledge' in relation to  this configuration o f the 'w orld ' o f practice. Therefore, in Chapter 
Three I referred to  my experiences o f the rhythms of practice o f ashtanga yoga, in order to 
explore what I have called 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice'. I described that many social 
'theories o f practice' despite claiming to  acknowledge and rescind such dualisms between the 
'm ind ' and the body, between 'conscious' and 'unconscious' actions and between 'practical' 
and 'discursive' 'consciousnesses' nevertheless maintain a distinction between body-subjects 
and body-objects that necessarily externalises 'knowledge' from practice and situates change 
as existing between tw o fixed entities. I therefore began this chapter, follow ing the work of 
Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1962), by making clear the argument that Heidegger's 'being-in-the- 
w orld ' is fu lly embodied, that the body is the there-ness o f all possible action whether 
characterised as routine or nonroutine. In this sense, I fundamentally opposed systems of 
thought that considered routine as 'habitual' action and nonroutine as 'conscious' action. 
Building on this argument I suggested that it was important to  re-frame questions that asked 
how 'practices' were learned, that asked how 'knowledge' about 'a practice' jumped from one 
person to another. Following Lave and Wenger (1991) I argued that 'knowledge' is not 
separate from practice; but instead is the very condition of practice. That 'knowledge', in this 
account, is never an external object that can be passed between practitioners; but is always 
established in doing, as 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice'. Finally, I prepared the ground for 
the following chapter on 'practice as event', by situating this concept of 'embodied- 
knowledge-in-practice', following Deleuze and Guattari's ([1980] 1988) argument, as the site 
at which the body constantly connects w ith other bodies, tools and machines constituting 
assemblages of the 'world ' of practice, 'in the moment of doing'.
Building on these ideas, in Chapter Four I described a re-orienting of 'theories of practice' 
towards recognising a theoretical approach underwritten by the notion of 'practice as event', 
that is, as the synchronisation and co-ordination of bodies and things that make up the 'world '
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of 'practice in the moment of doing'. This idea was shaped and illustrated through my analysis 
o f the rhythms o f stock car racing and in particular was explained w ith reference to the 
synchronisation and co-ordination of all the various, racing vehicles, spectators, officials, 
drivers, teams, mechanics, stalls, vendors and so on race day. To distinguish my understanding 
o f 'practice as event' from other 'theories of practice,' I compared my notion, as building on 
Allan Pred's (1990) analysis o f the temporally and spatially situated-ness and becoming-ness of 
social practice, w ith  'theories of practice' that fo llow  a distinction between practice as 
performance and practice as entity. I argued that it becomes increasingly problematic to 
consolidate and label what people do as 'a practice' and that re-presenting 'practice' as a 
provisionally stable entity externalises change, 'knowledge' and people from  practice. Having 
made this argument, I went on to show, through a close comparison of my understanding of 
'practice as event' w ith Schatzki's discussion in The Timespace o f Human Activity  (2010), that a 
distinction between practice as entity and practice as performance has significant 
ramifications fo r thinking about the relationship between practice and 'tim e ' and thus practice 
and change and therefore has important consequences fo r thinking about shaping rhythms of 
practice. By separating human activity and 'timespaces' Schatzki maintains an understanding 
of 'practices'-as-things that exist, arise and end at certain points in 'tim e' and 'space' (despite 
his attempts to  circumvent this problem). Instead this thesis suggests that social action, or 
practice is always situated in the "becoming space of tim e and the becoming tim e of space..." 
(Hagglund 2008, 2). In this way, rather than being separate, 'timespace' and 'human activity' 
as Schatzki describes them, produce and re-produce each other.
In Chapter Five, I elaborated on the temporal aspect o f 'practice as event' in order to  argue 
tha t rather than considering social change as external to  social action, recognising 'practice in
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the moment o f doing7 requires understanding change as a fundamental part o f practice.30 In 
order to  substantiate this claim I provided a discussion o f the rhythms o f practice o f computer 
gaming and described tha t computer gamers often detail experiences o f gaming as distorting 
the ir subjective experiences o f 'tim e ' and that games designers purposefully try  to  theorise 
and implement this experience when building games w ith explicit reference to 
Csikszentmihalyi's (1990) theory o f 'flow '. I argued that the theoretical distinction that 
underpins Csikszentmihalyi's theory o f 'flow ', between subjective and objective 'tim e' can be 
traced back to  Bergson's ([1889] 2008) distinction between 'spatialised' and 'real' 'tim e' and 
suggested that this distinction influences much contemporary social theory on 'tim e' and 
nearly all 'theories o f practice' that try  to  grapple w ith this issue. I argued that it is possible to 
move beyond these re-presentations of 'tim e' by considering Nietzsche's ([1883-85] 1961) 
transvaluation of 'tim e' through the notion of 'eternal return'. By following Nietzsche's 
argument I claimed that we can both re-focus 'tim e' away from a re-presentation as the 
present towards the 'm om ent' o f practice as presence and come to recognise that being is 
becoming, doing is difference and that practice is change. Thus, I argued that 'tim e' is not the 
mere medium of practice; rather it constitutes and is constituted by practice. Finally, in this 
chapter I gave a reading o f Deleuze's argument in Difference and Repetition ([1969] 1994) to 
support my assertion, that when considering 'practice as event', change, or difference, can no 
longer be understood as the negation of identities or entities and has to be understood as 
difference in itself, pure difference or becoming. Indeed as I described, with reference to 
Hagglund's (2008, 2012) work on Derrida's deconstruction o f 'tim e', this difference is at work 
from  the very beginning and it is this structure o f practice, as synthesised through the 'trace', 
which makes it rhythmical from the very outset. Thus I turned in the final chapter to Lefebvre
301 elaborate on the tem poral aspect not to separate 'tim e' and 'space', of course here the unity of 
'tim e' and 'space' is implied. However, opposing this account to temporal accounts given by other
systems o f  th o ug h t  provides a useful lens th rough which to  th ink  about this idea.
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([1992] 2004) to  provide an analysis o f the rhythms of 'everyday' life and suggest how rhythms 
o f practice might be shaped.
Chapter Six builds on all o f the arguments made in the previous four chapters concerning 'the 
world o f practice', 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', 'practice as event' and 'practice in the 
moment o f doing' in order to  put forward three theoretical concepts for shaping rhythms of 
practice: 'arrhythm ia', 'training' and 'syncopation'. In it I drew on my experiences of the 
rhythms o f practice o f mixed martial arts, to  explore Lefebvre's ([1992] 2004) conceptual 
scheme and 'new science' o f rhythmanalysis and the relationship between routine, 
'eurhythm ic' rhythms o f practice and nonroutine, 'arrhythmiatic' rhythms of practice, in order 
to  re-think 'everyday' 'interventions' on the subject-to-be-changed as the shaping o f rhythms 
o f practice and the scheduling of routine. Building on Lefebvre's work I argue that it is 
possible to  schedule routine by recognising 'moments' o f 'arrhythmia' and seeking to  imprint 
rhythms through repetition and 'training' to  place emphasis on or to highlight nonroutine 
rhythms o f practice that might lead to the 'syncopation' o f extra-'everyday' or nonroutine 
rhythms o f practice. In this way I argued that it is possible to come back to and to 'intervene' 
in the rhythms of 'everyday' life; but warned that any attempted 'syncopation' in the 
'polyrhythm ia' o f the 'everyday' cannot result in predictable outcomes and that anyone 
seeking to  shape rhythms of practice must recognise their own rhythms as thoroughly 
entwined, synchronised and co-ordinated w ithin the 'polyrhythmia' o f the 'everyday' in the 
same way that I described the historically and geographically situated position o f the 
rhythmanalyst in Chapter One. This is not necessarily a limitation; rather it provides the 
opportunity fo r the rhythmanalyst, fo r one who has considered the implications of thinking 
about rhythms of practice, to  restore the authentic to the everyday, to move past re­
presentation and to bring presence to the present.
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Towards A Sociology of Becoming: Socio-Theoretical Implications
Such an ontology o f practice, thus defined, has significant implications not only fo r 'theories of 
practice'; but could also be im portant fo r w ider social scientific programmes tha t are 
interested in studying social action and social change. In particular there are six key 
implications tha t can be drawn from  this research. First it re-presents a fundamentally 
a lternative approach to  many contemporary systems o f thought, second it lays the 
foundations fo r an understanding o f situated research through the body o f the rhythmanalyst, 
th ird , it draws attention to  the level o f the 'everyday', fourth it points to  an 'overcoming' of 
'h istory', fifth  it re-frames change as a fundamental property of ongoing rhythms o f practice 
and finally it points to  the responsibilities of the sociologist, o f the philosopher-poet, o f the 
rhythmanalyst, to  a ttem pt in the long term  to  return presence to  the present and restore the 
cyclical becoming-ness o f social being to  human life currently elim inated by the linear, 
repetitive and mechanistic rhythms of modern, technical and industrial production. I expand 
on each o f these implications below.
Thus, this thesis suggests a distinctive approach to the study o f social action, that is, o f what 
people do. It neither contends that the central unit o f enquiry should be the individual, 
motivated and structured to perform (or not) a variety of 'practices'; nor does it centre its 
analysis around 'practices' tha t capture or recruit more and less passive practitioners. Instead, 
this theoretical approach to studying the social necessarily rejects the distinction between 
subjects and objects of action and turns its attention to  practice proper, to  social action 'in the 
moment o f doing', as it presences, that is, not as it is re-presented and commodified as an 
entity. W hilst 'theories of practice' have claimed to have founded a field of study that 
underwrites subjectivity and objectivity (see Schatzki, Cetina, and von Savigny 2001), I have 
argued in this thesis that because these studies require an entity such as 'a practice' or a 
practitioner towards which they might focus the ir studies and 'interventions', that this project
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has had lim ited success. I argue that the model re-presented in this thesis much more 
successfully and thoroughly underwrites a re-presentation of social action, first and foremost 
through a recognition o f the situated position o f the researcher.
Not only does my research provide an alternative analytic approach to the study o f social 
action; it also re-presents a necessary approach to matters of methodology. Like other 
contemporary social theorists, I advocate an interpretative position, that does not seek to 
uncover an object 'tru th ' to  social action, or to  get as close to  it as possible; but seeks to 
recognise the historically and geographically situated-ness of the researcher as only able to 
interpret social action through her own experiences, her own rhythms of practice. Indeed this 
thesis provides an example o f rhythmanalysis by taking up o f the role o f the rhythmanalyst to 
demonstrate that conceptual analysis is not separate from empirical study, that theory is not 
separate from method and the researcher is not separate from her object o f study. Rather the 
rhythms of reading and writing in the academic 'world ' o f practice, I have argued, both shape 
and are shaped by participation in all other rhythms of practice in 'everyday' life. At the very 
least this suggestion has significant implications for how social scientific researchers consider 
and engage w ith  their 'object o f study' and could more widely point to  a re-configuring of a 
social scientific methodology that is capable of taking account of an interrelating o f both the 
rhythms o f the researcher and the rhythms of social action w ithin the 'polyrhythm ia' of 
'everyday' life.
Im portantly a th ird implication for sociologists and 'practice theorists', that can be taken from 
this research is that studying social action should be situated at the level of the 'everyday'. 
Again, 'practice theorists' often champion approaches that study routine, ordinary and 
habitual day-to-day living; however this research suggests refining this approach not just to 
the study of the repetitive nature of day-to-day living or 'everydayness' (quotidiennete); but to 
the study of the introduction of the 'everyday' (quotidian) into social life as the
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commodification and domination o f the becoming-ness of social being. Thus, focusing analysis 
at the level o f the 'everyday' draws both macro analyses of social structures and the 
experiences of people through a theoretical re-appropriation of the 'm oment' o f doing in its 
presence. This notion and its exemplification in this research is a useful tool to  contribute to 
social scientific investigations of practice and change.
Even further, the research re-presented in this text points to a re-framing o f 'history' as the 
histories and geographies that can be 'traced' from events or 'moments' o f practice. This is a 
significant implication that can be addressed both to 'theories o f practice' and systems of 
social thought more widely, that 'history' does not only have to  be understood as a linear 
stretching out o f things and events-as-they-happened. In fact, according to  Lefebvre, social 
science should see its job as seeking to 'overcome' 'history' as the past sequence of things and 
events. Instead, by 'overcoming' 'h istory' through a transvaluation o f 'tim e' we can come to 
understand becoming as ongoing and not as existing between two stable entities, identities or 
things. Indeed this is a significant contribution to  social theory, to argue again (that is to 
repeat the arguments made by Nietzsche, Deleuze, Lefebvre and others, so that they might 
become stronger rhythms w ithin the 'polyrhythm ia' of social science research), that becoming 
is not external to  being, that change is not the negation of social action as entity or identity; 
but that being is becoming, doing is difference and change is a fundamental property of 
practice. Thus, in contrast to  Schatzki's (2010) argument, practice is ipso facto  change.
All o f this implies one final suggestion for the social theorist. That is, that if one follows the 
path developed in this research, then the social theorist has a responsibility to  fully re-instate 
herself into the 'everyday', to come back to  it and to change it, no matter how small these 
changes at first might seem, to  restore moving to re-presentation, to restore living to  the 
commodified and to restore presence to the present. Simply by taking on this kind of 
theoretical-methodological approach the sociologist, the philosopher-poet, already brings
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herself to  the everyday and already achieves a small part o f the imprinting o f cyclical rhythms 
onto the linear.
Strengthening Eurhythmia: Policy Orientated Implications
Considering tha t the implications o f this study fo r the social theorist require both a level of 
theoretical-conceptual understanding and a recognition o f the strength o f linear 'polyrhythms' 
tha t m ight slow any recourse to  cyclical and becoming rhythms, one might ask: 'are there 
implications or suggestions that can be made in the shorter term, that might aid policy makers, 
NGO's or other institutions interested in making an impact on what people do, to  influence the 
shaping o f rhythms and the scheduling o f practice as routine or otherwise?' Whilst this thesis 
recognises the prevailing dominance of linear rhythms, of mechanical and technical repetition 
and makes the argument that in the longer term, social science should seek to restore the 
lived to  the 'everyday', it also suggests a framework for analysing and managing linear rhythms, 
fo r scheduling routine and nonroutine practice and fo r both strengthening and weakening 
'eurhythm ic' practice, through the tools of 'arrhythmia', 'training' and 'syncopation'.
That is to  say that whilst rhythms of practice are difficult to predict, fix and constrain precisely 
because they are always 'polyrhythm ic' and changing in 'the moment of practice', that it is 
possible to  significantly weaken 'eurhythmic' rhythms o f practice through deliberately 
introducing forms o f 'arrhythmia'. Take for example bans on fox hunting or smoking in public 
places. Those rhythms o f fox hunting or smoking do not desist or end; rather they are 
weakened and provide opportunities for other rhythms to be strengthened through repetition. 
Indeed this is exactly what Lefebvre argues in Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life 
([1992] 2004), that in order to  imprint a 'new' rhythm or to make a rhythm stronger, it is first 
necessary to  have an 'arrhythmia', a 'moment' of nonroutine practice. 'Arrhythmia' could be
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induced in several ways, fo r example introducing present-to-hand equipment to  a 'world ' of 
practice, or weakening 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' or through the prohibition of those 
rhythms and so forth.
Significantly though, this only schedules the 'm oment' as nonroutine, it still requires repetition 
fo r difference to  continue. Thus anyone seeking to shape rhythms o f practice would do well to 
take on board Foucault's discussion regarding the disciplining effect o f le dressage, o f the 
tim etabling and routine-isation (that is the making routine o f 'moments' o f practice) of 
prisoners through repetition in Discipline and Punish (1975). Indeed, Lefebvre makes it clear 
tha t in order to  strengthen 'eurhythm ia', it is necessary to  schedule practice as routine, 
through repetition and by building up 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' so that the material 
equipment that constitutes the 'w orld ' o f practice (including human bodies) comes to be 
experienced as ready-to-hand. We can think about this method of shaping rhythms of practice, 
o f weakening and strengthening 'eurhythm ia', o f scheduling routine, as 'syncopation'. In 
musical terms this refers to placing emphasis on or highlighting the offbeat so that it comes to 
change the dominant rhythms o f the whole. So too, it is possible to understand and to suggest 
to  those interested in shaping what people do, that it is possible to  schedule the nonroutine as 
routine, by placing emphasis on the nonroutine, that is by providing the material conditions 
and sufficient 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' fo r it to  be experienced as ready-to-hand and 
thus to  be repeated as routine.
In particular these suggestions contrast not only w ith much contemporary social scientific 
w riting that considers change as external to social action; but also to dominant political 
rhetoric that calls on individuals to  choose to adopt certain attitudes or behaviours. However, 
this is not to suggest that talking to people is a waste o f time and resources. Clearly this kind 
o f engagement has its place; but this thesis suggests that this is firm ly w ithin a theoretical 
framework that recognises talking as part of practice, as part o f social action.
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However, whilst 'arrhythm ia', 'tra ining' and 'syncopation' m ight seem like wholly applicable 
concepts tha t contemporary policy might make use o f to shape all manner of rhythms of 
practice, from  rhythms o f practice o f exercising to  rhythms o f practice o f recycling, these ideas 
come w ith a necessary theoretical-methodological re-framing that affects the position of the 
social theorist and policy maker alike. That is that the social theorist wishing to study rhythms 
o f practice o f exercising or the policy maker wishing to  shape rhythms of practice of recycling 
already bring the ir own 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice', their own understandings and 
experiences, to  the 'polyrhythm ia' o f the 'everyday', producing and re-producing the already 
changing 'worlds' o f practice that they seek to study and influence. Thus, policy has to 
recognise, in making use of these ideas that suggest that practice is produced and re-produced 
by the to ta lity  o f bodies and things tha t constitute its 'world ', tha t it is not separate from the 
rhythms o f practice that it wishes to shape and that any shaping that can be done is already a 
part o f the 'polyrhythm ia' o f the 'everyday'.
Finally, as far as policy orientated implications fo r this thesis go, considering social action and 
social change in this way requires understanding not only 'intervention' as inseparable from 
the 'polyrhythm ia' o f the 'everyday'; it also requires understanding 'intervention' in a different 
way that might make a significant implication fo r how any 'intervener' or policy maker might 
consider themselves or their own role in the longer term . Lefebvre makes this clear when he 
says:
"Intervention through rhythm (which already takes place, though only empirically, fo r 
example, in sporting and military training) has a goal, an objective: to  strengthen or re­
establish eurhythmia. It seems that certain oriental practices come close to these 
procedures, more so than medical treatments." (68)
Thus, the implication for policy might be to approach the shaping o f what people do by 
strengthening the 'eurhythmia' o f already continually changing rhythms of practice in a
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preventative sense, rather tha t attempting to  respond to  'arrhythm ia' or changes as external 
to  practice or social action in a curative sense.
Limitations and Future Research
In coming to  the end o f this thesis, it is useful to  reflect on some o f the limitations of this 
research, how these problems might be addressed and to take stock o f what future research 
in this area might look like. Significantly there are tw o important lim itations to this work, the 
firs t concerns the depth and detail o f the empirical study and the second concerns the 
potential rem it fo r translation o f these ideas into other social-theoretical schemes and fo r use 
by political or other institutions looking to  govern change.
First then, by drawing on the rhythms of practice from five empirical sites of study, I was 
unable to  provide in any way an equally detailed account of any o f the rhythms of practice in 
which I was engaged in the same way that Wacquant was able to paint a tota lly immersive 
picture o f the rhythms of boxing in Body and Soul (2004), fo r example. Further to this, o f the 
five empirical sites, two were rhythms of which I at first had very limited experience: stock car 
racing and computer gaming. Even by the end o f this research my 'embodied-knowledge-in- 
practice' at both these sites was still insufficient fo r either o f these rhythms of practice to 
become scheduled as routine fo r me. It could be argued that, if the thesis takes an approach 
tha t the rhythmanalyst has to  rely on her own experience to listen to rhythms of practice, to 
use all her 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' to understand what is going on, then there could 
be a problem here. In this particular piece of research, however, it seems to  me that what was 
gained by drawing on a multiplicity of sites, being able to learn and test ideas at different sites 
and being able to  compare and contrast concepts across sites, was necessary to prepare the 
ground fo r more detailed studies using this conceptual framework. Further, the fact that I had
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more experience at some rhythms o f practice than others was hardly a lim itation; as it seems 
to  me it helped to  draw out questions about nonroutine practice and the conceptualisation of 
'tim e '. Nevertheless, now that this study has drawn out a consistent and thorough social 
ontology o f 'practice as event' that is, 'in the moment of doing', it would be particularly 
interesting to  conduct a much more detailed and in-depth investigation into one of these 
empirical sites to  work w ith the concepts of 'arrhythmia', 'training' and 'syncopation' to  see 
how well they capture the shaping and changing o f the spatio-temporal rhythms of 'everyday' 
life.
The second significant lim itation or critique that might be levied at this thesis' argument is that 
the sites o f enquiry explored in this thesis are all taken from what might be termed the 'leisure' 
or 'autonomous' sphere and that they are activities which are more readily considered as 
'freely chosen' by practitioners. As such, the extent to  which a theoretical argument 
developed w ith these empirical cases can speak to political interventions, to  the contestation 
o f rhythms or to  the critical potential fo r shaping what might be considered more 
'heteronomous' or more deeply embedded rhythms of practice, such as 'work', that are more 
typically the target o f intervention in areas such as sustainability or public health fo r example , 
m ight well be contested.
In defence against such a critique I would argue that in this thesis I have hoped to have shown 
not only that a rhythmanalysis requires moving away from understanding 'practices' as 
present; but also away from a distinction between 'practices' understood as requiring 
'voluntary' commitment or as commitments that are imposed upon people. Such analyses do 
not usefully capture in any way different from those systems that rely on distinctions between 
individual actors and social structures, or between subjects and objects of action, the 
processes o f shaping rhythms of practice. Clearly, rhythms of practice become 'eurhythmic' 
and 'arrhythm ic' independently from their characterisation as 'leisurely' or 'workly'. Take for
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instance Larry's rhythms o f 'working' which were arranged around his online gaming 
commitments (see Chapter Five) or Shane's job as a professional mixed martial artist (see 
Chapter Six). Many so-called 'leisurely' rhythms o f practice become repeated even more 
routinely or embedded just as deeply as rhythms o f 'working'.
Thus, I would argue that, from  this perspective, it is no longer a m atter o f measuring 
'voluntarism ' or 'autonomy' in commitment; but rather a question of how rhythms of practice 
themselves change. That is, that the critical, emancipatory, or political importance of the 
argument o f this thesis clearly does not lie in the potential agency o f the practitioner. Rather it 
lies in both understanding and developing forward an analysis of how linear, repetitive and 
mechanical rhythms or production are imposed over the cyclical rhythms o f human life and in 
developing strategies to  contest this. One such strategy, as described in this thesis, is the act of 
rhythmanalysis itself. That is, to  promote fo r individuals, political institutions and the study of 
social science, a move away from the study o f the mediated present and towards recognising 
presences. Thus the rhythm of contesting rhythms is to restore the cyclical becoming-ness of 
social being to  human life that is currently eliminated by the repetitive and mechanistic 
rhythms of technical and industrial production.
Nevertheless, whilst I have drawn out three conceptual 'weapons' that might aid in this 
struggle, clearly there is much more work to  be done, more to  be considered and said 
regarding how these ideas might be further translated into a policy 'world ' and many more 
conceptual 'weapons' that might be developed from this theoretical framework to  help 
fu rther conceptualise the rhythms of contesting or shaping rhythms o f practice.
An Analysis of the Rhythms of Practice in Everyday Life
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To conclude, this thesis has sought to explain how practice becomes scheduled as routine or 
nonroutine through an analysis o f the spatio-temporal rhythms o f practice in 'everyday' life. I 
have argued that to  understand how practice comes to  be scheduled as routine requires 
understanding the concepts o f 'practice as event' and 'practice in the moment of doing' to 
recognise both the spatially and temporally situated-ness; but also the becoming-ness of social 
action, which I have come to  define as practice. This notion o f practice thus argues that 
neither 'knowledge' nor 'change', as they are understood in the 'everyday' sense, are separate 
from  practice. Rather 'embodied-knowledge-in-practice' is a fundamental and ongoing 
property o f social practice that is ipso facto  change. Therefore, w ithin this framework of 
practice, social change neither relies on individuals' motivations, desires or beliefs nor on the 
life and death o f 'practices' as entities. Instead social change is ongoing through the repetition 
o f 'moments' o f practice that come to constitute difference. These rhythms, repetitions of 
'moments' o f practice that produce difference, I have argued, form the fabric o f social life and 
can be shaped, by strengthening and weakening 'eurhythm ia'. In this way practice can be 
scheduled as routine or nonroutine through the concepts of 'arrhythmia', 'training' and 
'syncopation'.
In making this argument I have worked w ithin the limits of language and re-presentation to 
develop an analysis indebted to Henri Lefebvre, that might prompt further social investigation 
into the rhythms of 'everyday' life and thus challenge re-presentations of social action as 
distinct from  social change, of 'knowledge' as distinct from practice and o f human beings as 
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